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ABSTRACT 
One of the most important aspects of foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
that it embodies advanced technologies and business practices which can 
spill over to domestic firms via various channels, e.g. labour mobility, 
input-output linkages, export of multinational affiliates, demonstration and 
competition. 
This research combines computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling 
and econometric techniques to quantify FDI productivity spillovers. The 
research is conducted in the context of the Chinese economy. 
A static lOl-sector CGE model is constructed to measure the 
endogenous productivity spillovers of FDI. Spillover effects are analyzed 
under three different market structure assumptions, namely perfect 
competition, monopolistic competition with homogeneous firms, and 
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. 
The research results show that the presence of FDI productivity spillovers 
can generally improve the productivity and output level of domestic 
enterprises in China. Spillovers make foreign firms' total output decrease. 
But collectively, spillovers exert positive impact on national aggregate 
variables, i.e. GDP, total output and welfare. The market structure 
assumptions of monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity provide 
more perspectives (e.g. product variety and scale) for this research than the 
assumption of perfect competition does. 
A removal of preferential corporate income tax treatment on foreign 
enterprises can increase the output level of domestic enterprises and 
promote national welfare. From a dynamic perspective, it could also promote 
the productivity splllovers from foreign firms. 
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~ ~ THE WISDOM OF "PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS" 
"When I walk along with two others, they may serve me as my 
teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad 
qualities and avoid them." 
The Analects, Confucius (551 - 479 BC) 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to China increased dramatically 
from US$0.9 billion in 1983 to US$78.3 billion in 2007. China has been the 
largest FDJ host countries among developing countries in the world for 15 
years. The potential benefit which Chinese indigenous enterprises can obtain 
from connections with foreign-invested enterprises is enormous. This PhD 
research aims to find the magnitude of such benefit with a computable general 
equilibrium model. 
This Chapter introduces what are FDI and their productivity spillovers, 
the current status of FDI to China, factors governing FDI productivity 
spillovers from FDI in China, research questions and thesis structure. 
1.2. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE 
CHANNELS OF PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVER 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the movement of capital across borders 
in a manner that grants the investors a control over the acquired assets. FDI is 
different from portfolio investment in that the latter does not offer such a 
control. There are two forms of FDI- greerifield investment which initiates 
direct investment to new assets and merger and acquisition in which a foreign 
firm acquires part (or all) of the assets of an existing host firm. The firms that 
-/-
conduct FDI activities arc called multinationals enterprises (MNEs) or 
trans-national corporations (TNCs). FDI plays an increasingly significant role 
in the global economy. 
One of the most important aspects of FDl is that it embodies advanced 
technologies and business practices which can be transferred to the host 
economics. [)omestic firms can improve their productivity through their 
connections with MN Es. This externality is named FDI "productivity 
spillovcrs" or equivalently. "technology dilTusions" in the recent economic 
literature (Rlomstrom and Kokko. 1998; G{)rg and Greenaway, 2004; Gorg and 
Strobl, 2001; Keller, 2(04). Productivity spillovers do not include 
contract-based transfer or illegal acquisition of intellectual property rights, 
know-how, or any kind of technology. Productivity spillovcrs arc a relatively 
intangible and intractable phonomcnon and can take place through four 
channels, namely. labour mobility, vertical linkages, export of MNE atliliates, 
and horizontal e1Tects. 
Labour mobility: the employees trained by MNE's atliliates will benefit 
from the production knowledge and management expertise they have acquired 
after they flow to the domestic firms or establish their own enterprises (Fosfuri, 
Motta and Ronde, 200 I; G6rg and Strobl, 2005; Markusen and Trofimenko, 
2009); 
Vertical linkages: MNE's affiliates help upstream and downstream 
domestic firms to set lip production facilities, provide them with technical 
assistance and training in management and organization. Besides, the presence 
of MNEs may also trigger competition among their upstream and downstream 
firms (Girma and Gong, 2008a; Girma, Gi)rg and Pisu, 2008; Javorcik, 2004; 
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Markusen and Venables, 1999): 
l ~ x p o r t s s 0/ M N 1 ~ ' ' affiliates: 
. . . 
M N l ~ s s transfer and relocate their 
manufacturing centres to export-oriented economics which are relatively 
labour-abundant. e.g China and Vietnam, and export assembled product to 
third markets. This can help domestic firms gain access to international 
markets and promote their productivity (Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997: 
Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Greenaway and Kneller, 2008; Greenaway, 
Sousa and Wakelin, 2004); 
Demonslration and competition: MNEs usually possess an advantage in 
technology (Dunning, 1977, 1981; Markusen, 2002b) and exert a strong 
demonstration effect on the domestic firms in host countries. In observing the 
market activities of MNE affiliates and competing with MNE affiliates, local 
firms can imitate MNE technology and make corresponding innovations 
(Findlay, 1978; Koizumi and Kopecky, 1977; Wang and Blomstrom, 1992). 
Productivity spillovers are beneficial not only to domestic firms in the 
host countries, but may also benefit the multinational afliliates by fostering a 
more productive economic environment in the host market. 
1.3. IMPORTANCE OF FDI TO CHINA 
In the latc 1970s Chinese ended its closure to the outside world and 
started implementing a "reform and opening-up" strategy. With its enormous 
labour supply and low labour cost (Ceglowski and Golub, 2007), stable 
political and economic environment. and pro-rOI policies. China has become 
an attractive FDl destination. As a result FDI inflows' to China increased 
I About one quarter of its FDI inflow is speculative "hot money" and "round-tripping" capital. 
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dramaticall y from US$0.9 billion in 1983 to US$78.3 billion in 2007, as shown 
in Figure 1.1 . 
Since 1993, China has been the largest FDI rec ipient among the 
developing countries, and in 2003 it was the largest FDI recipient in the world . 
In 2007, China was still the world's fOUl1h largest destination for FOI , second 
only to the United States, United Kingdom and France. As the majority of FOI 
flows into developed countries (see I· igure 1.2), it is amazing that China, as a 
relatively backward country, holds such a strong attraction for foreign capital. 
Figure I.J: FDI Inflow to China, 1984-2007 
US $billiol7 
80 
70 ,- I-
60 -
50 I- -
40 -
30 r-
20 
10 I-I- - -
--- --• • • • -o 
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Note: In current prices unless otherwise stated. The same rule applies to all data used 
throughout the thesis. 
Source: Investment in China, Ministry of Commerce of China (http ://www.fdi.gov.cnJ). 
"Round tripping" FDI refers to cross-border investment motivated by the more favourable 
treatment of foreign as opposed to domestic capital. Domestic investors can transfer their 
capital out of. and then invest back into, the domestic market in the new form of "FDI". 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003 , pp. 45) 
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Figure 1.2: Fnllnflows, Global and by Group of Economies, 1970-2006 
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Source: UNCfAD FDI Database (hllp:/Istals. ul1ctad.orgIFDII). 
2000 2005 
More than 95% of the FDI to China takes one of the following three entry 
modes (scc Table 1.1): 
(I) Solely foreign owned enLerprises that are exclusively invested and 
owned by foreign companies, enterprises, and other economic organizations or 
indi viduals; 
(2) Joint ventures that are jointly invested by foreign compallles, 
enterprises, and other economic organizations or individuals and Chinese 
companies, enterprises, and other economic organizations. The latest Law on 
Chinese-Foreign Joinl Ventures (200 I) states in Article 4 that "the proportion 
of the investment contributed by the foreign partner(s) should not be less than 
25% of the registered capital of a joint venture"; 
(3) Co-operaLive enterprises that are established based on cooperative 
terms and conditions agreed upon by foreign companies, enterprises, and other 
economic organizations or individuals and their Chinese counterparts. 
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Table 1.1: Proportions of FDI Entry Modes, Cumulated to the End of 2006 
Signed contracts Utilized FDI 
Number Percent Amount ($bn) Percent 
Solely fore ign owned 265,228 44.6 328.5 46.7 
Joint venlures 270,640 45.5 25 1.4 35.7 
Co-operative enterprises 58,057 9.8 93.5 13.3 
Other types 460 0.1 30.6 4.4 
TOtlll 594,445 100 704.0 100 
Source: same as f igure 1.1. 
As fo r the sources of FOr, East Asia and Southeast Asia has contributed 
almost 70% of the FDI accumulated to the end of 2006, as shown in Table 1.2 . 
However, the outward FDI stock from East Asia and Southeast Asia only 
accounts for 12(Yo of the world tota l outward FDI stock by the end of 2006, 
while the outward FDI from the Europe and North America accounts for 80% 
of world total outward FOl stock. 
Table 1.2: Top 10 Sources ofFDI to China, Cumulated to the End of2006 
Signed contracts Utilized FDI 
Number Percent Amount ($bn) Percent 
/-long Kong 269,555 45 .3 279.8 39.7 
Japan 37,71 4 6.34 58.0 8.2 
Virgin Islands 16,6 16 2.8 57.2 8.1 
United States 52,2 11 8.8 54.0 7.7 
Taiwan 71 ,847 12. 1 43.9 6.2 
South Korea 43 ,130 7.3 35.0 5.0 
Singapore 15,556 2.6 30.0 4.3 
United Kingdom 5,359 0.9 13 .9 2.0 
Germany 5,338 0.9 13.4 1.9 
Cayman Islands 1,843 0.3 10.8 1.5 
Others 75,495 12.7 \08.4 15.4 
Total 594,445 100 704.0 100 
Source: same as Figure 1.1. 
Note: I "China" in the whole thesis refers to the People's Republic of China i.e. China 
Mainland unless stated otherwise. In China Mainland, direct investment from Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan enjoys the same favourable treatment as FDI fro m other sources. 
There are many fac tors leading to the unusually large-scale Asian FDI to 
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China. First is the "Chinese connections" which includes, inter alia, ethnic 
Chinese networks, similar languages and culture, and geographic proximity 
(Zhang 2005). Second is the perfect match between the relocations of 
export-oriented manufac turing sectors fro m Asian newly industrial economies 
(due to thei r ri sing labour cost) and China's national strategy of export • 
orientation . By transferring manufacturing centres to China, the 
resource-seek ing FDr helps multinationals maintain their cost advantage in the 
international market (Deng, Guo and Zheng, 2007). 
Figure 1.3: Industry Distribution of Contract FDllnllow in China, 
Accumulated from 1978 to 2006 
Source: same as Figure 1. 1 
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In terms of industry distribution, 67% of accumulated FDI flows to the 
manufacturing sectors in China (sce Figure 1.3). This ratio is much higher than 
the proportion of manufacturing in China's total GDP, which has been 
maintaining within a relatively narrow band between 37(Yo and 44% since 1978. 
By transferring manufacturing and assembly centres to China, FOl is viewed to 
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have brought significant technology spill over to these sectors (Buckley, Clegg 
and Wang, 2002, 2004, 2007; Girma and Gong, 2008a; Liu, 2008). 
1.4. FACTORS GOVERNING PRODUCTIVITY 
SPILLOVERS OF FDI IN CHINA 
The potential of the foreign capital inflow attracted by preferential FDI 
policies, low labour cost, and improved infrastructure to bring positive 
productivity spillovers to Chinese indigenous enterprises has been strengthened 
by the following factors: 
() ) Freer lahour market. During the process of markctisation. the Chinese 
government abandoned the life-long employment system. lowered the barriers 
between rural and urban areas, and gradually constructed a freer labour market 
(Knight and Yueh, 2004). A variety of "new" ownerships emerged, e.g. 
foreign-invested firms and private firms, which ended the dominance of 
state-owned enterprises. Employees are free to leave FIEs and set up their own 
private firms using the management techniques they have acquired during their 
work experience. 
(2) SfronKer linka[;es with PIEs. Domestic enterprises have developed 
quickly in the past three decades and their product quality has also improved. 
FIEs in China are more willing to source locally from those qualified domestic 
firms, creating the opportunity for backward productivity spillovers via 
input-output linkages (I,ong, 2005; Farrell, Gao and Orr, 2004) .. 
(3) Learning to export by ohservation. The extraordinary export 
performance of FIEs provided examples for domestic firms to learn to enter 
overseas markets. They have also familiarised the world with Chinese exports. 
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Both can effectively lower the entry cost of domestic firms to exporting. 
(Kneller and Pisu, 2007) 
(4) increased hut moderate competition. The competition caused by the 
increased foreign presence has stimulated domestic firms to improve their 
productivity and performance. At the same time. the competition in most 
induslries is not so fierce as to force a mass exit of domestic firms. The 
Chinese domestic market is growing suHicently fast that domestic firms have 
the opportunity to find their own niche (I,ong, 2005). 
However FDI productivity spillovers are neither free nor automatic. In 
fact. there have heen dehates over whether spillovers really occur, and if so, 
their magnitude. The following factors influence the size of the spillovers: 
( 1) /,()W absorptive capacity. For domestic enterprises with low ahsorptive 
capacity due to a lack of R&D activity or absence of employee skills, the 
foreign presence could lead to no spillovers at all (Buekley, Clegg and Wang, 
2002; Girma and Gong, 2008a, 2008b). Less qualified domestic firms can be 
forced to exit even before starting to absorb spillover benefits. 
(2) Limited scope ( ~ r r spillovers. Evidence shows that firms 10 Chinese 
cities take advantage of FDI spillovers not only from local FDI inflows. but 
also from FDI inflows to adjacent cities (Madariaga and Poncet, 2007). 
However, due to the inter-regional trade barriers imposed by local governments, 
the inter-regional linkages are restricted (Young, 2000). Given that by the end 
of 2006 85% of the accumulated FDI flowed to 11 eastcrn and costal provinces, 
little inter-regional spill over from FOJ will be reccived by the other 20 
technologically backward inland provinces which host 61 % of China's 
population and contribute 40% of total GDP (Girma and Gong, 2008b). 
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managers and salesmen from SOEs and other domestic firms. Evidence shows 
that SOEs with little care for the human capital development of their 
employees (i. e. little labour training expenditure) face a high possibility of 
losing talent and incurring negative spillovers (Girma and Gong, 2008a). 
(6) Indigenous technological capability suppressed. Technological transfer 
through FOI may substitute for domestic technologies in production (Fan and 
Ilu, 2007), and thus discourage indigenous R&D activities (Long, 2005). For 
example, in 1985 when Volkswagen established a joint venture with Shanghai 
Automobile, it introduced an outdated model Santana into the Chinese 
automobile market, and this model continued to be produced with little 
improvement for 20 years. At the same time the cars produced based on 
indigenous intellectual property struggled for a small market share (22% in 
2007). 
In brief. the roles of spillover channels are heavily dependent on a range 
of factors, and when investigating how FOI productivity spillovers occur, it is 
important to take these factors into consideration where possible. 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Although the productivity spillovers of FOI are appreciated in the 
literature and favourable FDI policies have been a common policy practice 
worldwide (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2006, pp. 
23-24), it is still debated how to quantitatively measure the productivity 
spillover and whether favourable FOI policies are necessary for host countries 
to pursue this bendit. 
This thesis aims at answering the following research questions which 
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concern the nature of FOI productivity spillover, the costs and benefits of 
preferential FOI policies, and theory and methodology to address FDI 
productivity spillovcr: 
(a) Can wc examine the effects of FOI productivity spillovers in China at 
the macro rather than the micro level using sector and national variables, e.g. 
sector output, value added and GDP? 
(b) In the economics literature, there have been alternative market structure 
assumptions, e.g. perfect competition, monopolistic competition with 
homogeneous firms, and monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. 
These assumptions form distinct market environments wherein the FDI 
productivity spillovers may take place. How do different market structure 
assumptions atTect the ways in which FDI productivity spills over to domestic 
enterprises and the magnitude of such spillovers? 
(c) In 2008, the Chinese government abolished its preferential corporate 
tax treatments for foreign-invested enterprises in China. How has this tax 
harmonisation impacted on the FDI productivity spillovcr effects? 
This research constructs a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model to quantify the productivity spillover from FDI. This research is 
conducted in the context of the Chinese economy in that China has been the 
largest FOI host country as a developing economy since 1993, and FOI 
productivity spillovers in China as a technologically backward country are 
potentially important. 
This research makes three contributions. First, the productivity 
improvement in manufacturing sectors caused by productivity spillover is 
captured as an endoRenou.\· phenomenon by linking the spillover effects to 
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spillover channels in a CGE model. Second. it compares the FDI productivity 
spillover effects in three different market structures. namely perfect 
competition, monopolistic competition with homogeneous firms (Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977), and monopolistic competition with firm heterogeneity (Melitz, 
2003). Third, it assesses how China's 2008 corporate income tax reform has 
affected the FDI productivity spillover effects. 
1.6. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This Chapter has discussed the stylized facts of FDI inflow to China. 
FDI to China has been increasing dramatically, which has potentially important 
productivity spillover effects on domestic enterprises via labour market 
mobility. industrial linkages. export of FIEs, demonstration and competition. 
However there also exist various factors which constrain FDI productivity 
spillovers, such as absorptive capacity, geographic scope of spillovers. 
technology intensity of FIEs, short-term learning cost. cherry-picking effect in 
labour market, and potentially oppressed indigenous technology advancement 
ability. These factors influence the sign of the overall spillover effects. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the origin and channels of FDI 
productivity spillover, factors governing FDI productivity spillover effects, and 
empirical methodologies to address FDJ productivity spillovers. 
The theories constructed in the paradigm of "ownership, location, 
internalisation" assume that firms engaging in FDI activities are homogeneous 
and more productive than their domestic rivals in a host economy so that they 
can overcome the cost disadvantages of overseas business operations. The 
latest theories built on the assumption of "firms with heterogeneous 
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productivity" find that firms engaging in FDI are more productive than firms 
which only export, while the latter are more productive than firms which serve 
the domestic market only. The above two generations of FDI theories both 
imply that multinational enterprises are the most productive in a host economy, 
implying the possibility of FDI productivity spillovers. 
The review also shows that possible channels of FDI productivity 
spillovers include labour mobility and vertical input-output linkages between 
multinational aililiates and domestic enterprises, export of MNEs. 
demonstration, increased competition, and resource reallocation. 
Various factors determine the effects of FDI productivity spillovers. They 
include FDI intensity, technology intensity, geographic proximity to 
multinational affiliates, absorptive capacity of domestic enterprises, legal 
environment on intellectual property rights in host countries, and learning cost. 
Available empirical methodologies include econometric models and 
computable general equilibrium models. The former are more widely adopted 
for firm-level and industry-level analysis, while the latter are more suitable for 
economy-wide analysis. 
Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical foundation and construction of a 
typical CGE model. CGE modelling involves designing a large-scale general 
equilibrium model across all the industries and implementing computer-based 
simulations of counterfactual scenarios. 
CGE models are a class of models that explore the overall economic 
impact of policy, technology or other external "shocks". The microeconomic 
foundation for CGE models is Walrasian general equilibrium theory. A CGE 
model consists of (1) a series of equations of production. consumption, utility 
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and so on, which cover the whole economy including the activities of all 
industries, governments, and households; and (2) a detailed database consistent 
with the model equations. 
As a Reneral-equilihrium modeL a CGE model is inappropriate for the 
analysis of small-scale, sector-specific changes. but is well tailored to the 
investigation of broadly based policy innovations where inter-region and 
inter-industry feedbacks and interdependences are important. Most of the 
applications of CGE fall into the categories of tax and trade policy research and 
more recently, resource and environment research. 
The simulation work in a CGE model is based on a social accounting 
matrix (SAM) or input-output table in a base year. A SAM expands a 
cross-industry input-output table by incorporating non-production sectors, (e.g 
households and government) in a more comprehensive way. A SAM or 
input-output table statistically represents flows of all economic transactions 
that take place within an economy. 
GAMS provides a tailored and powerful higher-level coding platform for 
CGE modellers. MPSGE as a subsystem of GAMS is specially designed for a 
mix of complementarity problems that are most frequently met in general 
equilibrium models. CGE modelling provides a convincing structural research 
framework on the topic of FDI productivity spillovers and the associated FDI 
policy assessment. A CGE model can decompose FDI spillovers effects into 
benefit obtained through different channels, namely vertical linkages, export of 
MNEs and horizontal demonstration. However, due to the data constraint and 
the only option of a single year as the benchmark year, the reliability of CGE 
modelling is subject to sensitivity tests. 
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Chapter 4 provides data sources used in this research and discusses the 
data compilations. The transformation of the original input-output table 
involves a complex data manipulation process, which mainly involves three 
types of work: (1) aggregating the original 122 by 122 input-output table into 
a 39 by 39 one; (2) disaggregating 39 by 39 one into a 101 by 101 one with 
information on different ownerships, which enables the CGE model 
constructed on this input-output table to address issues regarding ownership 
(i. e. spillovers from foreign-invested enterprises to domestic enterprises); (3) 
data balancing and consistency check. 
Data employed are mainly from China Statistical Yearbook 2003, China 
Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 2003 and China Input-Output Table 
2002. Data of several sectors are aggregated to reconcile different statistical 
standards. Data of agriculture, construction, and services are also aggregated to 
a great extent to cater for the data availability of FDI inflows. By doing so, we 
can obtain a 39 by 39 sector input-output table. With data estimated for FIEs, 
SOEs, and Private enterprises, 31 out of the 39 sectors can be further 
disaggregated into 31 x3=93 ownership-sectors. Data balancing techniques are 
used to make the transformed input-output table balanced. In the process of 
data manipulations, three rounds of data consistency checks are conducted. 
Chapter 5 constructs a CGE model tailored for this research on FDI 
productivity spillover in China. Theoretical models for three market structures 
are also discussed, namely perfect competition, monopolistic competition, and 
firm heterogeneity. 
A benchmark CGE model for the Chinese economy will be presented with 
the original forms and "calibrated duality forms" of CES functions. The model 
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contains blocks of value-added production, output production, CET 
transformation into export and domestic consumption, labour and capital 
disaggregation, Armington aggregation, export and import, representative 
domestic agent, representative agent for multinational enterprises, and 
government. Equations for equilibria of factor marks, Armington markets, 
aggregate export and import will also be presented. 
This model will then be extended to incorporate FDI productivity 
spillovers under perfect competition. Chinese industry-level data during 200 I 
and 2006 will be employed to estimate the coefficients of four spill over 
channels. Forward linkages and horizontal demonstration are found to be the 
most significant channels via which spillovers take place. 
FDI productivity spillovers will be modelled in an alternative market 
structure, namely monopolistic competition with homogeneous firms. In this 
scenario, the markup rate of a representative firm of each sector is derived, 
which is essential to extending a CGE model to incorporate monopolistic 
competition. A CGE model to study FDI spillovers under monopolistic 
competition can also reflect the changes of product varieties and quantities 
caused by the spillovers. 
Finally FDI productivity spillovers will be modelled in another alternative 
market structure, i.e. monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. This 
market structure is a newly explored one in the literature, and is potentially 
important in explaining the productivity change of domestic firms. A CGE 
model under firm heterogeneity is composed of a general equilibrium module 
and a partial equilibrium module. The former is a model with FDI spillovers 
under perfect competition. The latter deals with firm heterogeneity, assuming a 
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virtual '"quasi-representative" firm and "summarising" the distribution of firm 
productivity in each sector. The CGE model in this scenario can provide 
alternative perspective to the effects of spillovers by examining productivity 
improvement under FDI productivity spillovers in a more direct way. 
Chapter 6 discusses how an FDI shock to the benchmark economy. 
together with productivity spillovers, affects economic performance. 
Simulations are conducted under three different market structures, namely, 
perfect competition, monopolistic competition, and firm heterogeneity. 
Results show that (1) in terms of national aggregate indicators, an FDI 
shock is beneficial to the economy, and FDI productivity spillovers are 
followed by positive spillover premiums under the three market structures; (2) 
for domestic enterprises (including SOEs and Private enterprises), FDl 
productivity spillovers promote their performance and always outweigh the 
negative impact of an FOI shock; (3) for foreign-invested enterprises, FOI 
productivity spillovers cause resources to be attracted away by their rivals that 
are more productive thanks to the FOI spillovers, thus making the increase in 
foreign-invested enterprises' total output lower than otherwise. This finding 
also applies to all the three market structures; (4) product variety and 
production scale per variety can both be improved by an FDI shock, and FDI 
productivity s p i l l o v e r ~ ~ can exert positive "spillover premiums" under certain 
conditions: and (5) the experiments under monopolistic competition 
assumption show that FOI productivity spillovers are more prominent in an 
industry with a lower initial degree of competition. 
Chapter 7 simulates the impact of corporate income tax reform in 2008 on 
the FDI productivity spill over effect in China. 
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It introduces the major tax incentives to attract FDI in China. and discusses 
the cost and benefit of such preferential FDI treatment. The results of the tax 
reform simulations show that the original dual corporate income tax system 
was indeed good for the FDI productivity spillovers to occur in that it helped 
strengthen the foreign presence which is vital for FDI productivity spillovers. 
A higher corporate income tax levied on foreign-invested enterprises alone 
distorts the economy's structure and lowers total output. welfare. and GDP. 
However an integrated tax reform formula can do a better job by increasing the 
output level of domestic enterprises and by promoting national welfare. Under 
firm heterogeneity, the spillover benefit of integrated reform is even more 
prominent. because the reform can lift up the average productivity of all 
existing enterprises, and raise the possibility of productivity spillovers and the 
absorptive capacity of domestic enterprises. This is more beneficial to the 
productivity spillovers from foreign-invested firms to domestic enterprises. 
Neither single-sided reform nor integrated reform can increase the 
proportion of the productivity spilt over from foreign firms to domestic firms in 
total productivity of domestic enterprises. Taking into consideration the 
changing pattern of productivity under firm heterogeneity. the tax reform will 
only temporarily lower the FDI productivity spillover effects, however it may 
promote the speed and magnitude of spillovers later. 
Chapter 8 summarises the methodologies, contributions and mam 
findings of the whole thesis and discusses possible directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Thi Chapt r v.ill re iev the literature on the origin (Section 2.2) and 
channe l of For productivir pillover (Section 2.3), fac tors governing FOl 
producti it pillover effect (Section 2.4), and empirica l methodolog ies to 
addre rOI producti it spillovers (Section 2 .5). 
2.2. THEORIES OF FDI 
2.2.1. Theories of MNEs in Dunning's Paradigm 
t1ultinational affi li ates can compete with local firms in host countries due 
their ad antage in productivity. Without productivity advantage, 
multinational affi liates can ne er surv ive in competition with local firm s as the 
former fac e ' tra cost in doing business in ove rseas markets, including 
ommuni ati n cost. a higher pa for stationing employees overseas, and 
barri r of language and culture (Hymer, 1976). 
Dunning 1977; 1981) conceptualises this productivity advantage and 
attribut it t three fac tors of a multinational firm which outweigh the cost 
di adv ntag of pr ducing in an ho t country: 
Own r, hip admntage which represents both tangible (e .g. spec ial 
cqu ipm nt and intangible assets (e.g. know-how, patent, trade mark) , neither 
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of which is easily replicable to host firms; 
(2) Locution advantage which includes the benefit which a multinational 
can get by circumventing tariffs and transportation costs incurred in trade, and 
by getting closer access to consumers in local markets; 
(3) Internalisation advantage which means that profitable production 
processes can be fully exploited by multinationals in setting up overseas 
subsidiaries rather than licensing them out. 
Markusen (2002b) proposes the concept of "knowledge capitar which 
denotes the firm-level R&D activities shared by headquarters and subsidiaries. 
Markusen argues that knowledge capital offers foundations for ownership. 
location and internationalization advantages of multinational enterprises 
proposed by Dunning (1977; 1981). He constructed a "knowledge capital 
model". which owes the origin of vertical and horizontal FDI to the knowledge 
capital of multinationals. The theoretical hypotheses drawn from this model fit 
well with the results of econometric studies. 
2.2.2. Theories of MNEs with Heterogeneous Productivity 
The implicit assumption of the above theories is that all firms in a country 
have identical productivities and every firm is productive enough to go abroad 
and engage in more costly and risky overseas production. However, this 
assumption contradicts with the prevailing evidence that multinationals are 
typically more productive than those national firms that only engage in 
domestic business (Tomiura, 2007; Yasar and Paul, 2007; e.g. Girma, Kneller 
and Pisu, 2005). This contradiction has been largely solved by the latest 
development of FDI theories, namely the theory of firm heterogeneity 
(Helpman. Melitz and Yeaple, 2004) and theory of incomplete contracts 
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(Antras and Helpman, 2004). Both theories have predicted that only the most 
productive firms can engage in FOI, implying the possibilities of FOI 
productivity spillover in host countries. 
Firm heterogeneity model 
Helpman et al (2004) emphasise the role ofproduclivity difFerences across 
firms in determining the sales of MNEs relative to the exports of national 
enterprises (NEs). They find that only the most productive firms can afIord the 
high fixed costs of setting up foreign subsidiaries, whereas less productive 
firms remain as NEs and may serve foreign markets by exporting. The least 
productive firms can only serve the domestic market. 
The model of He1pman et al (2004) is supported by many empirical 
studies. With firm-level data of U.K. manufacturing sectors, Girma, Kneller 
and Pisu (2005) find that the cumulative productivity distribution of British 
MNEs lies to the right of that of non-MNEs in the level, i. e. the productivity of 
MNEs is generally higher than non-MNEs. Similarly, the productivity 
distribution of exporters lies to the right of that of non-exporters. 
With firm-level panel data of Japanese industries, Kimura and Kiyota 
(2006) also find evidence supporting the prediction of Helpman et at (2004), i. e. 
productivity is indeed an important factor explaining the decision to engage in 
FOI as well as export. They also find that the highest productivity firms export 
as well as engage in FOI. This does not contradict with Helpman et at (2004), 
as for a multi-product firm operating in a several countries different in sizes 
and wages, it is possible that the firm will adopt both exports and FDI as 
complementary rather than substitute strategies, as discussed by Girma et al 
(2005). 
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In their model with heterogeneous multinational firms, Falvey, Greenaway 
and Yu (2007) assume that unit cost of a multinational subsidiary is jointly 
determined by the parent firms' cost in its home country and a random cost 
drawn from a distribution that is common to all indigenous entrants in the host 
country. They find that a subsidiary is less likely to shut down when its parent 
firm's productivity is higher and the counterpart domestic firm's productivity is 
relatively lower. 
Nocke and Yeaple (2007) further differentiate FOI activities into 
cross-border merger & acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield FDI, and find that 
for R&D-intensive industries where the heterogeneous productivity at firm 
level mainly originates from firms' technological know-how, firms engaging in 
either M&A or greenfield FDI are more productive than firms engaging in 
exporting only. 
The technological superiority of grcenfield FD! is supported by an 
empirical study of U.S. multinational firms (Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). It is 
found that U .S. parent firms that choose greenfield FOI are systematically 
more productive than those firms that choose M&A. This stylized fact has been 
generalized as a theoretical proposition in a general equilibrium model of the 
world economy (Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). 
Incomplete contract model 
Antnls and Helpman (2004) model how a firm sources abroad either 
through foreign outsourcing or FOI with the notion of "incomplete contract". 
An "incomplete contract" denotes a contract of an intermediate product 
between its supplier and user, which however can not specify the legal 
consequences of every possible state of the intermediate product the supplier 
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sells to the user. In their model, the high-productivity firms source overseas by 
engaging in FDI; the low-productivity firms acquire intermediates only within 
the home country; and the firms with medium productivity choose foreign 
sourcmg. 
Tomiura (2007) finds evidence supporting the theoretical propositions of 
Antras and Helpman (2004) and Helpman et al (2004). With a firm-level 
dataset of 118,300 Japanese firms, Tomiura documents how the firm 
productivity varies as firms engage in difTerent internationalisation modes. 
Foreign outsourcers and exporters tend to be more productive than domestic 
firms, but less productive than the firms active in FDI or in multiple 
globalization modes. This productivity hierarchy is robust to the inclusion of 
control variables, i.e. firm size, factor intensity, and industry dummy. 
In brief. Section 2.2 has reviewed the theories of FDI. The theories 
constructed in Dunning's paradigm of "ownership, location, internalisation" 
assume that firms engaging in FDI activities are homogeneous and more 
productive than their domestic rivals so that they can overcome the cost 
disadvantages of overseas business operations. The latest theories built on the 
assumption of "firms with heterogeneous productivity" find that firms 
engaging in FDI are more productive than firms which only export, while the 
latter are more productive than firms which serve the domestic market only. 
The above two generations of FDI theories both imply that multinational 
enterprises are the most productive, which give rise to the possibility of FDI 
productivity spillovers. 
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2.3. CHANNELS OF FDI PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS 
In investing overseas, the advanced technology of multinationals will 
inevitably spill over to the domestic firms in the host countries via a variety of 
channels. such as labour mobility. vertical input-output linkages. exports. and 
horizontal effects. In the past decade. there has been emerging literature 
scrutinizing the spillovers hy examining the spillover channels at micro level. 
2.3.1. Labour Mobility 
Productivity spillovers could take place when workers or managers 111 
foreign-invested firms move to domestic firms or set up their own enterprises. 
In this process, the workers or managers will apply their knowledge legally 
acquired while working for multinationals in their new domestic firm and exert 
a positive impact on its productivity. Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) 
construct a two period model where a multinational trains a local worker to run 
its subsidiary in the tirst period, then in the second period the multinational and 
a local firm compete to employ the trained worker. Only if the MNE pays a 
higher wage can it stop the worker from moving to the local firm. Regardless 
of whether the worker moves to the local firm, the domestic economy can 
always benefit from the FDI presence. When the informed worker is hired by 
the local firm, a technolugical spillover takes place. while if the informed 
worker is retained hy the multinational subsidiary at a higher wage. then a 
pecuniary benefit arises. These technological spillover and pecuniary benefits 
are echoed by Glass and Saggi (2002) who build a model with multiple host 
and source firms. 
Markusen and Trotimenko (2009) situate the issue of FDI productivity 
spillover via labour mobility in a general equilibrium (rather than partial 
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equilibrium) framework. When the analysis is applied to Colombian firm-level 
data. the paper confirms that the inter-ownership mobility of workers with 
skills acquired from contacts with foreign experts have substantial and 
persistent positive effects (though not always immediate) on the value added 
per worker of domestic firms. 
Gorg and Strobl (2005) investigate FDI spillovcrs through the channel of 
labour mobility using detailed firm-level data for a sample of manufacturing 
firms in Ghana. Specifically. the authors have data on whether the 
entrepreneurs of the domestic firms in the sample have worked for a foreign 
multinational or have taken professional training in an MNE before they joined 
or established their current companies. They control for the underlying 
capability of entrepreneurs, using years of schooling and previous experience 
in the same industry. This avoids potential ambiguity in the causality between 
the productivity of the firms and the labour mobility: firstly. foreign firms 
might hire or provide training to more skilled workers as they already 
demonstrate a stronger capability, possibly through higher education; secondly, 
better domestic firms may attract better workers and managers. The 
econometric analysis shows that the FDI spillovers via labour mobility are 
significant and industry-specific. 
2.3.2. Vertical Input-output Linkages 
MNEs affiliates may help upstream and downstream domestic firms to set 
up production facilities, and provide them with technical assistance and 
training in management and organization (Girma and Gong. 2008a; Girma. 
Gorg and Pisu. 2008; lavorcik. 2004; Markusen and Venables, 1999). Vertical 
input-output linkages include backward linkages and forward linkages as 
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illustrated in I' igure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Backward and Forward Linkages as Spillover Channels 
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Backward linkages Forward linkages 
Backward linkages result in backward feedback from multinational 
affiliates in downstream sectors to upstream indigenous firms. Sourcing locally 
can effectively reduce the production cost of multinational affiliates and thus is 
a natural choice for them. This can trigger competition among upstream 
domestic firms. Moreover, multinationals usually set high technical standards 
for their intermediate inputs and it is likely that downstream foreign firms need 
to transfer necessary techniques to the upstream domestic firms (Javorcik, 
2004), improving the latter's technological capacity in the process. Thus the 
competition effect and high standards together w ith the knowledge transfer, all 
as a result of backward linkages , act as a channel of FDI productivity spi llover. 
Forward linkages promote the forward transfer of knowledge from 
multinational affiliates in upstream sectors to downstream indigenous firms . 
Domestic firms can improve their productivity via forward linkage in two ways. 
First by purchasing high-quality intermediate products from multinational 
firms . Similar spillover effects via forward linkages in international trade have 
been wide ly acknowledged in the literature (Falvey, Foster and Greenaway, 
2004; Keller, 2004). Second, in becoming a product distributor of a 
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multinational firm, a domestic company often has to make a series of 
improvements, e.g. employee training, to meet the standards to be a retailer for 
the multinational. 
Markusen and Venables (1999) develop a model with two imperfectly 
competitive industries which are linked by an input-output re lationship. It is 
assumed that foreign investment takes place in the final goods sector, thus 
creating backward linkages to intermediate goods suppliers in the upstream 
sector. Multinational firms can help domestic firms in upstream sectors 
improve productivity via backward linkages. Domestic firms in downstream 
sectors can then also benefit from the improved intermediate products supplied 
by domestic suppliers. This benefit can outweigh the competition effect (in the 
product and factor markets) which multinational firms impose on their rival 
domestic firms, therefore leading to the development of local industry. 
With firm-level data for Lithuania, Javorcik (2004) finds evidence of 
positive backward spill over from FDJ via the nexus between multinational 
firms and their local upstream suppliers. The specification for backward 
linkage is as follows: 
Backward = 'a [, ForeignShare * Y"k,l ] 
.1 ,1 ~ ~ I ,k,l ~ ~ " k ,l ,y 
kI(k '" I , ~ ~ ' .k ,1 
, 
(2.1 ) 
where OJ.kt is the proportion of sector j's output supplied to sector k at 
period t calculated from input-output matrix . Y1,k. r denotes the output of the ith 
Y 
firm in the kth sector at period t. ForeignShare, k I X I,"k" measures the 
.. y 
i ,k ,' 
foreign equity participation of the ith firm in the kth sector, weighted by each 
firm 's share in sectoral output. 
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Jacorcik's specification of backward linkages has been widely employed 
to examine backward productivity spillover in various studies (Girma and 
Gong, 2008a; Girma, Gorg and Pisu, 2008; Kneller and Pisu, 2007; Bitzer, 
Geishecker and Gorg, 2008). 
2.3.3. Export of MNEs 
To export involves sunk costs incurred for market research, advertisement, 
distrihution networks etc., which might deter entry. Trade models with 
heterogeneous firms predict, and evidence from firm level data sets confirm, 
that entry into exporting is a sell-selection process in which more productive 
firms become exporters while less productive firms serve domestic markets 
only (Melitz, 2003: Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998). But even when some 
domestic firms are productive enough to enter export markets, they may lack 
information of overseas markets and foreign consumers may be unfamiliar with 
products manufactured ahroad. As large multinationals have well established 
international trade networks and have extensive knowledge of international 
markets, their presence can help lower information barriers facing domestic 
firms and help acquaint foreign consumers with products manufactured in the 
host country (Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997; Greenaway and Kneller, 
2008). 
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Figure 2.2: Productivity Spillover of MNE Exports 
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For domestic export candidates which are not currently productive enough 
to find exporting profitable, the success of multinational firms in international 
markets can stimulate domestic candidates to emulate them (Alvarez and 
L6pez, 200S). To achieve thi s goa l, they have to improve their producti vity and 
product quality to meet international standards. 
There is little ev idence of exporting itse lf improving firm producti vity in 
developed countries (e.g . Greenaway and Knell er, 2004, 2007). However thi s 
does not necessarily imply that such productiv ity improvements may not occur 
in emerging markets, such as China. FDI from the East Asian economies have 
transferred their labour-intensive, export-oriented assembly centres to the 
coasta l provinces in China (Deng, Guo and Zheng, 2007), and the exports of 
fo reign-invested firms accounts fo r more than SO% of national total export 
vo lume in the past ten years. During 1980-2006, the commodity exp0l1 volume 
of China has increased dramatica lly (S3. S fo ld), whil e in the same peri od, the 
commodity export volumes of the U.K. and U. S. have only increased by 3.9 
fold and 4. 7 fold , respectively.2 
With panel data of Mexican manufacturing plants, Aitken, Hanson and 
2 Author's ca lculations based on data ITom United Nations Commodity Trade Statisti cs. 
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Harrison (1997) finds that the information externalities associated with export 
activity of multinational firms rather than domestic firms reduces the cost of 
exporting of other firms : 
am, 
- - ~ o o
orMNH 
where I11j denotes the distribution cost for fore ign market, and rMN1;· 
denotes the export activity of MNEs. Thus the export of a domestic plant is 
positively affected by contacts with multinational firms . 
Greenaway, Sousa and Wakelin (2004) investigate export spillover effects 
from multinationals to domestic firms in the UK. They find that exports of 
multinational affiliates can help increase domestic firms ' export propensity, and 
domestic firms can improve their productivity by increasing exports. 
The evidence found by Kneller and Pisu (2007) also supports productivity 
spillover via export of MNEs. With British firm-level data, they find that the 
decisions of domestic llritish firms concerning how much to export are 
positively influenced by the presence of foreign multinationals in the same, 
upstream or downstream industries. Both export-oriented and domestic 
market-oriented multinationals appear to generate positive and significant 
export spillovers, but those from the former are stronger. This suggests that the 
leakage of specific information about foreign markets from established foreign 
exporters is important in improving domestic exporters' productivity. Once a 
firm becomes an exporter, it is possibl.e that its productivity will be boosted due 
to learning and competition effects. 
Girma, Gorg and Pisu (2008) confirm that the degree of export orientation 
of both domestic and multinational enterprises is relevant to FDJ productivity 
spillover. Using a panel data set of British companies, they find positive 
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horizontal spillovers from export-oriented multinationals only. yet 
domestic-market-oriented MNEs generate positive spillovcrs through backward 
linkages for both domestic exporters and non-exporters. 
2.3.4. Horizontal Effects: Demonstration, Competition and Resource 
Reallocation 
Demonstration is probably the "most evident" spill over channel (Crespo 
and F ontoura. 2007. pp. 411 ). especially in transition economies such as China 
which are transforming from a centrally planned economy. dominated by SOEs. 
into a market economy with a variety of ownerships in a short time span. 
Foreign-invested firms with technological and managerial advantages open a 
fresh "window" of high productivity, and showcase their superior practices in 
production, management, and services to their indigenous counterparts. 
Domestic firms can thus imitate the production of foreign firms through 
"reverse engineering" (Das, 1987). 
Increased compelilion in a host economy created by the entry of MNEs 
constrains the market power of monopolistic domestic firms. forcing them to 
make a more efficient use of existing resources. 
Resource real/ocation is a channel via which FDI presence can help the 
host economy relocate resources towards the most productive firms and 
increase industry-level and national productivity. The entry of foreign firms can 
intensify the competition for labour resources in host countries. Even for large 
transition economies with a huge hidden surplus labour supply like China (Fu 
and Balasubramanyam. 2005), the price of non-skilled labour In 
export-intensive sectors will inevitably rise (Ceglowski and Golub, 2007) due 
to the factor price convergence effect of international trade (Falvey and 
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Kreickemeier, 2005) . The rising labour cost will make the least productive 
domestic firm s unprofitable and drive them out of market. Then resources will 
be relocated to more productive firms , allowing them to increase in production 
scale. Therefore the industry-level and aggregate-level productivity can be 
raised . This resource rea llocation effect driven by FDI is consistent with that 
effec t driven by trade which is modelled by Melitz (2003). This spillover via 
resource reallocation does not necessarily improve the productivity of any 
individual firm. But it helps explain why industry-level econometric analyses 
of FDI productivity spillovers tend to generate significantly positive results. 
2.4. DETERMINANT FACTORS OF FDI 
PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS 
2.4.1. FDI Intensity and Technology Intensity 
It is found that there exists a threshold effect 111 FDI productivity 
spillovers, i.e. if the FDI volume is too low, the productivity spillover will be 
limited (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). It is also generally acknowledged that the 
more 1; DI in an industry, the higher will be the possibility of productivity 
spillovers. However, the spillover effect also depends on the technology 
intensity of FDI. For foreign firms with mature and standardised rather than 
state-of-the-art technologies, their productivity spillover effect exhibits an 
inverted U curve traj ectory as their presence becomes higher. 
Koizumi and Kopecky (1977) were the first to explicitly specify the 
spillover effect of foreign capital. In their model , the total capital stock K in a 
host country is divided into KF and KN, (i. e. K = KF + KN), which represent the 
portion owned by foreigners and domestic nationals, respectively. KF and KN 
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are heterogeneous in that the former can trigger technology spillover. 
The production function of the only domestic commodity X is: 
X = Ij/ (K '" / L) * G[ (K F + K N ), L] 
Ij/(K,../ L) is the technology transfer function and K,.!L denotes foreign 
capital per capita. It is assumed that a host country always experiences 
technological improvement from the contact with foreigners so that Ij/(K,; / L) 
is greater than unity for any K F / L >0. 
Then teclmology spillover is denoted in partial differentiations: 
Therefore the marginal product of foreign capital is greater than that of 
domestic capital by (81j/ / 8K", )G which represents the productivity spillover 
embodied in foreign capital. When 8 2 1 j / / 8 8 ~ . . > 0 , (8 1j//8K,:)G is an 
increasing function of Kr:. By linking domestic production to foreign capital 
intensity, the model indicates the importance of foreign capital in influencing 
the path of economic development. 
In a dynamic model, Findlay (1978) hypothesises that the rate of technical 
efficiency change in the backward countries is an increasing function of the 
technology gap between advanced and backward regions. 
The ratio of foreign capital stock Kf...t) to domestic capital stock KcI...t) is 
used to measure foreign presence at period t. A(t) and B(t) represent the levels 
of technical efficiency in the advanced and backward regions at period I , 
respectively: 
B(I) K r (t) 
X=--' y=-' -
- A (I) , - Ki/(t) 
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8x / ay is assumed to be positive, i. e. the technological gap between the 
relatively backward and advanced countries will decrea e as foreign capital 
intensity in the relatively backward country increases. The model shows, that 
under thi s assumption, (x , y) can converge to a long-term steady state (x·, y *). 
Oas ( 1987) examines the optimal behaviour of a multinationa l firm 's 
subsidiary in a host country when tecimology spillover takes place between it 
and its local rival s. Let parameter A denote the productivity of local firm s, then 
the advancement of A in any period is positive ly and linearly correlated with 
QIII' the amount of output of the MNE's subsidiary during that period: 
A=aQIII ' a>O 
This will intensify the competition and lower the price of MN s' products. 
Assuming MNEs need to max imise their discounted slim of profit, the model 
also find s out that the best response o f MNEs is to lower the increase rale of 
domestic enterprises (A) by lowering their own production sca le (Qm) . 
Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2002; 2007) emphasi zes how the technology 
intensity of foreign investment affects the productivity spi 1I0ver effect. In 
China Mainland, the enterprises invested by ror from overseas Chinese in 
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (HMT) tend to engage in labour-intensive 
manufacturing with standardised rather than state-of-the-art technologies . Their 
studies show that the sp illover from HMT FOI falls beyond a certain critical 
point of fo reign presence as the productivity sp illover is mitigated by the 
competition with domestic enterprises for limited resources. T he findings of 
Buckley et af (2002; 2007) are echoed by Wei and Liu (2006), who find that 
OECD-invested firms play a much greater role in inter-industry spillovers than 
overseas Chinese firms from HMI. 
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2.4.2. Proximity and Participation 
Geographic proximity matters in l' Dl producti vity spillovers due to the 
limited spati al scope of labour mobility and the importance of face- to- face 
communication (Halpern and Murakozy, 2007). Similarl y, the entry modes of 
For i.e. M&A or greenfield, also matter. Joint ventures involve a higher degree 
of local participation and a higher possibility of linkages with loca l firm s. 
which could generate more productivity spillover. 
Us ing data of Hungari an manu fac turing firm s, Il alpern and Murako/.y 
(2007) exam1l1e the role of geographic di stance between where 
foreign-invested firms are located and domesti c firms in productivity spillovers. 
They weigh the spilIover vari ables with functions of di stance of foreign finn 
to domestic firms so that the spillover vari ables will be large r whl!n the 
distance is smaller. For example one of the weighing functions they employ is: 
j(d;,m) = 1/(1 d;,I// IOO ), where dim denotes the distance of the ith indigl!nolls 
firm to the mth multinational affili ate. Their econometric analys is results show 
a signi fi cantly negative relationship between the di stancc between foreign 
firms and domestic firms and the spilIover. 
Their conclusion is consistent with those of Greenaway and Kneller 
(2008). As industrial or loeational agglomeration might offcr opportunities for 
lowering sunk costs, industrial or locational proximity to export-ori ented 
multinational firms can help non-exporters become exporters. With firm-leve l 
data of U.K. manufacturing sectors, they find that exporters have a strong 
positive and significant impact on the export decision of potential exporters in 
the same industry, and similarly, from the same region. No significant impac t is 
found on entry from exporting firms located in other regions or industri es. 
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With Romanian firm-level data, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) find 
M&A FDI has a greater productivity spill over effect on domestic firms than 
greenfield FD! does. First, affiliates in the form of joint ventures are likely to 
face lower costs of finding local suppliers of intermediates. Thus they should 
be more likely to source inputs locally, which in turn leads to more vertical 
productivity spillover to firms in upstream sectors, i.e. backward spillover 
(Javorcik, 2004). Second, multinational headquarters tend to transfer medium 
advanced technologies to their partially owned affiliates and transfer 
state-of-the-art technologies to wholly owned subsidiaries. The medium 
advanced technologies could be easier to be absorbed after they spill over to 
domestic firms. 
2.4.3. Absorptive Capacity 
Absorptive capacity includes both macro-level characteristics including 
infrastructure, economic development and human capital, and micro-level 
indicators e.g R&D expenditure, education of employees, employee training 
and flexibility of labour turnover. Theoretical models have shown that a firm 
with a stronger absorptive capacity can reap more benefit from FDI 
productivity spillover (Lai, Peng and Bao, 2006; Keller, 1996). 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) find that the economy of Venezuela is not 
sufficiently developed to accommodate the positive externalities of FDI. Their 
appreciation of macro-level absorptive capacity is echoed by research on the 
productivity spillover of international trade (e.g. Falvey, Foster and Greenaway, 
2007) 
The studies of China also justifY absorptive capacity as a necessary 
condition of FDI productivity spillover. With industrial survey data of 1995, 
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Buckley et a! (2002) find SOEs could reap no spillove r from the presence of 
foreign firm s while non-SO Es could get positi ve bene fit from I-DI sp illover. 
This is not unusual as Chinese SOEs were tightly controlled by the g vernment , 
and operated "bureaucratically mandated plans" in the 1990s (Buck Icy, legg 
and Wang, , pp. 641). 
Girma and Gong (2008a) examine the adjustment o f hinese S Est lOlal 
factor productivity (TFP) to the presence of multinational firm s using the 
following empirical model: 
TFp" = a , + pt X " + y;RF"DJ" + y' OUTFDI" + b' I)" + e" 
where i and I index SOEs and time rcspecti ve ly, I.' represents a random 
error term and X is a vector of variables measuring absorptive cC/pac ify 
(employee training, market share, intangible assets, and exporting ac ti vity) 
hypothesized to impact on SOEs ' TFP. RFDJ and OUTFDI are two vectors 
consisting of variables capturing fore ign presence in the firm 's rcgion and 
outside the region, respecti ve ly. The vector D consi sts of the full . et of time, 
sectoral and regional dummies . These dummies control for economy-widc 
productivity shocks and the fact that FDT flow is endogeno us in the sense of 
being partly determined by sectoral and regiona l productivity leve ls. They find 
that foreign presence is generally negatively assoc iated with Trp level of OE. 
However, there is a positive effect of FOI on SOEs that export, invest in human 
capital or R&D, or have prior innovation experience. These findings confirm 
that absorptive capacity is indeed a necessary condition of rOI spillover. 
2.4.4. Protection of Intellectuall")roperty Rights 
How the protection of intellectual property right (lPR) affects FDt 
productivity spillover is largely dependent on the channels via which the 
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spillover takes place. 
On the one hand, knowledge of multinational affiliates spills over. VIa 
lahour mohility and demonstration, to domestic enterprises more quickly in a 
host country where the IPR protection system is not well established. Suppose 
know-how is protected as a patent in the U.K.. however it is very 
time-consuming to apply for a patent for this know-how in a host country. Then, 
as the employees in the host country know the details of the patent, there exist 
risks that these employees will join local companies. taking with them this 
sensitive technology. This technology spillover is not illegal as the know-how 
has not been protected in the host country. 
However a poor IPR protection environment usually discourages FDJ. 
especially in the form of joint ventures (Gattai and Molteni, 2007; Falvey, 
Foster and Memedovic. 2006; Saggi, 2002). This will decrease the magnitude 
of productivity spillover. 
On the other hand. a bettcr protcction of IPR can promote transfer of 
technology from multinational headquarters to overseas affiliates and also 
increase the local R&D expenditures of multinational affiliates (Branstetter. 
Fisman and Foley, 2006). This will possibly help FDI productivity spillover 
take place in a larger magnitude via vertical input-output linkages, although the 
chances of spill over via lahour mobility or demonstration is greatly restricted. 
Furthermore, a legal reform on IPR in host country will also stimulate 
indigenous R&D activities, which can enhance domestic firms' capacity of 
absorbing FDI productivity spillover. 
2.4.5. Learning Cost 
Spill over is neither free nor automatic due to numerous reasons. First, 
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regression can be applied interchangeably with another similar type of model 
that replaces the dependent variable with value added (YiJ.I) of local firms and 
add labour (LiJ I) and capital (K,j. ') inputs to the right hand side of the above 
equation: 
YiJ,1 =0.2 fJ2Kij,t +fJ3LiJJ + f f 4 F D ~ ~ I + t 5 ~ , 1 1 +(iJJ 
The above two regressions can be run with either firm-level , or 
industry-leve l data (by suppressing firm index i) . 
As for variable sciections,/oreign presence can be measured by total fOI , 
proportion of foreign firms' output or employment, total output or employment 
of foreign firms ; backward and forward linkage can be measured by either 
equation (2 .1 ) or sectoral FDI weighted by input-output coefficients; 
absorptive capacity can be measured by local firm 's R&D expenditure or 
labour training hours; various dummy variables are usually adopted to control 
for the factors related to industry, time, and export status. 
Capital (K) is usually measured as the value of fixed assets deflated by 
industry (or GDP) deflator (e.g. lavorcik and Spatareanu, 2008), or by 
constructing a capital stock from investment data using a certain depreciation 
rate (e .g. Aitken and Harrison , 1999). Various measures of labour input (L) 
have been employed in the literature , including (a) with the total number of 
employees which is the most straightforward and most commonly adopted 
measure (e.g. Girma and Gong, 2008a; Girma, Gorg and Pisu, 2008 ; l avorcik 
and Spatareanu, 2008 ; Liu , 2008), Cb) employees broken down into skilled 
labour and unskilled labour (e.g. Aitken and Harrison , 1999), (c) employees 
broken down into production workers and non-production workers (e.g. L6ez, 
2008) (d) with efficiency units which are calculated by dividing total wages by 
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to do the same" (pp. 149). Therefore, another speci fi ca tion is constructed to 
capture these intra-ownership externalities among domesti c firms. upposc 
there are n identical domestic firms and each of them is engaged 10 a il.:arning 
investment 1" i=\ , 2, .. . , I'l . Let Ei be the effective lea rning in ve Imenl in firm i: 
/J 
E, = 1, + IfJf" fJ E (0, I) 
1*' 
where fJ is intra-ownership ex ternality coe ffi cient. Therefore equati on (2. ) 
can be transformed to capture both an inter-owner hip and an intra-ownership 
productivity spillover: 
Sembenelli and Siotis (2008) employ Spanish firm-l evel panel data and 
examine how FOl affects the mark-ups of domesti c firms as a proxy of firm 
performance. Their research shows that FDl has a pos iti ve long-run effect on 
the mark-ups of domestic firms in R&O intensive sectors. However, fore ign 
presence dampens the mark-ups of domestic firm in the short-run . Thi s 
contrast refl ects the negative and significant effect of short-run learning cost. 
2.5. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES 
2.5.1. Econometric Methodologies 
Almost all empirical research on FOr productivity spillovcr i conducted 
with econometric models. A typical econometric model of FD l producti vity 
spill overs regresses productivity of individual local firms aga inst FDl presence 
in the local market, and a vector of control variables (V): 
where i , j , I index firm, industry, and time respecti ve ly. If it is as umed 
that the production of value added takes a Cobb-Douglas technology, then thi s 
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domestic firms need to pay a higher sa lary to attract employees with wo rk 
experience in MNE affi liates. Second, domestic enterpri ses need to make ex tra 
investments to improve their product standard to become qualified supplier 
candidates of MNE affIliates (Wang and Blomstr0111 , 1992). Third, after 
observing the success of MNE affi liates in exportations, domestic firms also 
need to do costly overseas market investi gation in preparing for export. Thus it 
is often found that perceived effect of spillovers over a short time span i often 
negati ve, although the long-term productivity growth induced by PD I spillover 
is positive (Liu, 2008). 
Wang and Blomstrom ( 1992) acknowledge the cost of transferring 
technology within a MNE and the cost that nati ve firms incur in learning from 
MNE affiliates. The technology capability of MN E, Aj, is augmented by 
resources (If ) devoted to transferring technology: Aj = l i Ar . 
The technology level of a domestic firm is an increasing functi on of its 
learning investment ( I,, ) and the investment exhibits a diminishing return as it 
increases. /J depicts the rate of costl ess (i.e . when 1(. - 0) technology spillover. 
Thus, 
A" = t)(1,, )A / 
t) '> 0, tjJ" < 0, t)(0) = U > ° 
Then the transfer-absorption process can be derived : 
(2 .2) 
Wang and Blomstrom also note that the ex ternalities among the learning 
efforts of domestic firms themselves: "once a domestic firm has adopted or 
modified fo reign technologies, it is generally eas ier and cheaper for other firms 
· -H}· 
the minimum wage (e.g. Javorcik, 2004). or if high-quality data are available, 
(e) with human capital constructed by weighing workers in different categories 
with their relative wages to adjust for quality (e.g. Kuglcr. 2006). 
It is found that how the FDI presence variables are defined affects the 
results. For example. empirical studies with either the share of employment in 
foreign-owned firms or the share of output produced by these firms to proxy 
the foreign presence tends to get a higher spillovcr effect than those with other 
measures (e.g. the share of foreign equity participation), ceteris parihus. (Gorg 
and Strobl, 2001) 
Data: panel data analyses are preferred to cross-section analysis when it is 
necessary to control for time-invariant effects and to permit investigation of the 
development of domestic firm's productivity over a period of time rather than 
at a fixed point of time. 
It is found that on the basis of firm-level studies. the empirical results of 
the FDI spillover effects are controversial. while with industry-level data. 
empirical studies usually support the view that the FDl spillover promotes the 
productivity of host countries (Saggi, 2002). One reason is that sector-level 
analyses also include the effects of resource allocation triggered by FDL as 
discussed in Section 2.3.4. 
2.5.2. Computable General Equilibrium Modelling 
FDI productivity spillover is a nation-wide and cross-industry 
phenomenon. It can be captured by computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models which attach due importance to the interdependency between industries, 
government and household activities. Therefore. a COE model can also be 
tailored to evaluating FDI policies with respect to its productivity spillovers. 
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Currently there is little literature ofCGE models on FOI spiIlover. Several 
CGE models are constructed with trade-embodied technology spiIl over 
(Robinson, Wang and Martin, 2002; van Meijl and van Tongcren, 1998 ; Das. 
2007), but no FDI spill over is incorporated in these models. 
Robinson, Wang and Martin (2002) build a ten-region, cl ven-sector 
global CGE model that focuses on the services sectors. Links between trade 
performance and total factor productivity are introduced into the model by 
connecting a region's TFP growth with its imports of capital and 
technology-intensive products and profess ional se rVices, especiall y from 
advanced industrial countries : 
" . NX ,r I1 Fp'r = 1 + In1S,r X --.....:.:...--
NX/I" VA ,r 
where ITFPir denotes the TFP shift vari able. imsir is the share o f imported 
products and services that are embodied with advanced technology used as 
firms' intermediate inputs in total imports of such products and ervices. NXj/" 
and VA ir are intermediate inputs and va lue added respec ti ve ly. XOjsr and X;sr 'Ire 
the base year and current trade flows, respecti ve ly. 1 M is the subset referring to 
those products embodied with advanced technology. R is the subse t referring to 
those technologically backward countries. (J is an exogenous parameter. 
They compare the effects of trade liberali zation under two assumption on 
the source of advanced technology, namely imports of intermediate and durable 
manufactures. and imported service intermediate inputs. They found that under 
the former assumption, service sector liberali zation has onl y a limited impac t 
on each region 's TFP growth, and such growth is rel£l ti ve ly concentrated ill the 
intermediate and durable sectors. However, under the second assumption, the 
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impacts are quite significant and spread to more sectors through forward 
linkages. 
van Meijl and van Tongeren ( 1998) also employ a global CG E model to 
address international technology spillovers. Their spillover hypothesis is 
summari zed as: 
a . I " ~ ~ = E I I ' ~ > ' ' , where 0 ~ ~ 0"., ~ ~ 1; 0 E I,r, ~ ~ 1; o,r, = o,r, ( H ,r." D,r.,) 
a f//" 
where ClJII and aj ls denote input-specifi c producti vity growth rates of input 
) in acti vity i in the regions of origin r and destination s, respecti vely, and 0ir., 
indicates the effectiveness of this amount of knowledge. Jt is a Function of an 
absorption capacity index Hirs, and an index of structural similarity Dirs. Ejirs is 
an index of the amount of knowledge embodied in commodity ) which is used 
in activity i: 
E = X fII'! Y" . 
)lr., V" /Y 
/ If /I' 
where Xjirs represents the bilateral trade nows of input.i that are used in 
sector i and which are exp0I1ed from the source country r to the destination 
country S, Yis production of sector i in country s, and Y/:I' domestic inputs of 
sector) delivered to sector i in country of origin r. 
The potential benefits from trade liberali zation with the above embodied 
technology spillovers are analyzed by taking Chinese barriers aga inst North 
American imports as a case study. The results show that its negative impact on 
the welfare of China (measured by equi va lent vari ation) can be more than 
counterbalanced by the gains from technology spillovers. 
Very similar specifications are employed by Das (2007) to explore the role 
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of absorptive capacity and socio-institutional factors for the capture of 
information technology and biotechnology. Oas find s that regions perform 
better with higher human capital, better governance, and superiour 
technological expertise. 
Lejour, Rojas-Romagosa and Verweij (2008) explicitly incorporate I· 01 
productivity spillovcr into a world CGE model with ror supplies and demands 
endogenised, Suppose a sectoral production function is y =A.f(If. fIJ.I), where A, 
kF, fIJ and L denote TFP, foreign capital, domestic capital and total labour. 
respectively. Then FOI productivity spillovers can be modelled as an 
externality: 
k / ~ I Iy--
( 
'/ '/ '}' ) ' k F k" A, = Ao 1+ Jt ' e . - 1+ H 
where /'FP is exogenous TFP growth rate, y is productivity spillover 
coefficient obtained from estimations in literature. The results show that 
opening up services market to FDI in European countries with the above 
productivity spillovers can lead to twice marginal GDP growth (e .g. with an 
extra 0.8%) as much as the case without productivity spillovers (e.g. with an 
extra 0.4%). Lejour et al. allow the magnitude of the spillover to vary with the 
size of FDI. However they take the value of the key parameter y from the 
literature to link the FDT presence and its influence on the economy, and )1 was 
not particularly estimated for the European Union economies in question , but 
for the US economy. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter has reviewed the literature on the origin and channels of FOI 
productivity spillover, factors governing FOI productivity spillover effects, and 
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empirical methodologies to quantify FDI productivity spillovers. 
The theories constructed in the paradigm of "ownership, location, 
internalisation" assume that firms engaging in FDI activities are homogeneous 
and more productive than their domestic rivals so that they can overcome the 
cost disadvantages of overseas business operations. The latest theories built on 
the assumption of "firms with heterogeneous productivity" find that firms 
engaging in FDI are more productive than firms which only export, while the 
latter are more productive than firms which serve domestic market only. The 
above two generations of FDl theories both imply that multinational enterprises 
are the most productive, implying the possibility of FDI productivity spillovers. 
The review also shows that possible channels of FDI productivity 
spillovers include labour mobility and vertical input-output linkages between 
multinational affiliates and domestic enterprises, export of MNEs, 
demonstration, increased competition, and resource reallocation. 
Various factors determine the effects of FDI productivity spillovers. They 
include FDI intensity and technology intensity, geographic proximity to 
multinational affiliates, absorptive capacity of domestic enterprises, legal 
environment on intellectual property rights in host countries, and learning 
costs. 
Available empirical methodologies include econometric models and 
computable general equilibrium models. The former are more widely adopted 
for firm-level and industry-level analysis, while the latter are more suitable for 
economy-wide analysis. 
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CHAI>TER 3: COMPUTABLE GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM MODELLING 
3.1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELLING 
3.1.1. Basics of General Equilibrium 
The theory underpinning computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
modelling is Walrasian general equilibrium theory, which shows that the 
demand and supply in an economy can achieve a general equilibrium with the 
interaction and interdependence of individual markets and agents. Compared to 
general equilibrium theory, a partial equilibrium analysis considers the 
determination of prices for some products only, assuming that the prices for 
other products are constant. 
A general equilibrium 111 an open economy can be depicted by the 
circular flow of the goods, services, factors and payments as shown in Figure 
3.1. 
There are three types of active agents in the economy, namely, firms , 
households and government. Firms employ the endowment of households in 
factor markets, and produce goods and services, which will be bought by 
households in the product markets. The income of households comes from the 
rental of their endowments including labour, capital and land. The government 
collects taxes from households and firms and disburses the tax revenue to firms 
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and households in the forms of subsidies and transfer payments. 
Goods and 
services 
Figure 3.1: Circular Flows of an Opcn Economy 
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Source: Sue Wing (2004), Dervis, de Melo and Robinson ( 1982). 
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3.1.2. An Exchange Economy with Walrasian General Equilibrium 
In a pure exchange economy, a Walrasian general equilibrium IS 
characterised by a vector of prices that makes the excess demand for each good 
in the economy zero. 
Suppose there are D consumers and N types of goods in the economy. The 
consumer agent needs to solve a utility maximization problem: 
d = I , 2, .. .. D 
where P is the price vector; Xii is the vector of demand for goods; and Ell 
--/9-
denotes the vector of goods (endowments) of the dth consumer. The so luti on 
X (P , p . E ,, ) to thi s utility max imi zation problem subject to the income 
constraint is the consumer's Marshallian demand bundle, which is 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices. 
Then for the ith good, the aggregate excess demand can be specified as : 
J) f) 
2 , (P ) = I X,." (P ,P · E,,) - I E,.t/ i :::: 1, 2, 00. , N 
(/=1 t/=, 
When Z, (P ) >0, the aggregate demand for the ith commodity exceeds the 
aggregate endowment of the ith commodity. When 2 , (P) <0, there is an 
excess supply of commodity i. 
In vector form, the aggregate excess demand function for the whole set of 
commodities can be speci fied as: 
Z (P ) = (Z ,(P ),oo"ZN (P» 
Since the endowment vector Et! is exogenous variables independent of 
prices, Z(P) is also homogenous of degree zero in prices. 
Walras ian general equilibrium occurs when the aggregate excess demand 
for each commodity in the whole economy is zero. That is to say, a price vector 
P * is called a Walrasian general equilibrium price vector if Z ( P*) = 0 . 
Furthermore, the aggregate excess demand function must satisfy Walnls ' Law: 
fo r any price vector P, we have p . Z (P ) = O. 
The existence of a general equilibrium III the economy has been 
controvers ial until it was proved by McKenzie (1954) and Arrow and Debreu 
(1954) with fi xed points theorems. The general equilibrium is named after 
Walras only because "Walras was the first to attempt to an answer to the 
question of existence by reducing it to a question of whether simultaneous 
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equations of market supply and market demand have a solution"(Jehle and 
Reny. 2001, pp. 191-192). 
Since the aggrcgate excess demand function is homogeneous of degree 
zero in commodity prices, then if po· =[P" P2, .•• , PN] is a solution, then 
~ ' = [ l . . (P]IPJ) ... , (PNIP,)] is also a solution to this exchange equilibrium, i.e. 
equilibrium determines relative prices, so we can choose the price of one good 
as numeraire. 
3.1.3. A Closed Economy with Competitive General Equilibrium 
The pure exchange economy can be extendcd to a competitive market with 
firms and production but no government. Now the general equilibrium in this 
economy have four important properties, namely, good market clearance, 
faclOr market clearance, zero profit, and income balance. 
Suppose there are N representative producers, each producing an 
idiosyncratic type of good or service. Suppose that there exists a single 
representative household owning F types of endowments. The household rents 
hislher endowments El and consume goods and services 0. Let indices 
.i = {1.2,···, N} denote the set of producers and their associated commodities, 
f = {1.2.· . '. F} denote the set of primary inputs. P = (P, . P2 ... , P/",,) IS the 
vector of market prIces for goods, servICes, and R = (R I' R 2··.' RI-) IS the 
vector of market prices for endowments. 
Market Clearance 
Firstly, an equilibrium of economlC flows implies that any product 
produced in a certain industry should be exhausted by firms in other industries 
as intermediate products, or consumed by households as final products, i.e. 
commodity market clearance; and all the endowments of households are fully 
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employed by firms , i. e. faclor market clearance. 
Commodity market clearance implies that the supply of the jth commodity 
Y} must be equal to the sum of the ith producer 's demand for this commodity 
G 1.' indexed by i = I , 2, .. , N, and the consumer's demand of this commodity 
N 
~ ~ = LG;" +X} (3.1) 
, ~ I I
In a similar way, factor market clearance implies that the quantity of thefi.h 
endowment is equal to sum of this particular endowment employed by the N 
industries: 
N 
Ef = I Ef ,} 
j ~ 1 1
Zero Profit 
(3.2) 
Another property of general equilibrium is that every representative firm 
makes zero profit. The reason for this property in competitive market is that 
otherwise firms would enter the profit-making industries so that we can not be 
in equilibrium. This implies that the revenue of gross output of the jth sector, 
P Y , should be equal to the sum of the total cost of the intermediate inputs } ) 
plus the total cost of the primary factors which are employed for the production 
of the jth industry : 
N F 
PjYj = LP;Gj,i + LRrEj,f (3.3) 
i ~ 1 1 / =1 
Income Balance 
The income balance implies that for the representative household, all of 
his/her income M should come from the return to his/her primary inputs into 
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the production of goods and services: 
F 
M= 'LRfEr (3.4) 
};I 
All the income of the consumer should exhaust in consuming the goods 
and services to satisfy his/her demand: 
N F 
Lp;x; = M = LRfEf (3.5) 
;=1 f =1 
3.2. MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
3.2.1. Constant Elasticity of Substitution Functions 
CGE modelling uses standard functional forms to solve the production and 
consumption decisions which are captured by nonJinear optimality conditions. 
Most widely adopted forms of functions for production and utility are constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) functions and their special cases, namely, 
Cobb-Douglas, Leontief and constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
functions. Various combinations of these four functional forms are employed in 
different scenarios in CGE modelling to capture different production 
technologies and consumption preferences. The choice of functional forms 
largely depends on availability of the parameter data , and the also on the 
amount of effort the modeller is willing to invest in econometric estimation 
(Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997). 
A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function has a form of: 
(3.6) 
To derive the elasticity of substitution of this production function , 
technical rate of substitution (TRS) between two inputs needs to be found first. 
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[ 
N ] ~ - I I1 . P P, P _ I 
ay, lax", = A, ' -P . ~ b " I X " ; ; '°1 ,1 ' P, ,X,,; 
I I- I 
TRS"s" = 
The logarithm of the technical rate of substitution is derived: 
! ! 
oX , 
In TRS I = In( ~ ) ) + (P I -1) · In(-,-"I ) 
1,1 . ° X 
,,I 1,1 
finally, the value of the elasticity of substitution (hereafter (1) can be 
calculated: 
dln(X,,1 I X ),S> dln(X" , I XI) 1 
er = = =--
I d In!TRS"",/! In(o;,';0I,1 ) + (p, -1), d In(X ),'; X ),,) 1- P, 
Therefore the elasticity of substitution of this CES production function is a 
As P ---+ 0, i.e. (J ---+ 1, we can prove, with L ' H o o p i l a a ~ ' ' rule, that equation 
(3,6) becomes a Cobb-Douglas form. The logarithm form of equation (3.6) is: 
[ 
N ] Y In I o", X ;: 
In(- ' ) = 1= 1 , so that 
A , P , 
= ~ ~° In X = In[rrN ./,( ,5,.,] L.J 1 ,1 1,1 "I 
1=1 1= 1 
That is, when p ---+ 0 (i.e. a ---+ 1), we can get a Cobb-DoughlS function 
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N 
Yj = A j IT X :':' , which also implies that any Cobb-Douglas function has a 
,=1 
uni lQly elasti city of substitution. Compared to the unitary ela ti city of 
substitution of the Cobb-Douglas functi ons, the elas ti city (0) of a CES functi on 
offe rs CGE mode llers a greater fl ex ibility because they can choose di ffe rent 
parameter va lues for er to capture a vast spectrum o f produc ti on technology. 
Another spec ia l case of CES is Lconticf form . As p---+ - , i.e. er---+O, 
Leonti ef fo rm is generated, as any Leontie f function has zero ubstitutability 
among its inputs: 
Constant elasticity of transformation (C ET) functi on have identica l 
functi ona l forms as CES functions. However, whil e CES functi ons spec ify an 
output as a function of inputs, the CET functions state the input as the 
functions of various outputs. Thi s function al forms is useful , for example, in 
disaggregating domestic output into exports and domestic sales on the 
assumption that the producers maximizes their profits, subject to imperfec t 
substitution between exports and domestic sales . 
[ 
N ]"T' 
X , = A, ~ ~ ~ ) ' : ~ : : (3. 7) 
CES, Cobb-Douglas, Leonti e f and CET [uncti ons are all homogeneous of 
degree one. 
Nested Functions 
In CGE modelling, it is a common practice to combine several diffe rent 
functi ons in a nested form , with the upper level functi on using as its input the 
output o f the lower level functions. F igure 3.2 prov ides a nested form of 
produc ti on. 
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Figure 3.2: A Nested Production Function 
I ntermed iatc 
good bundle 
(Leonliej) 
~ . , , X; .N 
Output '" 
(CaM -Douglas) Va I ue-added 
bundle 
U,.3 = I /(J -pJ 
(CES) 
Labour Capital 
In thi s nested production functi on, total output IS defined as a 
Cobb-Doug las functi on o f an intermediate good bundle and a value-added 
bundle , which implies that the e lasti city of substitution between these two 
bundles is I . The intermediate good bundle is a Leontief, or linear, combination 
of N intermediate products, 0 ./, . . . , 0 ,N, so that the e lastici ty of substitution 
between any two alternative inputs is specified as zero. T he value-added nest 
comprises a CES transformation o f primary inputs such as labour and capital. 
Savings 
Figure 3.3: A Nested Utility Function 
Utility U 
x , 
Con umption 
goods 
In a similar way, Figure 3.3 provides a nested utility function. The utility 
function is a Cobb-Douglas function of savings (future consumption) and 
goods (current consumption), so that the e lastic ity of substitution is one. 
Current consumption of goods is a CES function o f N goods. 
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Nesting allows for combining vanous production teclmologies and 
consumption preferences to a single model. Theoretically, infinite layers of 
nesting can be selected in a single CGE model , but the more layers the less 
tractable the model would be. Should a counterintuitive simulation result 
emerges, it would be difficult to pinpoint the precise source, thus forcing the 
modellers to turn to less informative explanations (Blake, 1998; Sue Wing, 
2004). Therefore, two or three layers of nesting is a feasible option. 
3.2.2. Algebraic Framework of CGE Modelling 
A CGE model consists of a system of core equations of production and 
consumption which need to be solved simultaneously, with benchmark data 
obtained from an input-output table or social accounting matrix (SAM), to 
identify the equilibrium price and output set in accordance with the principles 
of general equilibrium, namely, market clearance, zero profit and income 
balance. The algebraic framework of CGE modelling can be illustrated within a 
closed Cobb-Douglas economy, where preference and technology are 
represented by Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, respectively. 
The utility level of the only representative consumer is specified as a 
Cobb-Douglas function of the consumption of N commodities (.X): 
.v N 
U = A[1 X;l with La) = I 
J =1 ) =1 
Assume the consumer needs to maximize his/her utility level: 
N 
max U = A[I X : ' 
)=1 
N 
s.l . Ip,X, ~ M M
) =1 
where the bar over a variable indicates the value of the variable IS 
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exogenously given. 
The quantity of demand for the j th good can be derived: 
M a , a i M )( =-x-- = --
, P N P 
' I a) , 
, =1 
P X 
This can be rewritten as a , = ~ ~ , . Therefore (J.J is the share of the j th 
commodity in the total expenditure. Constant expenditure shares IS also an 
important property of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
The production function can be defined in a similar way. Assume the j th 
producer needs to produce the j th good or service using N types of intermediate 
inputs g and F types of primary inputs E with a Cobb-Douglas function: 
N F N ,.. 
Y = A IT C lf ,., IT E r).! } J J ,I . J ,J with L Pj,1 + L Y J,J = I 
1= 1 / = 1 1= 1 / = 1 
This producer needs to minimize its total cost: 
N /; 
min C, = I p,CJ" + IRrE,J 
1=1 /=1 
N F N F 
s.t. Y < A ·IlC fJ" Il Er}.! . 
, - , "I J..! ' with If3,,1 + I yJ.! = I 
1=1 { =I i=1 1=1 
The quanti ty of demand for the ith intermediate input and / th primary input 
are: 
y 13 N ( P JPI" F (R Jrl'[ C = = I l l _, Il -.1 ),1 A,P; 1=1 13./ ,1 1=1 YJJ 
( J
fl ( JY Y N P . I.' ,; R . J f E =JJ.! Il _, n -.I 
./,1 A ,PI 1=1 f3 ,,i / =1 YjJ 
With the solutions to consumption demand, intermediate and pnmary 
inputs 111 production, the four central conditions of a general equilibrium 
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specified by equation (3.1), (3 .2), (3.3) and (3.4) can be reformulated. 
Commodity market clearance condition (3. 1) can be transformed into an 
N-dimension excess demand vector which measures the gap between supply 
and demand in the market for thejth commodity: 
/=1 
(3.8) 
Primary input market clearance condition (3.2) can be transformed into an 
F-dimension excess demand vector which measures the gap between supply 
and demand in the market for thefih primary input: 
N 
..1;:" = L E, . ./ - E, 
, =1 
(3.9) 
Zero profit condition in equation (3 .3) can be transfo rmed into an 
N-dimension vector which measures the gap between the cost incurred in 
production and total revenue for thejth commodity: 
N F 
L f ~ ~ = PX , - L ~ ~ , . , , - IPj E, ,j 
1=1 ' = 1 
(3 .10) 
finally, the income balance condition in equation (3.4) can be transformed 
into the excess income w hich measures the di ffe rence of total expenditure and 
the scalar income M of the representati ve consumer: 
F 
/).m = LRf Ef -M 
.r =1 
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(3.11 ) 
Vectors (3.8), (3 .9), (3. 10) and (3 .11 ) fo rmulate 2N+F+l equat ions fo r 
2N+ F unknowns: N industry output leve ls Y = [ ~ ~ ' Y2 , .. . , YN ] , N commodity 
prices P = [ [ ~ , P 2 , , ... ,PN] and F primary fac tor pri ces R = [R" R2, .. . , Rd. 
The general equilib ri um is therefore the joint so lution to these 2N+F 
unknowns with 2N F- 1 equations denoted by (3.8), (3.9), (3. I 0) and (3. 11 ) . 
Thi s p rocess can be reformulated as so lving a mixture of the fo llowing 
complementarity problem (as defined in Table 3.1 ): 
V 2 0 
,<j.t . V/CV) ~ ~ 0, V'V/(V) = 0 
(3. 12) 
where V = [Y, P, R]' is the vector of commodi ty prices, primary input 
prices, quantities of commodi ty and income leve ls. V/CV) = [L( , A"' , AI!', ,1 /11 ] 
is a system of equations from (3 .8) to (3. 11 ). Thi s complementari ty problem is 
summarized in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1: Complementarity Problem 
A general equilibrium model can be formulated as a square system of 
weak inequalities, each with an assoc iated non-negative vari able. Thi s is 
referred to as a complementarity problem in mathematics, and the 
associated variables are referred to as complementary vari ables. 
For example, if a zero profit condition holds as a strict inequality in 
equilibrium, profits for that activity are negati ve, thus that good will not be 
produced. So the complementa ry vari able to a zero-pro fi t condition is the 
quantity of the ac tivity level. Take the pro fit of the j th product as an example 
as shown in equation (3 .11 ): 
N I-" 
Inequality: 6,R -= P Y - '\' PG - '\' R E < 0 
.I I I L..J I I .' L..J r l .f -
/""'= \ ( :.- 1 
Associated complementary variable: Jj 
Complementary form: }' * t"X = 0 
I J 
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Table 3.2: A Sketch of the Complcmentarity Problem (3.13) 
Inequality Vnriable Dimension 
C "" ' / ,' n P, [l' 1 a ,m N [Y fJ N ( 1PN r ( R 1Y',{ 1 1'1. = ~ ~ -- - - +-- - y 
/ ,=1 A/ P, ,=1 (3", { = I r J.! PI / 
p , N 
F 
N 
Y N ( p )P',' /; (R )Y/./ /'>,." =py _ _ i TI - ' TI - I 
J / / A . fJ r 
i ,=1 i,' ( = 1 iJ 
}' , 
Therefore, problem (3,12) is an extended representation of the Walras' 
Law with the presence of firms and production, As the system of equations 
(3.8), (3.9), (3.10) and (3. 11 ) is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, once a 
nominal vector (P, R) are identified to solve the problem (3. 12), then ()J', AR) 
should also be the solution to it for any constant A. Therefore, on ly relative 
nominal values matter in solving a general equilibrium model. [n other words, 
the model displays a "neutrality of money" (Robinson and Lofgren, 2005). 
So when the price for a certain good or primary factor is chosen as a 
numeraire, e,g P J = I , all other nominal variables can be defined relative to the 
nurTIC!raire, e.g P; = P2 / ~ ; ; ••• ; P ~ ~ = PN / ~ . . In CGE modelling, if a 
numeraire is not specified, prices obtained from different simulations are not 
directly comparable as they can be the base values (P, R) simultaneously 
multiplied by an arbitrary scalar ()J', }...R). To avoid this problem, one must 
specify a price as numeraire and fix it at a constant value (normally I) 
throughout all simulations, so that simulation results can be compared. 
Theoretically any price can be taken as the numeraire, e.g. labour wage, 
nominal exchange rate and domestic price index. Prices obtained from a 
-6 / -
simulation may be different dependent on the choice of the numeraire, but no 
quantities are affected by it. Choosing the exchange rate as the numeraire does 
not imply a fixed exchange rate regime. Similarly, choosing domestic 
consumer's price as the numeraire does not imply zero inflation. To design a 
fixed real exchange rate we have to put one more constraint on the exchange 
rate, i. e. to fix the ratio of exchange rate to domestic price index. 
3.2.3. Labour and Capital Markets 
Classic CGE models usually assume full employment of primary factors of 
production (labour and capital) so that the economy always functions at its 
production possibility frontier. The product prices and factor prices adjust so 
that all factor markets clear, i.e. there is no excess supply or demand of factors. 
The supply of various types of labour (e.g. skilled and unskilled) can be 
assumed to be fixed in a static model so that the total labour supply as a sum of 
them is also fixed. Constrained by their sector-specific skills and experience, 
labour can also be assumed to be imperfectly mobile across sectors in the short 
run, subject to certain constant elasticity of transformation functions. 
Similarly, the total supply of capital can also be assumed fixed in a static 
model. Usually capital is treated as a homogenous factor and does not need to 
be further disaggregated into different types. But as capital is associated with 
ownership, entrepreneurship and sector-specific factors in the real economy, 
capital can also be assumed imperfectly mobile across sectors in the short run. 
Foreign direct investment can be introduced into a CGE model as an increment 
to the capital stock invested by a representative agent for multinational 
enterprises. 
There are also two alternatives in terms of capital supply (Bussolo and 
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Round, 2003). The first is to fix the savings rate so that the change of capital 
stock will be proportionate to the change of GDP ("savings-driven"). The 
second one is to keep the savings rate endogenous, so that a target real return to 
capital is achieved and maintained ("investment-driven"). These two options 
concern the relationship between investment and savings, and will also be 
addressed in Section 3.2.4. 
The above full-employment and imperfect-mobility assumptions arc 
suitable in the short run only. In the long run, it is usually more appropriate to 
assume that both capital and labour are freely mobile across sectors and there 
exists slack capacity in the economy so that the wage and capital rental are 
maintained at stable levels (Bussolo and Round, 2003). 
3.2.4. Model Closure 
In CGE modelling, modellers often need to incorporate macroeconomic 
mechanisms (e.g. government activities, international trade and foreign 
exchange) into general equilibrium models by including some variables that are 
central to policy considerations. Closure rules refer to how endogenous 
microeconomic price and quantity variables are constrained by exogenous 
macroeconomic balances. 
Sen (1963) was the first economist identifying the necessity of closure rule 
in applied general equilibrium modelling with macroeconomic variables. He 
found that it would be impossible to warrant the ex post identity between 
savings and investment if some market equilibrium conditions have to be 
imposed on the model simultaneously. Therefore to find a reasonable solution 
for a CGE model with macroeconomic variables, one of the conditions must be 
relaxed. Choosing a "closure rule" means deciding which of the conditions 
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should be relaxed. In other words, a closure rule is a modified balancing 
constraint that does not necessarily represent a market equilibrium condition 
(Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997). The design of closure rules is crucial to CGE 
modelling, in that it affects the model structure, simulation results and policy 
conclusions (Whalley and Yeung, 1984; Dcwatripont and Michel, 1987; 
Bussolo and Round, 2003; Robinson and Lofgren, 2005). 
Generally there are three types of macroeconomic closure rules that need 
to be designed by CGE modellers, namely government closure dealing with 
government behaviour, savings-investment closure for the determination of 
savings and investment, and external closure for current account and exchange 
rate regime. Each of the above three types of closure rules contains a variety of 
alternatives, the most commonly applied of which are outlined in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Alternative Macroeconomic Closures 
Government Savings-investment 
.:. Fixed government savings .:. Savings-driven 
or spend ing 
.:. Fixed government sav ings 
rate w.a GDP 
.:. Fixed real government 
consumption and subsidy 
.:. Ut ility-max imising agent 
.:. Investment-driven 
Source: Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2002). 
(1) Government closure 
External 
.:. Large/small 
economy 
.:. Current 
balance 
.:. Floating or 
exchange rate 
open 
account 
fixed 
Government is generally modelled in CGE models as an agent co llecting 
taxes, a llocating transfer payments, and purchasing goods and services. There 
are a variety of choices to deal with govenmlent revenue and expenditure as 
well as government savings (surplus) or borrowing (deficit). 
The first option is that the ratio of fiscal expenditure to GDP is maintained 
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at a fixed level by introducing an endogenous tax variable. This policy design 
would reflect the target of the government to maintain a relatively stable level 
of economic intervention. 
The target magnitude of fiscal savings (borrowings) can also be taken into 
consideration in the the government closure. For example, it could also be 
desirable to fix the level of government savings (borrowings), by forcing 
government spending and revenue to move in tandem. More realistically, we 
can also fix the fiscal savings (borrowings) rate with respect to GDP at a target 
level. This closure rule is pertinent to some countries whose political stability 
is easily threatened by inflationary pressure. For example, all European Union 
member states must abide by the Stability and Growth Pact, which requires an 
annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP. The above two "fiscal 
neutral" settings on fiscal savings (borrowings) will transmit any pressure of 
external shock impacting government expenditure directly to taxpayers. 
There are also alternative government balance closure rules related to 
poverty-relieving policies. For example, both government consumption and 
subsidy can be set fixed in real terms to guarantee stable poverty-relieving 
efforts, and government revenue comes from fixed tax rates. Thus the 
government savings (borrowings) is determined as a residual which is equal to 
the difference between variable government expenditure and revenue. 
Finally, we can also treat government analogous to a private representative 
utility-maximising agent (Shoven and Whalley, 1992). In that case the 
government has a utility function determining government demand and the 
government meets its demand subject to its fiscal constraint. 
The instrument by which the government reaches its closure target is also 
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important. With any of the above fixed savings and/or consumption targets, the 
government can balance its budget by a variety of measures. Using a 
non-distortionary lump-sum transfer is often suitable if the distortionary costs 
of tax changes need to be separated from the costs or benefits of the simulation 
being imposed. Using a tax rate (e.g. an income tax) to meet the government's 
budget balance is often more suitable in practice. 
(2) Savings-investment closure 
Savings-investment closure refers to the mechanism of how savings and 
investment are generated. It is either savings-driven (the value of investment 
adjusts endogenously) or investment-driven (the value of savings adjusts 
endogenously). Savings-driven closure fixes all non-government saving rates 
and scales investment demand so that investment spending equals savings. A 
standard investment-driven closure fixes real investment quantities and adjusts 
the savings rate of households endogenously. 
(3) External closure 
External closure for CGE models with export and import activities 
concernS three basic questions: (a) whether the country modelled is a large 
country; (b) how current account balance (foreign savings) is treated; and (c) 
whether the foreign exchange rate is flexible. 
For a small open economy, its economy scale is so small that it has no 
monopolistic power to influence its export or import prices. Under such an 
assumption, we need to fix the export and import prices at which this country 
engages transactions with the rest of the world. But under the 
large-open-cconomy assumption, the export and import prices at world market 
need to change cndogenously with the changes of the economy's exports and 
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imports. 
As for the current account balance, the most widely adopted solution for 
current account balance is to fix the balance as an exogenous parameter in the 
modelling. This implies that modellers need to force both exports and imports 
to change with the same magnitude, and in the same direction (Robinson and 
Lofgren, 2005). 
Another equilibrium variable which is also integral for open economy 
modelling is foreign exchange rate, which is the relative price of commodities 
in international markets and commodities consumed in domestic market. Fixed 
exchange rate closure means that this price has to be fixed relative to a certain 
domestic price index, while the flexible exchange rate closure lets this price 
freely determined by the current account balance. Under a flexible exchange 
rate regime. an increase of current account surplus suggests a relatively higher 
demand for domestically manufactured commodities. This lifts up the relative 
prices of domestic commodities and leads to an appreciation (decrease) of real 
exchange rate (Robinson and Lofgren, 2005). 
3.3. DATA FOR CGE MODELLING 
3.3.1. Input-output Table 
An input-output table contains the information on transactions within and 
between production sectors and non-production sectors. It represents the value 
of transactions in a given year. The demand for marketed goods and services is 
disaggregatcd into two blocks. namely intermediate demand by producers and 
final demand by households, government, and external markets. In terms of the 
input side. total input is divided into intermediate input and value added. The 
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value-added items include, inter alia, compensation to empl oy ment, net taxes 
and depreciation. As Table 3.4 shows, an input-output tab le can be broken 
down into three blocks. Block G captures the detai led intermediate input and 
demand presented by N x N inter-industry and intra-industry transac tions. The 
entry G
I
.) measures how much output of sector i is used by sector .J. Block 
X displays the final demand for each of the N industries, while block 
E contains the value-added items for each of the N industries. 
An input-output table provides an ideal dataset for CO E modell ing as it 
represents a "balanced" economy characterized by goods and Jactor market 
clearance, zero profit and income balance. In Table 3.3 , the row sum of any 
sector i in block G and X is equal to the total output in the corresponding 
sector, V, . This stands fo r the goods market clearance . which is what the 
equation (3. 1) conveys. The column sum of block E is equal to the total 
fac tor endowment of the corresponding factor supplier, l ';; which implies the 
Jactor market clearance condition as shown in equation (3.2). The sum fo r any 
column in block G and E is the total va lue of intermediate inputs and 
value added from primary inputs. This is equal to the gross value of output, 
which is exactly the zero profit condition in equation (3 .3). Finally, the um of 
all the element of block X and E should be equal, which means that the 
total fac tor endowment should be exhausted. Thi s implies income halance, as 
stated in equation (3 .5). 
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Table 3.4: A Basic Structure of an Input-output Table 
Total Demand 
Intermediate Demand Final Demand 
Industry Industry Change in Total 
1 ... N Households Government Export . .. Inventories Output 
Industry 1 r; 
Intermediate G X .,. 
Input 
Industry N ~ v v
Total Net Taxes E) 
Inputs Wages 
... 
Value Added 
Depreciation 
E 
Operating 
EF 
surplus 
~ o t a l l n p u t s s Y. ... Y\, Xl ... Xj) 
---
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006b) 
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Table 3.5: A Basic Structure of a Social Accounting Matrix 
Expenditures 
Factors Institutions Capital Rest of 
Activities Commodities Labour Capital Households Government Account the world 
Domestic Export 
Activities commodity subsidy 
supply 
Intermediate Private Government Investment 
Commodities 
inputs consumption consumption 
Factors I Labour Wages 
Capital Rental s 
Labour Capital Transfers Capital 
Households 
I Institutions income Income flow Receipts 
Indirect Tariffs Direct taxes 
Government 
taxes 
Private Government 
Capital Account 
savIng saving 
Imports Reserve 
Rest of the world 
accumulation 
Total costs Total Factor Factor Household Government Investment Foreign 
Totals absorption income II1come income expenditure exchange 
flow 
Source : Dervis et al (1982, pp. 155-162) , Yao and Liu (2000), Round (2003). 
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3.3.2. Social Accounting Matrix 
While an input-output table only shows the relationship between 
production accounts and non-production accounts, an extended form of 
input-output table, namely social accounting matrix (SAM), includes thc 
information of all transaction within and between all accounts. That is to say, 
the blank area below block X in Table 3.4 can be tilled in with new 
information of transactions among non-production sectors in a SAM. 
Table 3.5 provides an example of the standard form of a SAM. Apart from 
the addition of transactions among non-production sectors, a SAM has two 
more special features. Firstly, there is a distinction bctwecn "activities" and 
"commodities". While the accounts of "activities" represent the production 
sectors, the "commodities" accounts combine domestic supply with imports to 
generate a total supply to the domestic market, usually following the 
"Armington" assumption which specifies product differentiation by country of 
origin (Armington, 1969), as illustrated in Figure 3.4. Secondly, there is a 
separate "capital" account which can be treated as an investment bank 
collecting savings from households. government. and thc rest of the world. and 
spending them on investment goods. 
There is an important analogy of a balanced input-output table and SAM. 
For a balanced input-output table. the row sum is always equal to the column 
sum for each production sector, which represents the balance between 
production input and output. In a balanced SAM, the row sum for every 
"activity", "commodity", "factor", "institution" and "capital account" is equal 
to the associated column sum respectively, perfectly reflecting the goods and 
value t10ws at an equilibrium. 
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Figure 3.4: Flows of Commodities and Armingtol1 Aggr'cgation 
Commodi ty output 
from acti vity I 
Commodity out put 
from acti vity N 
••••••••••••••••••••• 
•• 
.-
•• • 
•• • 
•• • 
•• • 
. 
.. .... 
• Imports ri'om diffe rent • 
I\ggregate export 
· • 
• 
• 
· • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
origins 
Composite 
commod ity fo r 
· • 
· • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• + • 
domestic market 
•••• •• •• • • • • • • • • • • . ................. . 
• 
• 
.+ 
Pri vate consllm ption, govcrIllll t:n t 
consumption, investment, intermed iate use 
So urce: Lo fgren et al (2 002) 
The choice of CGE modellers between an input-output table and a AM is 
dependent on data availability and the purpose of CGE research. For research 
foc used on consumption, poverty, or any phenomenon directly related to 
household behav iour, a SAM is integral to the modelling, as a AM has 
information on the transactions among non-production sectors. However, fo r 
multi -national or global economic research where in a full set of in fo rmation on 
transactions among non-production sectors is not ava ilab le, then input-o utput 
tables can be used in place of SAMs. For example. the core datasets of the 
widely employed Global Trade Analysis Project database (Hertel, 1997) are 
mainly input-output tables instead of SAMs (Walmsley and Lakatos, 2008). 
Input-output tables are also suitable for other type of CGE models whose main 
concern is in production rather than consumption side. 
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3.4. CALIBRATION AND "CALIBRATED FORMS" OF A 
CESECONOMY 
3.4.1. Calibration of A CES Economy 
Calibration is an essential step in CGE modelling to make sure that the 
designed model equations can replicate a balanced benchmark economy 
(Mansur and Whalley, 1984; Shoven and Whalley, 1984). This requires, apart 
from selecting existing parameters from the econometric estimates from the 
same time period, calculating other necessary parameters with the model 
equations and benchmark dataset. 
In calculating the parameters, all prices should be treated as unity and thus 
all value flows in the input-output table or SAM can be regarded as benchmark 
quantiti es . With these parameters and those selected from the econometric 
estimates in literature, solving the problem of (3 .12) will then make the 
quantities of variables equal to the corresponding values in the benchmark 
dataset, thus replicating the benchmark equilibrium. 
For a CES function as specified by equation (3.6), or equivalently by 
denoting (/j l /(l-pj) : 
(3.6a) 
only Ai and oIl can be calibrated. The elasticity of substitution i.e. {/J should 
be exogenously selected by estimation or directly from literature since an 
economy at the benchmark equilibrium only tells the information of price and 
quantity levels. (Shoven and Whalley, 1984). 
The marginal revenue product (MRP) of the ith input J0.i in the jth output 
}j is then equal to the price of the ith input: 
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ay cy ( N ) 1/(a ,- I ) cy - I 
P x _ ,_I = P x A - , -.1 - '" (5 X (a / - I )I <T/ a _I_ X - I / a , 
I ax I I cy - 1 ~ ~ 1,1 ) ,' I ,' 1,1 
1,1 I , ~ I I CY I 
= P X r l / a , v - I / a , A PI- l / a , 
./ I a / ,1 '/\ /,1 / (3. 13) 
( ) 
11 a / 
= P x A (a,-Il / a / o" l = P" 
/.1 J ,I X ' 
./,1 
Similarly, the MRP of lj of the kth input X;.k is equal to the price of X;.k 
P X A(O"' 1) l a , 0 ( ~ ~ l / r r l l = P
k / I / ,k X 
./,k 
(3. 14) 
Divide (3 .1 3) by (3 .14) and we can get the quantity of one input in terms 
of the other: 
(
0 P) O"I X -X ~ ~
./ ,k - J,I 0 P. 
/ ,I k 
(3 .15) 
Equation (3. 15) can be transformed with benchmark values (X, P) from 
the input-output table (in Table 3.3): 
- - (0 P]<T I X =X ~ ~
/.k /,1 0 1. 
./ ,1 k 
o = 0 Pk X / ,k _ ( - )I / <T/ 
./,k J,I P X , 
I ./ .1 
N 
Since I O,l ,k = 1, 
k=1 
N I - (- f ' f s: l{ ( X,/ 'k ]1/0'1 s: . . : : . . : := : : . : . . . .I _ ~ _ X ~ , , , _ k k_ ' = I 
~ ~ / I I = U"I p,x l/, 0', I 
k=I ' P, X/" I ./ ,1 
pxl/O', o = I ./,1 
/,1 N 
'" P (X WO', ~ ~ k ./.d (3. 16) 
With calibrated value of 6j ,i, Aj can then be deri ved by rearranging 
equation (3.6a): 
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Y, 
A, = - ( ( N - - - - - - ~ - - - ) - r r /- ' ( ~ ~ ~, , - I ) )
"t5 x ( r r J J I ) / ~ 1 1
L..J ) ,1 " I 
1=1 
(3,17) 
With the calibrated parameter values of (A), 6)i) and selected parameter 
values of «(Jj) , a CGE model can solve the counterfactual results of (./\),;, O, p)' 
Pj,;) when an external policy shock is introduced to the model. 
3.4.2. "Calibrated Forms" of CES Functions 
In CGE counterfactual simulations, an alternative a lgorithm, namely the 
"calibrated form" of CES functions can be employed to replace the 
complicated and error-prone calibration procedures with more e legant and 
intuitive specifications (Blake, Rayner and Reed , 1999; Rutherford, 1995), 
We need to specify a certain input as a function of the total output first. 
With zero-profit condition: 
( J ~ ~ (Ja N N t5 p i p ) N t5 ~ , ,PY = PX = PX ~ ~ =X __ , P ~ ~.I i I k ) ,k I k i,i t5 P i ,l Ii . I k (p ) k =1 k=1 i ,l k i ,l k =1 k 
( J
p ) N 
= X ~ ~ " li a, pl-"I 
"I t5 L.. "k k 
i ,l k= 1 
( Ii )'" / N (Ii )a
J 
/ N X = P Y - ,-,I " t5"1 p,1-a, = P Y ~ ~ " t5"1 pl-a, 
" I I I P L.. .I ,k k .I i P L.. J,I I 
I k=1 I 1=1 
(3 , 18) 
Since equation (3,18) only contains four variables, i. e. the prices and 
quantities of an input and total output, replace ~ , i i in equation (3.18) with that 
in equation (3.6a), and eliminate Yj, then we can derive the relationship 
between input priee and output price. With equations (3.6a) and (3.18): 
N 
Y, = A, 'Lt5 ,,1 
( 
t5 ) ) ) )py _ ,_,I 
)' P 
I 
1=1 
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(CT ,- I)/CT , 
=A / N 
'\' OCT I i -CT , ~ ~ ),' I 
N (8 ) (CT /- I) 
x '\' 0 -:!.:!... ~ ~ / ,1 P 
1=1 I 
;=1 
By eliminating }j from both sides, we get a unit cost fun ction: 
(3 .19) 
Calibrated form of quantity 
With equation (3 ,17), 
With equation (3 .1 6), the above equation can be transformed into: 
y =y ~ / -~ ~ - - - - - - - - - -
) .I 
'\' (5 X (CTJ- I)/CT, 
~ ~ J.I /,1 
1=1 
k=1 
N PX I/CT, 
'\' N ' / ,1 X (CT,-I)/CT, 
~ ~ ./. ' 
,=1 '\' Po (X )1/ rrJ 
~ ~ k .I,k 
x y 
/ 
k=1 
N CT.l I( CTr l) 
'\' (pXI/CT I x X(rrJ-I)/rr.l ) 
~ ~ I / ,1 ) ,1 
=f. ~ ~ - ~ I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.I ~ ~ (PJt/rr, x x(rrJ-I) / CT , ) 
~ ~ '/ ., / ,1 
N 
I p,Xj ., 
,=1 ;=1 
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= y 
I 
= y , 
.v 
L L ~ X I . , ,
1=1 
N (__ (X J«7'-I)/<71 J 
" PX X .....:' .1 L.. " .' X 
,=1 ' .' 
= y 
I 
(7 ,/("' ,-1 ) 
where Bj.i denotes the cost share of the ith input in product value. 
Replace the upper case variables with lower case ones which represent the 
y 
ratios to the benchmark quantities i.e. Y , = -.:!. and y) 
.x , 
X =-'-' . 
I X . 
.1 .1 
(3.6b) 
With equation (3 .6b), it would be faster to solve the values o o ) ~ ~ and xj . ; in 
counterfactual scenarios. Then new values o f outputs and inputs can be 
obtained by multiplying these ratios with the assoc iated benchmark values. We 
can see that there is no need to calibra te the parameters here. Eq uati on (3.6b) 
exhibi ts e legance and conc iseness compared to equation (3.6a). 
Calibrated form of prices 
Substitute aj .i, Aj in equation (3.19) with the specifications in equations 
(3 .1 6) and (3.17) and foll ow similar procedures, we can get the re lationship 
between multiples of output price and input price: 
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(3.19a) 
This specification also applies to CET production functions specified as 
(3. 7). 
Calibrated form of input demands 
With equation (3. 16), we can get an eq uat ion to capture the relationship 
between output and input demand from equation (3. 19) as we ll: 
(3.18a) 
For a CET production function specified by equation (3.7) , the calibrated 
share form of output supply is similar to equation (3.18a): 
(3. 18b) 
Extensions with (Ir"'" 1 
Nonetheless, for the case of (5j = 1, an extension to equations (3.6b) and 
(3. 19a) with calibrated form is necessary. Otherwise they will collapse as 
We can get a logarithm form of equation (3.19a), 
When fJ; approaches 1, both numerator and denominator of the equation 
above approach zero. L 'Hospital s rule applies: 
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/= 1 
Thus, when O"j-41 , equation (3.19a) will be transformed to be its 
"Cobb-Doug/as counterpart": 
N 
P, = TIp/Oj) 
i=1 
(3.19b) 
For equation (3.6b), when O"j-41 , we can get its "Cobb-Douglas form" with 
L 'Hospital s rule as well: 
N 
Y = TIxo1.,/a/ 
.I "I (3.6c) 
/=1 
With equations (3.6b), (3.I8a), (3.I9a, b) , most of equations of a CGE 
model can be listed succinctly. Actually, all of the generalized "production' 
functions, e.g. Armington aggregate, export and import, labour and capital 
disaggregation can be denoted by (3 .18a) and (3 .19a, b) forms. These functions 
together with the associated variables and parameters can then be used to 
derive the income balance equations, demand-supply equilibrium equations 
and zero profit conditions, which provide a more parsimonious specification of 
a general equilibrium analysis. These "calibrated forms" will be heavily used in 
Chapter 5 where a benchmark CGE model for the Chinese economy is 
constructed. 
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3.5. A FLOWCHART OF CGE MODELLING 
A typical CGE modelling work consists of a sequence of steps such as 
model design, data collection and compilation, model benchmark checking and 
counterfactual simulation. 
First of all, a reasonable and feasible model framework should be built up. 
Beside the basic equations for standard production and consumption, special 
specifications should be designed to accommodate different features of the 
research project. The model should be flexibly designed so that the efforts can 
be focused on the major research topic. For example, a CGE model designed 
for examining the productivity spill over effects in manufacturing sectors 
should avoid using complex nested production functions for services sectors. 
Then basic datasets of a benchmark year should be collected. They include 
an input-output table or SAM, tax data, trade data, etc. After the data have been 
manipulated for mutual consistency, they can be used in computer 
programming to calibrate the benchmark equilibrium. 
Counterfactual policy shocks are simulated to estimate the impact on the 
whole economy, the results of which need to be compared with the benchmark 
scenario for policy appraisal. 
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Figurc 3.5: A Flowchart of CGE Modclling 
Replication 
Identi fY funct ional forms 
Basic data for economy of a single 
year or average of multiple yea rs 
(input-output table or soc ial 
accounting matrix, tax data, trade 
data, etc) 
Data adjustment fo r mutual 
consistency and generate 
benchmark equilibrium data set 
.. ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ .. .. .. ..... ;:::. Calibrate to benchmark equilibrium 
Yes 
Po licy change spec i lied 
Counterfactual scenarios are 
performed for new policy regimes 
and shocks 
Policy appraisa l based on pairwise 
compari son between counterfactual 
and benchmark 
Exit 
So urce: hoven a nd Whalley ( 1984) 
:" Specijicai/c)/7'" 
: 0/ e x o o e n o u ~ ~
: elasticity 
:'. values 
... : ............. ...... . 
3.6. SOFTWARE TO IMPLEMENT CGE MODELS 
3.6.1. G A MS/MPSGE 
More and more powerful computer software has he lped CGE modellers to 
be ab le to 01 e problems and arri ve at ins ights that they would have not been 
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able to achieve otherwise. It has dramatically changed, extended and deepened 
the research agenda of CGE modellers (Markusen, 2002b, pp. 346). Among 
many software packages like GEMPACK, MATLA8. C++ and EViews with 
which a CGE model can be coded and implemented, GAMS (General 
Algebraic Modeling System) and its subsystem MPSGE (Mathematical 
Programming System for General Equilibrium Analysis) help CGE economists 
focus on the model designing work with a higher-level programming platform. 
Software packages other than GAMS/MPSGE generally do not allow the user 
to solve complementarity problems, greatly limiting model formulation and the 
range of questions analyzed by the modellers. (Markusen, 2002a, pp. 4) 
GAMS is a modelling system for a compact representation of large and 
complex mathematical programming problems, including linear, nonlinear, 
mixed integer, mixed integer nonlinear optimizations and mixed 
complementarity problems (GAMS Development Corporation, 2008; McCarl 
et aI., 2007). GAMS has been widely employed for large-scale economic and 
operations research modelling work after it was originally developed in the 
1970s (Rutherford, 1999). 
MPSGE as a subsystem of the GAMS is a language particularly tailored 
for the general equilibrium models. Based on nested CES production and utility 
functions, a MPSGE framework provides a concise modelling representation 
for the large-scale system of nonlinear inequalities which are the core of a CGE 
model. 
The interface of GAMS/MPSGE hybrid combines the strength of both 
systems. While the GAMS language has a strong capacity for managing large 
datasets, the MPSGE is of particular use for solving the general equilibrium 
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models. With MPSGE employing an extended syntax based on GAMS sets, the 
integrated system GAMS/MPSGE uses GAMS as the "front end" and "back 
end" to MPSGE, providing a compact model specification. This provides great 
benefits to economists who are more interested in the insights achieved by the 
CGE models than the time-consuming programming work (Rutherford, 1999). 
What a CGE modeller needs to do is to specify the production and utility nest 
structure, selcct or estimate parameters for the elasticity of substitution at each 
nest level and then select a representative point of the functions which contains 
output quantities, input quantities and prices. Once this information has been 
collected, the production functions and utility functions are uniquely 
determined. 
3.6.2. An Example of Modelling CGE in GAMS/MPSGE 
Tables 3.6 to 3.10 provide an example of modelling CGE in 
GAMS/MPSGE syntax. It provides a transformed SAM in Part 1 and initiates 
two parameters in Part 2. Part 3 is the core model which is written in MPSGE 
syntax. Part 4 implements the benchmark check and counterfactual 
simulations. 
In Part 1, positive entries are values of commodity flows into the economy 
(sales or factor supplies), while negative entries are values of commodity flows 
out of the economy (factor demands or final demands). Zero row sum implies 
market clearance while zero column sum denotes zero profit for production 
sectors and income balance for consumers. 
In Part 2, the initial ad-valorem tax rate (TY 1) for Y, sector's inputs is o. 
The initial labour endowment level (LEN DOW) is 1. These parameters will be 
changed in counterfactual simulations to examine the effects of tax reform and 
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change of country size. 
Table 3.6: A Closed Economy in GAMS/MPSGE Syntax 
$TITLE A Closed 2x2 Economy 
* Part 1 : Transformed SAM 
$ONTEXT 
Prod uction Sec ors 
Markets I Yl 
PYl 
PY2 
PW 
PL 
PK 
SUM 
$OFFTEXT 
100 
- 25 
- 75 
o 
Y2 
100 
- 75 
- 25 
o 
* Part 2 : Parameters 
PARAMETERS 
W 
- 100 
- 100 
200 
o 
Consumers 
CONS 
- 200 
100 
100 
o 
SUM 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
TYl ad - valorem tax ra te for Yl sector inpu ts 
LENDOW l abour endowmen t mu l tipl ier fo r co un er ac ual simulati o n s ; 
TYl = 0 ; 
LE DOW = 1; 
* Part 3 : Core MPSGE model 
$ONTEXT 
$MODEL : Markuse n 
$SECTORS : 
Yl ! Activi y leve l for 
Yl! Activity level for 
sector y1 
sector y2 
W! Activity level for sector W (Hicksian 
$COMMODITIES : 
PYl ! Price index for c ommodity yl 
PY2 1 Pri e index for commodity y 2 
PL' P ice i ndex for pr i mar y factor L 
PK I Price index for p rimar y faclor K 
PWI Pr ice i ndex for welfare (expenditu e 
$CONSUMERS : 
CONS! Income level for consume r CONS 
Source: Markusen (2002a) 
- 84-
welfare i nde x) 
unction) 
In Part 3. the $SECTOR statement indicates the model involves three 
activities that convert commodity/welfare inputs into commodity/welfare 
outputs. All the activity levels are unity. For example, activity Y, runs at a 
unitary level, producing 100 units of good Y" as displayed in the transformed 
SAM. Setting unitary initial levels for the activities will make the pairwise 
comparison between benchmark levels and counterfactual results more 
straightforward. 
$COMMODITY states that the model contains two goods, two factors , and a 
special product, welfare. $CONSUMER represents the individuals who supply 
factors and receive transfers from government. The three $ PROD blocks 
describe the production for product X and Y, and welfare W. 
The production of good Yj and Y2 follows from a CES production function 
with the elasticity of substitution to be one (s : 1), as Table 3.7 shows. This 
implies that the CES production technology has a special specification, i.e. 
Cobb-Douglas form, as discussed in Section 3.2.1 of this Chapter. Assume the 
production of Y2 is to solve the problem below: 
n11n ~ . L L + PKK 
s.t . Y2 ~ ~ AlLa , K J- u2 
Table 3.7: Production Blocks 
$PROD : Y1 s : l 
0 : PYl Q : 100 
I : PL Q: 25 A: CONS T : ty1 
I : PK Q: 75 A: CONS T : ty1 
SPROD : Y2 s : l 
0 : PY 2 : 100 
I : PL : 7:' 
I : PK : 25 
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The cost ratio of the two inputs can be derived: 
With [ =75 and K=25 , the value of A2 can be obtained: A2 = 
Y2/ [ 075 K025 = 1.75. Thus the underlying Cobb-Douglas production function is 
The above "standard" calibration process, however can be replaced with 
"calibrated forms" without calculating the va lues of parameters of a2 and A2. 
With equation (3 . ISa) and (3. 19b), we can get ratio equations for prices and 
input demands (with lower case letters denoting ratio rather than level 
variables) : 
07- 0.25 
PYI = P,. PK 
1- PY2 -Y2--
P,. 
(3. ISb) 
(3. l9c) 
(3. 19d) 
The parsimony of these "calibrated fo rms" of the model will be fully 
mani fes ted in Chapter 5 with a benchmark model fo r the Chinese economy. 
As for production taxes on both inputs of labour and capital, the tax (T : ) 
revenue is assigned (A : ) to the agent "CONS". 
The welfa re is "produced" by consuming good Y, and Y2, with a 
Cobb-Douglas function as we ll . The elasti city of substitution here is also one 
( s : 1). Calibrations and "calibrated forms" of this block is similar to that in 
Table 3.7. 
[n a demand block as shown in Table 3.9, the consumer agent demands the 
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utility good PW and receives income from his/her endowment which is denoted 
by "E : " . LENDOW is a shift parameter to mUltiply the endowment amount. 
Table 3.8: Welfare Block 
$PROD : W s : l 
o: pw Q: 200 
I : PYl Q : 100 
I : PY2 Q: 100 
Table 3.9: Demand Block 
$DEMAND:CONS 
D: PW Q: 200 
E : PL Q: (100*LENDOW) 
E : PK Q: 100 
After specifying the core model with parameter values and data imported, 
the fitness of the model is checked by seeing whether it can replicate the 
benchmark economy with the price of welfare as the numeraire ( PW . FX = 1), 
which is shown in Table 3.10. If acti vity levels of all production sections (y 1, 
Y2 and W) and consumer (CONS) equal 1, and all prices ( PY1, PY2 , PL, PK) 
are equal to I as well, then the benchmark economy is successfully replicated. 
Then the shift parameters for labour endowment LENDOW and production tax 
TYl can be altered to check how the production and welfare levels will be 
affected in these two counterfactual scenarios. 
Table 3.10: Benchmark Check and Counterfactual Scenarios 
* Part4: Benchmark checking and counterfactual scenarios 
$SYSINCLUDE mpsgeset markusen 
PW.FX = 1; 
$INCLUDE Markuse n.gen 
SOLVE Markusen using Mep ; 
* Solve t he counterfactuals 
TY1 = 0.5; 
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LENDOW - 1 ; 
$1NCLUDE Markusen . gen 
SOLVE Markusen using MCP ; 
TY1 = 0; 
LENDOW = 2 ; 
$1 CLUDE Markusen . gen 
SOLVE Markusen using MCP ; 
3.7. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
MODELLING FDI SPILLOVERS WITH CGE 
OF 
Generally speaking, the advantages of CGE modelling lie in its capability 
of structurally modelling economic general equilibrium, and thus its 
complementarity to econometric methodologies, especially in po licy 
simulations. In terms of research on FDI productivity spillover, a CG E model 
can provide a capable research framework on thi s topic thanks to the conduit 
mechani sm of FDI producti vity spillovers : 
Firstly, the input-output table used in a CGE model captures the verti ca l 
linkages which generate productivity spillovers. As di scussed in Chapter 2, the 
importance of vertical linkages in FDI productivity spillover are theoretica lly 
mode lled (e.g. Fosfuri , Motta and Ronde, 2001 ; Markusen and Venables, 1999) 
and empirically evident (Javorcik, 2004; Girma, Gorg and Pisu, 2008). 
Secondly, exp ort activities of MNE affili ates in host countries which also 
prov ide possibilities for productivity spillover can be readil y explored by a 
CGE model. The export pattern of foreign-invested enterpri ses in China merits 
specia l attention in studying FDI productivity spillover. The share of export of 
foreign-invested enterprises in total foreign trade in China has gradually 
increased from 4% in the early 1980s to over 50% after 2000. These 
- 88-
export-oriented MNE affiliates exert a vital demonstration effect on the boom 
of labour-intensive exporting firms in China, especially in the coastal provinces. 
A CGE model for China can comprehensively incorporate MNE's export 
characteristics. 
Thirdly, FDI productivity spillover takes place via many other direct and 
indirect channels, including labour turnover, demonstration, competition, and 
induced resource reallocation towards the most productive enterprises. These 
channels can also be captured by CGE modelling with incorporation of 
corresponding endogenous variables. 
Finally, a CGE model can be constructed to assess FOl spillover effects by 
examining not only industry-level performance e.g output, export and price 
changes, but also macroeconomic changes, e.g GOP and national welfare. As a 
structural model, CGE can also be used to address more interesting issues 
which other methodologies rarely deal with, e.g. an assessment of the impact of 
FOI policy reforms on FOI productivity spillover effects. 
Meanwhile we also need to understand the weakness of CGE in applying a 
CGE model to doing research on FOI productivity spillover. 
Firstly, as discussed in Chapter I and 2, FOI productivity spillovers are 
subject to various macro and micro-level constraints. However, CGE models 
each industry as a representative agent and can only convey information on 
these constraints implicitly, in an aggregated way. For example, due to data 
limitation, the CGE model developed in this research can not disaggregate the 
data of foreign-invested enterprises by the origin of FDI, namely from Hong 
Kong, Macau, Taiwan (HMT), or from other economies. However, as 
suggested by the literature (Buckley, Wang and Clegg, 2007), the difference 
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between spillover effects of the FDI from the above two types countries of 
origin is not trivial. 
Secondly, the perceived magnitude of FDI spillover effect gauged by a 
CGE model. by and large, relies on the 5pil/over coefficients selected from 
existing econometric literature or estimated from new econometric estimations. 
Such a reliance on parameter can pose a dilemma for researchers. The 
parameters in the literature are usually not estimated for the economies to be 
modelling in CGE. For example. Lejour et al. (2008) have to employ the value 
of spillovcr coefficient estimated for the US rather than the El) countries 
examined in their research. However, if researchers want to estimate spillover 
parameters with their own econometric models. such an ambition will require 
another investment into data collection and analysis. 
The last drawback is related to the fact that this CGE model is based on 
Chinese input-output table of 2002 which is indeed the latest one, yet still a 
little dated. This constraint makes it unlikely to exclude the impact of 
long-term business cycle on the FDI inflows and the performance of domestic 
firms. More importantly. after China's accession into WTO in December 2001, 
the market barriers to foreign commodity and investment have been effectively 
lowered. Chinese government has also continued to use policy to channel 
resources into certain activities, with a view to "promoting investment in high 
technology, encouraging innovation. and protecting the environment" (World 
Trade Organization, 2008, pp. xi). 
3.S. CONCLUSIONS 
CGE modelling involves designing a large-scale general equilibrium 
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model across all the industries and implementing computer-based simulations 
of counterfactual scenarios. CGE models are a class of models that explore the 
overall economic impact of policy, technology or other external "shocks". The 
microeconomic foundation for CGE models is Walrasian general equilibrium 
theory. A CGE model consists of: (a) a series of equations of production, 
consumption. utility and so on, which cover the whole economy including the 
activities of all industries, governments, and households; and (b) a detailed 
database consistent with the model equations. 
As a general-equilibrium model, a CGE model is inappropriate for the 
analysis of small-scale, sector-specific changes, but is well tailored to the 
investigation of broadly based policy innovations where inter-region and 
inter-industry feedbacks and interdependences are important. Most of the 
applications of CGE fall into the categories of tax and trade policy research and 
more recently, resource and environment research. 
The simulation work in a CGE model is based on a social accounting 
matrix (SAM) or input-output table in a base year. A SAM expands a 
cross-industry input-output table by incorporating non-production sectors, (e.g. 
households and government) in a more comprehensive way. A SAM or 
input-output table statistically represents flows of all economic transactions 
that take place within an economy. 
GAMS provides a tailored and powerful higher-level coding platform for 
CGE modellers. MPSGE as a subsystem of GAMS is specially designed for a 
mix of complementarity problems that are most frequently met in general 
equilibrium models. 
CGE modelling provides a convincing structural research framework on 
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the topic of FDI productivity spillovers and the associated FDI policy 
assessmet. A CGE model can decompose FDI spillovers effects into benefit 
obtained through different channels, namely vertical linkages, export of MNEs 
and horizontal demonstration. However, due to the data constraint and the only 
option of a single year as the benchmark year, the reliability of CGE modelling 
needs to be subject to sensitivity tests. 
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CHAPTER 4: DA TA COMPILATIONS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter introduces how the input-output table used in the CG E 
modelling is constructed. Secti on 4.2 introduces stati stical standards in China, 
avail able data sources and strategies to manipulate data. Section 4.3 discusses 
issues around a data consistency check. Section 4.4 presents how to aggregate 
the original 122 by 122 input-output table into a 39 by 39 one due to the 
avail abili ty of supplementary data. Section 4.5 discusses estimating data of 
di ffe rent ownerships. Based on the data estimated in Section 4.5 , Section 4.6 
disaggregates the 39 by 39 input-output table into a 10 1 by 10 1 one by 
ownership to cater fo r the later research on cross-ownership producti vity 
spillovers. Data balancing and data consistency checks are also di scussed. 
4.2. DATA SOURCES 
4.2.1. Statistical Standards in China 
Data used in the CGE modelling follow two di ffe rent stati stical standards, 
which necessitates identify ing the mapping between di ffe rent stati sti ca l 
standards. While version 1994 was the industri al class ifi cation adopted in 
Chinese official stati sti cs between 1994 and 2002, version 2002 is the latest 
one (see Table 4. 1) adopted by the National Bureau of Statisti cs (NBS) of 
China after 2002. Version 2002 is convertible to version 3.0 of the International 
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Standard Industri a l Class ificati on (l SIC). 
Both vers ion 1994 and version 2002 fo llow ISIC's prac ti ce 111 
differentiating industries into 4 hierarchies: section, di v ision, group, and class. 
The difference (Table 4.2) between version 1994 and 2002 mainly li es in the 
classificati on for services. As an interim c lass i fi cation standard, version 1994 
has a similar structure of version 2002, but is less compatible with ISIC . 
Table 4.1: Chinese Industrial Classification (Version 2002) 
Section Division 
A: Agriculturc, fo restry, animal husbandry and fi shing 5 
B: Mining 6 
C: Manufacturing 30 
D: Utilities (production of electricity, gas lllld water) 3 
E: Construction 4 
F: Traffi c, transport, storage and post 9 
G: Information transfer, computer services and so ftware 3 
H: Wholesale and retail trade 2 
I: Accommodation and restaurants 2 
J: Finance 4 
K: Real estate I 
L: Tenancy and business services 2 
M: Scientific research, technical service and geo logic 4 
perambulation 
N: Managemcnt of water conservancy, environment and 3 
public establishment 
0 : Res ident serv ices and other services 2 
P: Education I 
Q: Sanitation, social securi ty and socia l welfa re 3 
R: Culture, SP0l1S and entertainment 5 
S: Public management and social organizati on 5 
T: International organizations I 
Total: 20 95 
Source: Zhao (2004) 
Group Class 
18 38 
5 33 
169 482 
7 10 
7 II 
24 37 
10 14 
18 93 
7 7 
16 16 
4 4 
II 27 
19 23 
8 18 
12 16 
5 13 
11 17 
22 29 
12 24 
I I 
396 913 
Table 4.2: A Comparison between Version 1994 and Version 2002 
2002 1994 Difference 
Section 20 16 4 
Division 95 92 3 
Group 396 368 28 
Class 913 846 67 
Source: Zhao (2004) 
· 94· 
4.2.2. Data Sources 
As Tablc 4.3 shows. the FDI inflow to sectors of mining. manufacturing. 
and utilities (hereafter "MMU") in the benchmark year of 2002 accounted for 
73.5% of the total FDI inflow to China. The FDI inflow to sector 
'"manufacturing" alone accounted for 69.8% of total FDI. According to China 
Statistical Yearhook 2003 (hereafter ·'CS}"'). MMU contributed 44.4% of GDP 
of China in 2002. Given the importance of these three sectors and the data 
availability on FIEs and SOEs in these sectors, special attention is paid to 
MMU in the following data disaggregation and CGE modelling. 
One point merits special attention. The statistics of FDI in China has been 
greatly contaminated by "round-trippinR" FDI. i. e. fake FDI. Round-tripping 
FDI refers to cross-border investment motivated by the more favourable 
treatment of foreign as opposed to domestic capital in a host country. In China 
a large number of domestic investors transferred their capital out of, and then 
invested back into, the Chinese market with a new label of "foreign capital". 
Those enterprises invested by round-tripping investment are entered as 
'"foreign invested enterprises" instead of "domestic enterprises" in the Chinese 
economic census. By 2003, about a quarter ofFDI to China was round-tripping 
FDI (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2003, pp. 45). 
Those round-tripping investments are unlikely to generate the same 
productivity spillovers as the "authentic" foreign investments originated from 
successful western entrepreneurs or institutions with advanced technology and 
mature management skills. Due to data availability, this research can not 
differentiate round-tripping FDI from authentic FDI. It is also extremely 
difficult to find out the exact countries of origin of these round-tripping FDI. 
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and the industry di stribution of those fake foreign-invested enterpri ses in China. 
This problem might make the later analyses underestimate the real magnitude 
of productivity spillovers of the "authentic" FDI , especially in some sectors 
with a relati ve ly concentrated presence of ro und-tripping r Ol. However, 
aggregating both types of FOl s and then examining the actual spillover effects 
of such "blended" FDl s rather than " purified" FDI in China, can at least serve 
the purpose of refl ecting the reality in the Chinese economy context. 
The benchmark year of this CG E modelling work is 2002. The main data 
sources for that year include CSY, China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook 2003 (hereafter "CIESY") , and China Inp ut-Outp ut Table 2002 (in the 
format of Table 3.4, hereafter " I/O"), all of which were complied and released 
by the Nati onal Bureau of Stati stics of China (NH S). CSYand CIESY were 
published in 2003 and that is why they were titled with " Yearbook 2003" 
instead of "Yearbook 2002". 110 was released in 2006. 
Table 4.3: Foreign Direct Investment by Sector in 2002 
Sector 
Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fi shery 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electric power, gas and water production and supply 
Construction 
Geologica l perambulation and water conservancy 
Transport, storage, post and telecommunicati on services 
Wholesa le & retail trade and catering services 
Banking and insurance 
Rea l estate 
Social services 
Health care, sports and social welfa re 
Education, culture and arts, radio, film and telev ision 
Scienti fi c research and polytechnic services 
Other sectors 
Total 
Source: National Bureau of Stati stics of China (2003b). 
amount rather than contracted amount. 
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Amount Share 
(Smn) (%) 
1,028 1.9 
581 1.1 
36,800 69.8 
1,3 75 2.6 
709 1.3 
7 0.0 
913 1.7 
933 1.8 
107 0.2 
5,663 10.7 
2,943 5.6 
128 0.2 
38 0. 1 
198 0.4 
1,32 1 2.5 
52,743 100 
"Amount" denotes utilised 
Two supplementary data sources are (1) China Economic Census 
Yearbook 2004 (CECy) published by NBS in 2006; and (2) the data available 
in the paper of Girma and Gong (2008a) which employs Chinese firm-level 
industrial survey data to evaluate FOl spillovers. 
Table 4.4: Available Data 
CSY 
I. For FIEs, SOEs, Private 
enterprises in MMU : 
I) Total output 
2) Value added 
3) Annual average 
employees 
2. Amount of utili sed 
foreign direct investment by 
Section 
3. GDP 
4. Total export & import 
CIESY 
I. For fI Es, SOEs, Private 
cntcrprises in 
manu facturing, 
utilities: 
I) Total output 
2) Value added 
3) Annual 
employees 
4) Export 
mining, 
and 
average 
I/O 
I. Total intermediate inputs 
2. Total value added 
I) Compensation of employees 
2) Net taxes on production 
3) Depreciation of fixed capital 
4) Operating surplus 
3. Total input 
4. Total intermediate use 
5. Total final use 
1) Rural household 
consumption 
2) Urban 
consumption 
household 
3) Government consumption 
4) Gross fixed capital 
formation 
5) Change in inventories 
6) Exports 
6. Imports 
7. Gross output 
In CSY, disaggregated data of total output and value added at ownership 
level are available for foreign invested enterprises (hereafter "FIEs")} and 
state-run and state-holding enterprises (hereafter "SOEs") 4 in MMU are 
provided. Section-level data of FOI inflows are provided in CSYas well (Table 
3 " F1 Es" represents foreign-invested enterprises. As introduced in Chapter I, it consists of 
enterprises funded by investment from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and from any country 
other than the People's Republic of China. 
4 "SOEs" denotes state-run and state-holding enterprises. They consist of state-owned 
enterprises, state joint ownership enterprises, sole sate-invested enterprises, and state-holding 
enterprises . State-holding enterprises refer to enterprise where the percentage of state assets 
is larger than any other single share holder of the same enterprise. 
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4.4). Disaggrcgated data of FDI to MMU at Division level are also available at 
the website of "Investment in China" project, Ministry of Commerce of China 
(hereafter "MOFCOM", http://www.fdi.gov.cn). 
The data of FIEs and SOEs in MMU are originally collected by statistical 
officials with Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics from (1) all 
state-controlled industrial enterprises that account for 36.3% and 48.3% of 
gross output and value added of all enterprises surveyed, respectively; and (2) 
non-state-owned industrial enterprises with annual sales above RMB 5 million 
(equivalent to approximately US$600,000, with an exchange rate of 8.27 RMB 
per Dollar in 2002). The enterprises surveyed account for 68% of total 
industrial output and 69% of total value added in MMU in 2002. 
Similar to any input-output table, the Chinese liD exhibits an 
interdependence of an economy's various productive sectors, as it contains the 
information of transactions within and between production sectors and 
non-production sectors. The 110 also provides data of value added, private 
consumption, export, import, and investment. 
4.2.3. Data Compilation Strategy 
There are many steps to go in transforming the original 110 into a tailored 
one for this CGE modelling work (see Figure 4.1). The first step is to check 
data consistency caused by different statistical standards. While the 
compilation of the CSf and CIESY follows the old Chinese industry 
classification standard (version 1994), the 110 follows the new one (version 
2002). As will be discussed in Section 4.3, a data consistency check shows that 
the data of two sectors in the 110 are inconsistent with those from CSf and 
CIESY. That problem can be sorted by aggregating the data of sectors in 
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question with those of other similar sectors. 
Figure 4.1: Transformations of the Input-output Table 
Original 110 (122 sectors) 
Aggregnted I/O (3 sectors) 
./ MM1J (31); 
./ Agriculture (1); 
./ Construction (1); 
./ Services (4); 
./ Others (2) 
Disaggregated rID (101 sectors) 
./ MMU disaggregated b 
ownership (31 *3=93); 
./ Agriculture (1); 
./ Construction ( 1); 
./ Services (4); 
./ Others 2 
Data ready for CGE modelling 
Data balancing; 
Final round check 
The second step is to reconcile the data availability of FDI inflows. 
MOFCOM only releases data on FDI at "Section (see Table 4.1)" level. The 
only exception is manufacturing. As FDI to manufacturing accounts for about 
70% of total FDl in recent years, MOFCOM also releases disaggregated data 
of FOI to manufacturing at "Division (see Table 4.1)" level , although data of 
some of these 30 Divisions are missing. Thus an FDI shock introduced to the 
CGE model (see Section 6.2) can only take the values at a relatively aggregated 
level. This problem requires relevant data aggregation of some sectors in the 
/10 , which will be discussed in detail in Section 4.4. 
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The third step involves estimating data of FIEs. SOEs. and other 
domestically-invested enterprises (hereafter "Private"). as will be discussed in 
Section 4.5. As the main function of this CGE model is to analyze the effects of 
FDl productivity spillovers on Chinese domestic enterprises. it would be 
essential to expand the dimensions of I/O by disaggregating each of 31 MMU 
sectors into three ownership-sectors. To take sector "textile" for example. it can 
to be disaggregated into three individual sectors, namely, "FIEs textile sector", 
"SOEs textile sector", and "Private textile sector". This procedure can help 
explicitly model FOI productivity spillovers from FIEs sectors to SOEs and 
Private enterprises. 
This can be done with the supplementary information from the CSY and 
CIESY But the problem is that the data provided by the CSYand CIESY do not 
cover all enterprises. as introduced in Section 4.2.2; however the CGE 
modelling needs input-output information at national level. Therefore we need 
to estimate the total output and value added of FIEs, SOEs and Private 
enterprises with certain techniques. 
The fourth step is then to disaggregate the input-output table with the 
additional information on ownerships. which will be discussed in Section 4.6. 
The last step involves data balancing and final-round data consistency check. 
4.3. DATA CONSISTENCY CHECK 
4.3.1. Data of FDI in Real Estate 
FDI to the sector of "real estate" in China in 2002 and recent years are 
extraordinarily high, and accounts for about 10% of total FOI. Although this 
ratio is higher than most of other countries, it is not unusual in the context of 
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China due to following four factors: 
(1) Urbanization. Since the implementation of "Reform and Opening-up" 
policy in 1978, the level of urbanization in China has increased from 17.9% to 
39.1 % in 2002. Cities and towns hosted a population of 502 million by the end 
of 2002, which generated a great demand on real estate development and 
management (Ministry of Housing and Rural-urban Development of China). 
(2) Policy incentives. Real estate is among the industries where 
non-resident investment is always encouraged by China's FDI policies. as is 
explicitly stated in the Guiding Directory on Industries Open to Foreign 
Investment, although 136 out of 184 IMF member countries have various 
controls on the non-resident investment on real estate (International Monetary 
Fund, 2004. pp. 12, 225). 
(3) Macroeconomic prospects. As one of the most rapidly growing 
economies in the world, China has attracted a very high amount of FDI in real 
estate. 
(4) Speculative investment. As a high-profit industry, real estate in China 
is very attractive to foreign institution investors (Jiang, Chen and Isaac, 1998). 
Combined with the expectation of Reminbi revaluation, FDI in real estate 
soared dramatically after 2004. 
4.3.2. "'Tobacco Processing" Sector 
The total output data (RMB 172 billion) and value added data (131 billion) 
for "tobacco processing" sector in the I/O are smaller than the figures in CSY 
for 2002 (RMB 204 billion and 136 billion) respectively. As introduced in 4.2.2, 
the total output of each sector in CSY only covers (1) all SOEs, and (2) 
enterprises of other ownerships with annual sales above RMB 5 million. So 
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('Sf data should have been smaller than the counterpart //0 data. 
The causes of this problem could be the fact that the industry 
classification adopted in //0 and CSYare different. Some sub-sectors might be 
classified as "tobacco processing" in CSYbut not in //0. 
To solve this problem, we can aggregate tobacco processing with related 
sectors, namely food processing, food manufacturing and beverage 
manufacturing. 
4.3.3. "Production of Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water" Sector 
According to CSf, total output of all SOEs and other above-scale 
enterprises in this sector is RMB 5,889 billion. The figure for SOEs is 4,930 
billion, and the figure for other above-scale enterprises is 1,080 billion. That 
means the national output level is even smaller than the sum of the 
ownership-disaggregated enterprises, 6,010 billion. 
The cause for this problem is double counting of some enterprises with 
multiple ownership. There is a possibility that some enterprises fall into both 
categories of "FIE" and "SOE". If a firm's foreign share accounts for more 
than 25%, the threshold to register as an "FIE", then it is an "FIE". However, if 
its largest portion of share (e.g. 40%) is owned by the state agencies, then it is 
also an "SOE". 
Therefore to avoid double counting, we need to purify the "SOEs" by 
excluding FIEs from them. The paper of Girma and Gong (2008a) provides a 
useful reference. They provide the shares of total output of FIEs and SOEs in 
total output of each sector in 2002. Their dataset and CSY dataset come from 
precisely the same source, i.e. Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics 
of (1) all SOEs; and (2) all above-scale (with annual sales of RMB 5 million 
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Yuan) enterpri ses of other ownership. 
Girma 
& 
Gong's 
SOEs 
CSY 
SOEs 
Table 4.5: Different Definitions of "SOEs" 
Enterprise Types 
Domestic-invested Enterprises 
• State-owned enterprises 
Collective-owned enterprises 
Cooperative enterprises 
Joint ownership enterprises 
• State joint ownership enterprises 
Co llecti ve joint ownership enterprises 
Joint state-co llecti ve ownership enterpri se (with state-owned fund 
dominated) 
Joint state-collective ownership enterprises (without state-owned fund 
dominated) 
Limited liability corporations 
• Sole sate-funded enterprises 
Share-holding enterprises 
Private enterprises 
Other enterprises 
Enterprises with fund s from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
Foreign-invested enterprises 
Source: Girma and Gong (2008a); National Bureau of Stati stics of China (2003b). 
Girma and Gong's definition of ] ~ ~ lEs is exactly the same as that adopted 
by the CSY. However their definiti on of "SOEs" is slightly different from that 
in the CSY, as shown in Table 4.5. In the paper of Girma and Gong, "SOEs" 
includes state-owned enterprises, state joint ownership enterpri ses, joint 
state-collective ownership enterprises (with state-owned funded dominated), 
and sole state-funded enterpri ses. However, in CSY, "SOEs" only consists of 
state-owned enterprises, state joint ownership enterprises, and sole state-funded 
enterprises. Joint state-collective ownership enterpri ses (with state-owned 
funded dominated) are categorized into state-holding enterprises in the CSY. In 
brief, Girma and Gong's definition of SOEs will be adopted here. 
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4.4. DATA AGGREGATION 
Prior to the CGE modelling work, the original China l i D is aggregated 
from 122 sectors to 39 sectors, as shown in Table 4.6 and 4 .7. This aggregati on 
reconci\cs the di fference between industry classificati ons used in 110 and FDl 
data so that one and only one FDI inflow fi gure corresponds to each "model 
section" . The li st of sectors after aggregation is given by Table 4.8 . 
Table 4.6: I/O prior to Aggregation 
I Sector i I Sector Final Import Error Total Sector I (i=2, ... , 12 1) 122 use Output 
Sector I 
Sector i (i=2, .. .. 12 1) Intermediate input-output matrix 
Sector 122 
Value Added I I 
Total Input I I 
Note: Total II1put, = Total output" i= 1, .. . , 122. 
Table 4.7: 110 after Aggregation 
Sector 1 I S S c c o r r i I Sector Final Import Error Total (/ - 2, ... ,38) 39 use Output 
Sector I 
Sector i (i=2, . . . ,3 8) Intermediate input-output matrix 
Sector 39 
Value Added I I 
Total Input I I 
Note: Totalll1put, = Total output" i= 1, . .. , 39. 
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Category 
Mining* 
Manuracturing* 
Utilities* 
Agriculture 
Other 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Banking and 
Insurance 
Real Estate 
Other services 
Model 
sector 
I 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Table 4.8: I/O Aggregation 
NBS 
Version 
2002 
06,07 
08 
09 
10, 11 
13 -1 6 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
39,40 
41 
44 
45 
46 
0 \-05 
42 
43 
47-50 
68-71 
72 
51-63 ; 
65-67; 
73-92 
Name of model sectors 
Resource manufacturing (coal, petroleum, and gas) 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing 
Mining of non-meta l, other minerals, and other ores 
Food , beverage, and tobacco manufacturing 
Texti le industry 
Garments and other fibre product 
Leather, furs, down and related products 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc. 
Furniture manufacturing 
Papermak ing and paper products 
Printing and record medium reproduct ion 
Cultural , educational and sports goods 
Petroleum process ing and cok ing 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 
Chemical fibre 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Non-metal mineral products 
Smelting and press ing of ferrous metals 
Smelting and press ing of nonferrous metals 
Metal products 
Ordinary machinery 
Special purpose equipment 
Transport equ ipment 
Electronic and electric products 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery 
Production of electric power, steam and hot water 
Production of gas 
Production of tap water 
Farming, forestry, animal husbandry & fishing 
Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing 
Recycling and disposa l of waste 
Construction 
Banking and insurance 
Rea l estate 
Geological perambulation & water conservancy; 
transport, storage, post & telecom munication services; 
wholesale & retail trade & catering; Social services; 
healthcare, sports & soc ial welfare; Education, culture 
and arts, radio, films & television; Scientific and 
technical services 
39 93-98 Publ ic administration & other services 
Note: (a) Categories marked with " ",, " (i. e. MMU or Industry) will be further 
disaggregated by ownership, namely FIEs, SOEs, and Private in Section 4.6. (b) In the NBS 
statistical standard version 2002, there are 98 two-digit sectors in total. Some of them are 
disaggregated into three-digit sectors in the I/O 2002, so that the I/O contains 122 sectors. 
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4.5. ESTIMATING DATA OF FIES, SOES AND PRIVATE 
ENTERI>RISES 
4.5.1. Total output 
With Girma and Gong's data on share of SOEs by sector, and CSY' s data 
on total output for each sector, we can estimate the data of total output of SOEs 
in manufacturing sectors by "reverse engineering" : 
Q ~ ' ( } } ! \ ' ' = R a t i i ~ ' ( ) ) ! " " x Q /CSY)AII' i E Manufacturing 
where R a t i i ~ , ( ) ! : , , is the share of total output of each manufacturing sector 
(with "SOEs" ownership) obtained from Girma and Gong (2008a). Thus, we 
can get total output value for "pure" SOEs. 
The next step is to estimate the output level for SOEs in MMU based on 
the data of the output level of " pure" SOEs in MMU and manufacturing alone, 
Assuming 
OMMU Q MMU 
_ SO f s (CS }' )SOEs 
Q Manu/acIl/ring 0 Manl/jClcll/ring SOEs - (CSl')SOEs 
we get 
QMM(J Q ~ 1 M l f f = Q ~ 1 0 / ~ / l f f c l l l I l 1 g g x (CSY)SO/is 
,\()I; ,\' so!:, Q Manu/aclulIIg 
(('S),),\'( )I ,',,' 
Then the output level for each sector in mining and utilities can be 
estimated by allocating the difference between Q ~ : ; : ' ' I I and Q ~ 1 a I / U r a C l t t r r / / l ! . .
,\01:.< with 
sector shares of corresponding SOEs and state-holding enterprises (SHEs) 111 
CSY in each sector as a proxy for the share of sole SOEs. 
0
' 
= (Q MM(J _ Q Ma/1/1/ac//I /"I l/g ) Sh ,' , 
_.1'01,'" so!:"' SOl,', x areSO/isI-SIIF., i E Mining, Utilities 
Now we can augment (with a multiplier R a l i i ~ / H , \ ) ) the output value of 
above-scale fIEs in CSY to estimate an output value for all the FIEs, 
- J()6 -
Q I/O Q I/ O 
R . () rn /al - SOI:s ) 59 alloi ll:.\' = Co\')' c.w = . 
Q l illal - Q .W) /:',\' 
As there are only three categories of ownerships in the CGE modelling, 
namely, F1Es, SOEs, and Private, the total output value of all Private 
enterprises can be obtained by subtracting total output values of FlEs and SOEs 
from the total output values of corresponding sectors. 
4.5.2. Value Added 
The value added of SOE sectors in MMU are estimated based on the total 
output value for each sector with an average ratio of value added to total output 
ofSOEs in manufacturing, 29.22%. 
Then, with a similar estimation, we can augment (with a 
multiplier Ralio ':1/:.\, ) the value added of above-scale FIEs in CSY to get actual 
value added for all the FIEs. 
VA tO V. to 
R . VA 1'" 01 - 'A .W)f:'" ) 52 allO FI"'s = c.w (' SY = . 
VA1illal - VAW)f:,\' 
As there are only three categories of ownership in the present CGE 
modelling, namely, FlEs, SOEs, and all Private, the total value added of all 
Private enterprises is obtained by subtracting total value added of FIEs and 
SOEs from the total value added of corresponding sectors. 
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Table 4.9: Shares of Output and Value Added of SOEs, FIEs and Private 
Enterprises in MMU (%) 
Division Name 
Resource manufacturing (coal, petroleum, 
and ga.l) 
Ferrous metals mining and dress ing 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and 
other ores 
Food, beverage, and tobacco 
manufacLUring 
Textile industry 
Carments and other.ftbre products 
L e e t t e / ~ ~ furs , down and related products 
71mher processing, bamboo, cane, palm 
fibre etc. 
Furniture manufacturing 
Papermaking and paper products 
Printing and record medium reproduction 
Cultural, educational and sports g o o d ~ ~
Petroleum processing and coking 
Raw chemical materials and chemical 
products 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 
Chemical fibre 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Non-metal mineral products 
Smelting and pressing offerrous metals 
Smelting and pressing of no nferro us metals 
Metal products 
Ordinary machinery 
Special purpose equipment 
Transport equipment 
Electronic and electric products 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office 
machinery 
Production of electric power, steam and 
hot water 
Production of gas 
Production of tap water 
SOEs 
Output 
share 
29.5 
6.0 
13 .3 
4.7 
21.0 
8.2 
1.4 
0.9 
2. 1 
0.7 
5.7 
8.4 
1.2 
27.3 
15.1 
15 .9 
11.8 
11.1 
1.5 
10.0 
24.6 
15.9 
3.0 
9.9 
14.1 
25 .8 
6.4 
5.5 
32.2 
22.5 
29.5 
Value 
added 
share 
13 .6 
3.8 
9.8 
2.9 
19.7 
9.7 
1.5 
1.3 
2.2 
0.8 
5.6 
5.8 
1.2 
46.4 
17.5 
12.0 
16.0 
11.8 
1.8 
8.9 
27.6 
23.5 
3.7 
10.2 
14.9 
28.8 
8.5 
6.3 
18.8 
32.2 
17.2 
FIEs 
Value 
Output added 
share 
share 
5.2 3.9 
0.5 0.3 
1.3 0.9 
1.7 1.0 
34.8 31 .8 
24.8 24.2 
5 1.2 47.5 
60 .1 72 .5 
12. 7 11.0 
29.2 29.2 
30.5 28.8 
20.0 15.1 
53.0 44.0 
12.7 15 .9 
24.0 25.5 
29. 7 28.4 
38.2 39.6 
39.0 39.8 
30.5 32.1 
23.4 20.8 
6.8 5.9 
13.1 13 .0 
31.3 31.9 
19.8 19.1 
17.4 17.7 
43 .7 45 .2 
81.5 78.7 
63.3 51.4 
2 1.7 22.9 
27.7 14.0 
3.9 3.0 
Private 
Value 
Output added 
share 
share 
65.3 82 .5 
93 .5 95 .9 
85.4 89.3 
93 .7 96.0 
44.2 48.4 
67.0 66.1 
47.4 5 1.0 
39.0 26.1 
85 .2 86.8 
70.1 70.1 
63 .9 65.6 
71.7 79.1 
45 .7 54.8 
60.0 37.8 
60.9 57.0 
54.4 59.7 
50.0 44.4 
49 .8 48.5 
68.0 66.1 
66.5 70.3 
68.5 66.5 
71 .0 63 .5 
65.7 64 .5 
70.3 70.7 
68.4 67.4 
30.4 26.0 
12. 1 12.8 
3 1.1 42.3 
46.1 58.3 
49.9 53 .8 
66.7 79.8 
Note: the sunl of output shares across SOEs, FIEs, and Private In each diviSion IS equal to 
100% . The same rule applies to the value added shares. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006b); National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (2003b); Girma and Gong (2008a). 
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4.6. DISAGGREGATION OF INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE BY 
OWNERSHIP 
The CGE model constructed in thi s research is used to estimate the 
productivity spillover effects of FIEs on SOEs and other enterpri cs. It is 
necessary, therefore, to di fferentiate the ownership of enterprises and 
di saggregate the input-output table (Gillespie et a l. , 200 I , 2002). As 
ownership-di saggregated data of tota l output and value added for sector I to 31 
in MMU are available only, we disaggregate each of those 31 sectors into three 
separate sectors by ownership, while the other 8 sectors remain intact. 
Figure 4.2: Disaggregate Output and Value Added by Ownership 
SOEs 
( Q ; ~ ) )
Note: Q, = Q;\. + Q,'. Q,I', i = I, ... , 31: and Q represents total output or value added. 
To take the " textile" sector for example, it can be di saggregated into three 
individual sectors, namely, "FIEs textile sector", "SOEs textil e sector", and 
" Private tex tile sector". Therefore, we can get 31x3=93 
ownership-di saggregated sectors plus 8 other un-disaggregated sectors. In other 
words, there will be altogether (3 1 x3)+8 = 101 sectors: 31 fo reign Industry 
sectors, 31 SOb Industry sectors, 31 Private Industry sectors, and 8 
non-Industry sectors. 
4.6.1. Disaggregation of Output by Ownership 
With the estimated ratios of output and value added by ownership (FIEs, 
SOEs, and Private) to total output and value added by industry as shown in 
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Table 4.9 , we can, at the first step, divide total output of each sector (see Table 
4.10) into output by ownership (see Table 4.11). For example, sector 
"nonferrous metals" purchases 11 ,819 unit output of sector "coal , petroleum, 
and gas" . As shown in Table 4.10, we can find that 1'IEs, SO Es and Private 
provide output level of 611, 3490, and 7,718, respectively. The export 
propensity, i, e, the portion of export in total output, of FIEs, SOEs, and Private 
are distinct from each other according to the CIESY. As export of multinational 
enterprises is one of the channels of productivity spillover effects by FIEs, we 
need to incorporate this distinction and make minor adjustments on the 
"Export" values: 
Export FlI:'.\' = Q FlLI' x e l 'N:',I' • 1 "I , , " I = , .,, ' .) 
E t SOl"'.\' - O SOl;'s 801:'.<+SIII:',I' • - 1 31 ~ x p o r r , - _ , x e, ' I - , ... , 
E. -( Ollier,l' - Q (J/h er,\' S()J:'.<+SIII:'s ' - 1 31 JXpOl , -, x e, , 1 - ' ''. , 
where e,' is the export propensity obtained from CIESY, whose industrial 
statistical data comes from the same source as CSY. Due to the data availability 
of CIESY, the export values for SOEs and Private can only be estimated by 
multiplying corresponding output level with the export propensity values of 
SOEs plus SHEs. 
But the sum of the estimated export values is larger than the sum of 
original export values of these 31 industry sectors. To make the adjusted I/O as 
approximate to the original one as possible, it is necessary to make a further 
adjustment. We can get a ratio of total original export value in the sum of 
estimated total export value of these 31 sectors. 
31 L L Export ~ ) / ' I X l l l a l l
. ' =1 .1 RatIO = 31 = 0.79; j = FIEs , SOEs, Others L L E x p o r t t ~ : ' ' ' ' l I I a l c d d
;=1 , 
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Table 4.10: UO prior to Disaggregation by Ownership (to be cont'd) 
1: Coal, petroleum, gas Sect ion ;, (;=2, ... ,30) 31: Nonferrous metals 
All - - All - - All - -
I: Coal, All 1,530,390 - - ... - - IJ,8J9 - -
petroleum, - - - - ... - - - - -
gas - - - - . .. - - - - -
All 0 - - ... - - 0 - -
Section ;, - - - - ... - - - - -
(;=2, ... ,30) - - - - ... - - - - -
31: All 86,257 - - ... - - 234,702 - -
Nonferrous - - - - .. . - - - - -
metals - - - - ... - - - - -
32 All 305,261 - - ... - - 15 - -
Sector j All (j=33, ... ,38) '" - - ... - - . .. - -
39 All 0 - - .. . - - 0 - -
TII All 26,729,892 - - ... - - 2,879,596 - -
Note: "all" means that the aggregate value is the sum of all three ownerships (SOEs, FIEs, Private). 
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Table 4.10: lIO prior to Disaggregation by Ownership (cont'd) 
Non-industry sectors Final use Other 
32: 39: Rural Export Import Error Total Al!riculture ... Private consumption ... Output 
1 : Coal, All 896,766 . .. 275,332 725 ,778 .. . 2,785 ,896 11 ,244.793 4,222, 156 72,742,]43 
Petroleum, - - .. . - - ... - - - -
Gas 
- -
.. . - - .. . - - - -
All . . . .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . 
Section i, - . .. . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(;=2, ... ,30) - .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
31: All 87,588 . .. ] 05 ,509 2 ]7,195 .. . 10,558 1,367, 136 -36,903 5,664,668 
Nonferrous - - ... - - .. . - - - -
Metals - - ... - - .. . - - - -
32 All 46,368,196 .. . 0 49,328,792 ... 4,741 ,965 6,8]] ,579 7]4] ,077 285,787,423 
Sector j 
(j=33, ... ,38) All .. . . .. ... ... . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. 
39 All 0 . . . 0 0 ... 304,8]7 37] ,087 -7,147,553 95 ,754,579 
TII All 1]9,482,762 . .. 47,076,127 
--
39 
Note: TB = Total Intermediate Input = Linpu{, 
1=1 
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Table 4.11: The First Step of Disaggregation by Ownership (to be cont'd) 
I: Coal, Petroleum, Gas Section i, (i=2, ... ,30) 31: Nonferrous "'etals 
All - - All - - All - -
1 : Coal, FIEs 79, 144 - - ... - - 611 - -
Petroleum, SOEs 451 ,888 - - .. . - - 3,490 - -
Gas Private 999,358 - - ... - - 7,718 - -
FIEs ... - - . .. - - . .. - -
Section ;, SOEs ... - - . .. - - . . . - -
(;=2, ... ,30) Private . .. - - . .. - - . .. - -
31: FIEs 3,359 - - ... - - 9,139 - -
Nonferrous SOEs 2,540 - - ... - - 69, 134 - -
Metals Private 57,490 - - ... - - 156,429 - -
32 All 305,26 1 - - . .. - - 15 - -
Sector j 
- - - - - -(j=33, ... ,38) All . .. ... . .. 
39 All 0 - - ... - - 0 - -
TII All 26,729,892 - - ... - - 2,829,596 - -
------- - --
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Table 4.11 : The First Step of Disaggregation by Ownership (cont' d) 
:"Ion-ind ustry sectors Fina l use Other 
32: 39: Private Rura l Export Import Error Tota l O utput Agricul t ure ... consumption . .. 
I : Coal, FIEs 46,376 .. , 14,239 37,534 . . . 1,158,936 581,524 -796515 3,761 ,858 
petroleum, SOEs 264,794 .. . 81 ,299 214,305 ... 1,018 ,944 3,320,323 1050369 21 ,479 ,046 
gas Private 585,596 ... 179,794 473 ,939 . .. 608 ,016 7,342,945 3968302 47,501 ,240 
FIEs ... . . . . . . ... . .. . . . ' " . . . . .. 
Section i, SOEs . .. . .. ... .. . .. . ., . ... .. . . .. 
(i=2, ... ,30) Private . .. . . . . .. ... . .. . .. ... . . . . . . 
31 : FIEs 3,411 .. . 4,108 8,457 ... 0 53 ,234 - 1026 220,575 
Nonferrous SOEs 25,800 ... 31 ,079 63 ,977 .. . 259 402,704 -8019 1,668 ,587 
metals Private 58,377 ... 70,322 144,761 .. . 585 911 , 198 -18144 3,775 ,507 
32 All 46,368, 196 ... 0 49,328,792 .. . 4,741 ,965 6,811 ,579 7141077 285,787,423 
Sector j 
U=33, ... ,38) All ... . .. .. . ... ... . .. '" . . . . .. 
39 All 0 .. . 0 0 . .. 304,817 371 ,087 -7147553 95 ,754,579 
TB All 119,482 ,762 ... 47,076,127 
39 
Note: TII = Total Intermediate Input = Linput, 
1= 1 
- 114 -
This ratio can be multiplied to the estimated export values to make them 
"shrink" to new values, whose sum is equal to the sum of the ori ginal total 
export for these 3 I sectors. 
4.6.2. Disaggregation of Value Added by Ownership 
We also need to di saggregate the va lue added for sector I to 3 1 by 
ownership. 
The original value added matrix for industri al sector 1 to 3 I is shown in 
Table 4. 12. With the portions of value added for each type of ownerships (see 
Table 4.9), we can disaggregate each item in the upper panel into three items in 
Table 4.13. For example, total value added for Sector I is 46,01 2,25 1. After 
disaggregation, the corresponding total value added for FIEs, SOEs, and 
Private are 1,773 ,282 , 6,276,175 and 37,962 ,794, respectively. 
Table 4.12: Value Added Matrix prior to Disaggregation by Ownership 
I: Coal, petroleum, gas Section ;, (i=2, ... ,30) 31: Nonferrous metals 
All - - All - - All - -
CP 18,695 ,996 - - ... - - 1,272,82 1 -
NT 4,344,716 - - ... - - 387,779 -
DP 5,285,208 - - ... - - 1,200,874 -
OP 17686,331 - - ... - - -26,402 -
TVA 46,01 2,25 1 - - ... - - 2,835,072 -
Note : CP = CompensatIOn to employees; NT = Net taxes on productIOn; DP -
Depreciation of fi xed capital; OP = Operating surplus; TVA = Total va lue added. 
Table 4.13: Value Added Matrix after Disaggregation by Ownership 
I: Coal, petroleum, gas Section ;, (;=2, ... ,30) 31: Nonferrous metals 
-
-
-
-
-
FIEs SOEs Private FIEs SOEs Private FIEs SOEs Private 
CP 720531 2550176 15425288 ... ... .. . 37953 218892 101 5975 
NT 167443 592629 3584645 ... .. . . .. 11 563 66688 309528 
OP 203688 720914 4360605 ... . .. ... 35808 2065 19 958547 
OP 68 1620 24 12456 14592256 .. . ... ... 
-787 -4540 -21074 
TVA 1773282 6276 175 37962794 ... ... ... 84537 487559 2262976 
Note: same as Tab le 4.12. 
4.6.3. Further Disaggregation of Intermediate Inputs by Ownership 
We can further disaggregate the make-use matri x in the upper left panel in 
Table 4.11 under a simpli stic hypothesis, i. e. the more a sector produces. the 
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more it purchases from other sectors. But the disaggregation is not as 
straightforward as that used in constructing Table 4.11. At the first step, as total 
input is equal to total output for each ownership-disaggregated sector, if we 
transpose the colunm "Total Output" in the lower panel of Table 4.11 , we get a 
row of "Total Input" . In the second step, we can estimate the ratio of input in 
total intermediate input (T/J) for each category of ownership by: 
. TotalOUlput,j - TVA Ij 
Ra/tal) = -------
TII, 
i = I , .. . , 39 ; j = FJEs , SOEs, Private. 
For example, the ratio for partitioning the input value for "All" categories 
of ownerships to get the input value for FIEs in Sector 1 can be obtained by: 
. Total Output l j - TVA l j 3,761 ,858 -1,773,282 RatIO) . = = = 0.074 
J TIII 26,729,892 
where j FJEs, SOEs, Private. The three numbers 111 the above 
calculation, i.e. 3,761,858, 1,773 ,282 and 26,729,892, come from Table 4.11, 
4.13 and 4.11 , respectively. 
With 0.074 as the share of input value for FIEs in Sector 1, we can get all 
the 101 input values for FIEs in Sector 1, as shown in the third column of Table 
4.15. With the value of each ownership in every sector, we can sum up all the 
inputs by columns and get all the values for "TU", as shown in the third last 
row in Table 4.15. 
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Table 4.14: Intermediate Input-output Matrix by Ownership (prior to Fur·ther Disaggregation) 
I: Coal, petroleum, ~ ~ s s Section i , (i=2 , .. . ,30) 31: Nonferrous meta ls 
All - - All - - All - -
I: Coal, FIEs 79, 144 - - .. . - - 6 11 - -
petroleum, SOEs 45 I ,888 - - .. . - - 3,490 - -
gas Private 999,35 8 - - ... - - 7,71 8 - -
FIEs ... - - ... - - . . . - -
Section i , SOEs ... - - .. . - - ... - -
(;=2, ... ,30) Private .. . - - ... - - . .. - -
31: FIEs 3,359 - - ... - - 9, 139 - -
Nonferrous SOEs 25,408 - - ... - - 69,134 - -
metals Private 57,490 - - .. . - - 156,429 - -
32 All 305 ,26 1 - - .. . - - 15 - -
Sector j 
- - - - - -(j=33 , ... ,38) All . . . .. . .. . 
39 All 0 - - ... - - 0 - -
TH All 26,729,892 - - ... - - 7,829,596 - -
TVA All 1,773 ,282 6,276,175 37,962,794 ... ... ... 84,537 487,559 2,262 ,976 
Total Input All 3,76 I ,858 2 1,479,046 47,50 1,240 .. . . . . . .. 220,575 1,668,587 3,775,507 
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Table 4.15: Intermediate Input-output Matrix by Ownership (after Further Disaggregation) 
): Coal, petroleum, gas Section i, (i=2,. .. ,30) 3): Nonferrous metals 
FIEs SOEs Private FIEs SOEs Private FIEs SOEs Private 
1 : Coal, FIEs 5,888 45 ,014 28,242 . .. . .. . .. 29 255 327 
petroleum, SOEs 33,6 18 257,016 161 ,254 ... ... . .. 168 1,457 1,865 
Gas Private 74,347 568 ,394 356,616 ... .. . . .. 371 3,221 4,125 
FIEs ... . .. . .. ... ... . .. . .. . .. . .. 
Section i, SOEs .. . . .. . . . . . . ... . . . . .. . . . . .. 
(i=2, ... ,30) Private .. . . .. . .. .. . . .. ... . .. . .. . . . 
31: FIEs 250 1,910 1, 199 . .. ... . .. 439 3,814 4,885 
Nonferrous SOEs 1,890 14,451 9,067 .. . .. . . .. 3,324 28,855 36,955 
metals Private 4,277 32,698 20,515 ... ... ... 7,521 65 ,291 83,617 
32 All 22,710 173 ,620 108,93\ ... ... . .. 1 6 8 
Sector j 
- - - -(j=33, ... ,38) All . .. .. . .. . . .. . .. 
39 All 0 0 0 .. . ... . .. 
° ° 
0 
TII All 1,988 ,576 15,202,871 9,538,446 ... ... . .. 136,038 1,181 ,028 1,512,530 
TVA All 1,773 ,282 6,276, 175 37,962,794 ... ... . .. 84,537 487,559 2,262,976 
Total Input All 3,761 ,858 21 ,479,046 47,501 ,240 .. . ... . .. 220,575 1668,587 3,775 ,507 
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4.6.4. Negative Data and Data Balancing 
The "Operating Surplus" in sector "production of tap water" is negative 
(see Table 4. 16) . This negati vity is not acceptable in coding the CGE mode l. To 
so lve thi s problem, we need to "smooth" the values for the whole " Utiliti es" by 
ownership whil st keeping row "Net Taxes on Production (NT)" unchanged. 
Table 4.1 6: Old Dataset for " Utilities" Sectors 
Production of electric power, Production of gas Production of tap water 
steam and hot water 
FlEs SOEs Private FIEs SO Es Private FlEs SOEs Private 
ep 1,953 ,597 1,607,695 4,986,182 42, 187 96,65 1 16 1,472 37,953 2 18,892 1,0 15,975 
NT 1,8 14,02 1 1,492,832 4,629,940 19,388 44,417 74,206 1/ ,563 66,688 309,528 
OP 2,48 1,278 2,04 1,945 6,332,986 42,570 97,528 162,93 7 35 ,808 206,519 958 ,54 7 
OP 2,807,624 2,3 10,509 7,165 ,923 22 50 83 -787 -4540 -21 ,074 
Note: same as Table 4. 12. 
Table 4.17: Sum of Value Added (NT Excluded) of Three "Utilities" 
Sectors 
Sum of Three " Utility" Sectors 
FIEs SO Es Private 
ep 2,033,738 1,923 ,238 6,163 ,630 
NT - - -
OP 2,559,656 2,345,992 7,454,469 
OP 2,806,859 2,306,0 19 7,144,932 
Sum 7,400,253 6,575,249 20,763 ,03 1 
Shares 
FlEs SO Es Private 
ep 27.5% 29.2% 29.7% 
NT 
OP 34.6% 35 .7% 35.9% 
OP 37.9% 35. 1% 34.4% 
Sum 100% 100% 100% 
Note: same as Table 4. 12. 
The fi rst step is to sum up CP, DP, and OP of the three "Utilities" sectors 
by ownership, as shown in Table 4.17. NT ("Net Tax of Production") is 
excluded here to keep its values unchanged, as this variable is important fo r tax 
refo rm analys is in Chapter 7. The second step is to calculate the percentage of 
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CP, DP, and OP in their sums (see lower panel in Table 4.17). With these 
weighted shares, we can then "redistribute" CP, DP, and OP within each 
ownership. The results are shown in Table 4.18 . A comparison of Table 4.16 
and 4.18 shows that (l) the values of NT do not change; (2) values of OP in 
"production and supply of tap water" sectors are now positive. 
Table 4.18: New Dataset for "Utilities" Sectors 
Production of electric power, Production of gas Production of tap water 
steam and hot water 
FlEs SOEs Private FlEs SOEs Private FlEs SOEs Private 
ep 1990384 1743324 5487410 23299 568 11 96327 20055 123103 579893 
NT 1814021 1492832 4629940 19388 44417 74206 11 563 66688 309528 
OP 2505091 2126530 6636629 29324 69299 116501 2524 1 150163 701339 
OP 2747024 2090296 6361052 32 156 68 11 8 111664 27678 147605 672217 
Note: same as Table 4.12. 
The "Error" colunm 111 the (10 table needs to be removed and the 
remaining I/O matrix needs to be balanced with certain data manipulation skills. 
Usua lly this job can be done by nonlinear programming (NLP). However, this 
balancing technique generated big discrepancies between the old unbalanced 
data set and the new balanced data set. An explanation for this is that many 
observations in column "Change in Inventories" are negative. When forcing all 
the data in the new estimated SAM to be positive in NLP, the overall quality of 
the data will be impaired. 
To avoid the problem caused by NLP, we have to do the data balancing in 
Excel manually. We can augment each entry in the "Final Demand" columns 
with a multiplier so that the new "Final Demand" data plus the "Intermediate 
Demand" for each sector is equal to the "Gross Output". The multiplier is 
obtained by: 
a , = FD, + ER, , i = 1,2, ... ,101 
FD, 
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where FDi and ERi represent "Final Demand" and "Error" of the ith 
industry respectively. 
4.6.5. Final-round Data Consistency Check 
Before importing the new ownership-disaggregated input-output table into 
CGE modelling, it is very important to take a final round data validity checking 
to make sure that the table is balanced in an accounting sense. 
The first step is to check whether the sum of ownership-disaggregated 
intermediate inputs is equal to the corresponding disaggregated "Total 
Intermediate Inputs" (TII). For example, for FIEs in sector I, we need to check 
whether 
3 1 39 
L,inpUI/;'fl:" + L,inpUI/;'fE, = T1I/;'''' .1 =1,988,576. 
1=1 1=32 
The second step is to check whether the sum of disaggregated value added 
is equal to the corresponding disaggregated "Total Value Added" (TVA). For 
example, for FIEs in sector I, we need to check whether 
Cp Flf,'.1 + NT. FlE' + DPf-'IIi.l + Op,f-'II", = TVAf:fC.I = 1 773 282 1 1 1 1 I '" 
The third step is to check whether the sum of disaggregated intermediate 
use is equal to the corresponding disaggregated "Total Intermediate Use" (TIU). 
For example, for FIEs in sector 1, we need to check whether 
3 1 39 
"use FlE' + "use Fl f " = TIUFfh" =1 988 576 L..J 11 L..J 11 1/ '" 
1=1 1=32 
The final step is to check whether the sum of disaggregated final use (FU) , 
export (EX) , error (ERR) with import excluded is equal to the corresponding 
disaggregated "Gross Output" (GO) . For example, for FIEs in sector I, we 
need to check whether 
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FUI OI FlEs + FUI02 F11: s + FU1 03 /;'IE, + FU201 F11:.· , + FU202 FJJ::., EXFI/;'s _IM FI/:s 
I I I I I + I I 
= GOI
FlEs 
= 3 761 858 , , 
4.7. CONCLUSIONS 
The transformation of the original input-output table involves complex 
data manipulation process, which mainly involves three types of work: (I) 
aggregating the original 122 by 122 input-output table into a 39 by 39 one; (2) 
disaggregating the 39 by 39 one into a 101 by 101 one with information on 
different ownership, which enables the CGE model constructed on this 
input-output table to address issues regarding ownership (i.e. spillovers from 
foreign-invested enterprises to domestic enterprises); (3) data balancing and 
consistency check. 
Data employed are mainly from China Slalislical Yearbook 2003, China 
lndustlY Economy Statistical Yearbook 2003 and China lnpul-OulpUI Table 
2002. Data of several sectors are aggregated to reconcile different statistical 
standards. Data of agriculture, construction, and services are also aggregated to 
a great extent to cater for the data availability on FDI inflows. By doing so, we 
obtain a 39 by 39 input-output table. With data estimated for FIEs, SOEs, and 
Private enterprises, 31 out of the 39 sectors can be further disaggregated into 
31 x3=93 ownership-sectors. Data balancing techniques are used to make the 
transformed input-output table balance. In the process of data manipulations, 
three rounds of data consistency checks are conducted. 
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CHAPTER 5: A BENCHMARK CGE MODEL FOR 
THE CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS EXTENSIONS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This research on the productivity spillover effects of FOI in China is 
conducted in a static single-country CGE model with 101 sectors . The basic 
framework of the benchmark model will be discussed first. Three extensions to 
the benchmark model are also presented. In the first extension, endogenous 
variables are constructed to capture the FDI productivity spi llovers. Parameters 
of FDI productivity spillovers are estimated with econometric analysis. The 
second extension incorporates monopolistic competition into the CGE model 
with FOI spillovers. Then the model is further extended to examine the effects 
of FDI spillovers under monopolistic competition among firms with 
heterogeneous productivities. 
5.2. CGE MODEL STRUCTURE 
The CGE model structurally encapsulates the productivity spillover 
effects of FOI on domestic finns by endogenising four spillover channels, 
namely backward linkages, forward linkages, export of MNEs, and hori zontal 
impact (demonstration, competition and resource reallocation). The model is 
focused on the manufacturing sectors in that almost 70% of FDT flows are into 
manufacturing in China. The research is done in the context of the Chinese 
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economy considering the fact that China has been the largest FDI host among 
the developing countries since 1993. In China, as a country in transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy, the potential impact of FDI 
productivity spillovers on state-owned enterprises and the emerging private 
sectors is of special interest. 
The circular t10ws of the Chinese economy are depicted by Figure 3.1 In 
Chapter 3. Commodity aggregation and disaggregation are sketched by Figure 
3.4. 
31 out of 39 industries (i.e. manufacturing and utilities industries) are 
disaggregated into 31 x3=93 sectors by ownership, namely foreign-invested 
sectors, state-owned sectors, and domestic private sectors, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. The data of the other 8 agricultural and services industries remain 
unchanged. Thus a 101 x 101 dimension input-output table is constructed as the 
basis of this CGE model on FDI productivity spillovers. 
In this model, the national composite demand for products and services is 
satisfied through a nested aggregation structure, each nesting level of which 
can be represented by a CES fUnction, as shown by Figure 5.1 and equation 
(5.1 ) to (5.4). 
The lowest level (level 4) aggregates the commodity across firms in the 
same industry with the same ownership, e.g. the products of stated-owned 
enterprises in the textile industry: 
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3 ownership-type sectors. 
Suitable fo r modelling FDI 
spillovers 
Armington 
aggregate I 
Figure 5.1: Consumption Aggregation (101 Sectors) 
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y = ·· 0"" . 
,.}.k LQ'J, ,},k.} ~ ~ . } , k J J
/ =1 
(5.1) 
where i, j , k,J index the hierarchy of this composite aggregation from the top to 
the bottom respectively.Jindexes individual firms. The number of firms (N;J,kf) 
in each ownership sector is rather different, ranging from 2 to 15,305 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2003a). k indexes ownership and takes values of 
I , 2, 3, representing foreign-invested enterprises ("HE"), state-owned 
enterprises ("SOE"), and domestic private enterprises ("PRlVATE"). j 
represents sources of commodities and takes binary values of 1 and 2, denoting 
domestically produced and imported commodities. Finally i stands for the 
sectors. There are 101 sectors: 93 ownership-disaggregated sectors and 8 
ownership-mixed sectors. Thus i = 1, 2, ... , 10 I. While Qij,k,f denotes the 
firm-level output, Y;j,k, denotes aggregate production of FIEs, SOEs, and 
private enterprises. 
The second last level of aggregation is a CES aggregation across three 
ownerships: 
(5 .2) 
At the second level is Armington aggregation (ARi) of domestically 
manufactured goods and imported goods : 
(5.3 ) 
At the top level , a further aggregation is applied : 
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0"1 
AG = [ I I , A R l a a ~ 1 1 ]0"1-1 
1=1 
(5.4) 
The sum over the shares parameters at each aggregation level is assumed 
to be equal to one: 
10 1 2 3 N f 
'a = , n . = 'r k = '/11 .. k J. = I ~ ~ I ~ P P , J J ~ ~ 1,1 , ~ n n I " "
1= 1 /= 1 k = 1 / =1 
5.3. A BENCHMARK CGE MODEL 
In this section, we will discuss the framework , closure rules and 
numeraire of the benchmark model. Table AS.I to A5.13 in the Appendix to 
this Chapter list the MPSGE declaration, equations, variables and parameters 
of the benchmark model. 
5.3.1. Model Characteristics 
(1) Sectors, commodities and representative ~ , g e n t s s
In the model , there exist many production activities (SECTOR) that 
convert inputs (including primary inputs and intermediary inputs) into outputs 
(COMMOD IT Y). The complementary variable associated with a sector is the 
activity level , while the complementary variable associated with a commodity 
is its price. 
Consumers are represented by a domestic representative agent (RA). He or 
she receives the returns to the labour and capital and the balance of current 
account, and then purchases investment and private consumption. The 
government is also designated to be a representative agent (GOV) . In an 
imperfect competitive market where markups or profits exist, a representative 
enterprise can also be denoted as a representative agent (ENT RE) to collect 
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markup and pay its fixed cost. Finally, a foreign representative agent (FOI) is 
designed to allocate foreign investments into different sectors and collects 
earnings to foreign capital in each sector. 
(2) Production of value-added composite 
The production of value-added composite is the starting point of the core 
model. Value added is produced with a Cobb-Douglas (C-D) technology from 
two primary inputs, labour (WL) and capital (RK). The elasticity of substitution 
is thus equal to I (S: 1). The choice of C-D functions, rather than CES or 
Leontief forms, is consistent with Chow and Lin (2002) who employ C-D to 
estimate the TFP in China, and Fan, Liao, and Wei (2007) who find non-zero 
substitution between labour and capital in the Chinese economy. This choice is 
also echoed by Balistreri, McDaniel and Wong (2003) who fail to reject the 
C-D specification in 20 of the 28 industries in the V.S. 
The FDI productivity spillovers are modelled as an economic externality 
taking place during the production of value added, which will be discussed in 
detail in Section 5.4 of this Chapter. The productivity spillovers take the form 
of "increment" to the value added, with an incremental rate of NTFP. This 
extra increase of value added exists due to the presence of foreign enterprises, 
but it does not "borrow" resources from anyone of the agents in the economy. 
In coding productivity spillover in the CGE modelling, the incremental part (i.e. 
the spillover part) of the value added is "transferred" by the government (GOV). 
But this does not change the government budget balance at all - in the event of 
productivity spill over, there is always an exact match of extra government 
expenditure for spillover and extra government revenue (i.e. extra 
"endowment") to offset the "spillover expenditure". 
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(3) Production sectors 
The value-added composite and intermediate products are employed for 
production of commodities with a Leontief production function (S: 0). Ad 
valorem tax is levied on the output at a rate of NTP (A) and is redistributed to 
the government (GOV). The change of production tax rate (TDIFFl (A) can 
be added to the existing tax rates to perform simulations on FDI tax rd'orms 
which will be analysed in Chapter 7. 
The production block will also be used to capture the efTect of 
monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity, theoretical models of which 
will be constructed in Section 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. 
(4) CET transformation of production 
Outputs of each sector are disaggregated into two portions with a CET 
technology, one for export and the other for domestic use. The elasticity of 
transformation takes values from the Global Trade Analysis Project database 
version 6. 
(5) Labour and capital disaggregation 
The total supplies of labour and domestic capital are both fixed and the 
economy is assumed to in full employment. Extra capital can be introduced to 
the stock of foreign capital in the form of an FOI shock, which will be 
discussed in detail in the next Chapter. The purpose of imposing the 
assumption of fixed domestic capital supply is to simplify the model so that we 
could focus on the pure effects of an FDI shock with spillovers. 
The assumption of fixed total labour supply is consistent with the 
economic environment in China in the last three years or so. It was argued in 
the literature that China was in the process of fast urbanisation and 
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industrialisation, and it had a huge amount of hidden unemployment in both 
urban and rural areas, which provided a large pool of extra labour supply to the 
economy (Fu and Balasubramanyam, 2005). However, this "excess labour 
supply" story is no longer true. Since the early 2006 China's 
export-concentrated provinces began to face a mounting pressure of labour 
shortage, partly because massive rural tax cuts have helped keep people 
working on farms, and also because the "one-child policy" has started to allcct 
the supply of young Chinese workers5. 
Both capital and labour are first disaggregated across 39 industries at all 
upper nesting level first, subject to constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
technologies. For each of the 31 MMU industries (mining, manufacturing and 
utilities), both primary inputs will be further allocated to the three 
ownership-disaggregated sectors, namely FIEs, SOEs, and Private sectors, also 
subject to CET technologies. 
Both labour and capital can move imperfectly across industries and 
owners hips within each of the 31 MMU industries. The elasticity of 
transformation for the upper nesting CET function is set to be I, while the 
elasticity for the lower nesting CET function takes the form of a parameter 
(TAU L for labour and TAU K for capital), the value of which will be subject 
- -
to sensitivity tests in the next Chapter. 
(6) Armington aggregation 
There are two nesting levels here in the generation of Armington 
aggregate goods. At the lower nesting level, domestically produced goods are 
5 David Barboza, "Labor Shortage in China May Lead to Trade Shift". New York Times, April 3, 
2006. 
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aggregated across owners hips in each industry. Then at the higher nesting level. 
domestically produced goods in each industry are aggregated with imported 
goods. The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 
takes values from the Global Trade Analysis Project database version 6. 
(7) Export and import 
In the export block, exported goods generate a special output. foreign 
currency (PFX), while in the import block foreign currency is exchanged for 
imported goods. 
(8) Representative domestic agent 
The representative domestic agent (RA) is endowed with primary factors, 
i.e. labour and capital. Using the returns to the labour and capital and the 
balance of the current account, the agent purchases investment goods, which 
include fixed asset formation and change of inventory. The remaining part is 
expended over private consumption. 
(9) Representative agent for multinational enterprises 
An agent representing multinational firms (FOr) is added here to capture 
the capital flow of FDI. This agent manipulates its capital and re-directs the 
earnings worldwide. Its investment stock in China is approximately RMB 
2 x 105 million in 2002, which is denoted as an endowment of foreign exchange. 
An increment of total capital in the form of worldwide earnings will take the 
form of new FDI. This FDI flows to each foreign-invested sector and will thus 
boost the production of these sectors. This agent also earns returns to capital 
since the agent has its presence in every industry. With these endowments and 
earnings, the agent FDI spends 2x 10s foreign currency in investment plus the 
returns to its presence. 
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5.3.2. Closure Rules and Numeraire 
(1) Government closure 
Tax revenue is less than government consumption demand, suggesting a 
fiscal deficit. The deficit is financed by borrowing money from t h ~ ~ p r i v a t ~ ~
households in the form of "direct taxes". In this model, the direct taxes are 
measured by a fixed quantity of consumed commodities multiplit!d by the 
endogenous commodity prices. In other words, this model assumes a 
fiscal-neutral deficit, which is fixed in terms of the quantity of consumed 
commodities. 
The government consumes a variable quantity of commodities and their 
prices may also vary endogenously. The fiscal revenue comes from tht! 
collection of indirect taxes (i.e. "net taxes on production" which will be 
introduced in section 7.4 in Chapter 7) at fixed tax rates. 
In counterfactual simulations the fiscal revenue collected from indirect 
taxes will vary with the change of tax bases (production). Thus the government 
has to adjust its consumption demand given its variable indirect tax revenue 
and fixed amount of deficit in terms of commodity quantity. This fiscal-neutral 
closure therefore "insulates" the external shock from the amount of 
commodities to be consumed by private households, as the government can 
only borrow a fixed amount of commodities from the households. So this 
closure provides a reasonable environment for the analysis of welfare changes 
caused purely by the shock of FDI productivity spillover in the next Chapters. 
(2) Savings-investment closure 
This is a static model and there is no intertemporal savings-investment 
transformation. The model is based on input-output table data, so data on 
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savings and investment are determined by gross domestic fixed capital 
formation. The investment demand of the representative agent is tixed and 
includes fixed asset formation and changes of inventories. The representative 
agent receives income from labour and capital and makes (fixed) purchases of 
foreign exchange (net transfers and foreign savings) and investment. The 
remainder of his or her income is spent on private consumption. 
(3) External closure 
The nominal exchange rate is selected as the numeraire6 and a .flexihle 
real exchange rate regime is adopted. Alternatively we could set a tixed real 
exchange rate by fixing the ratio of exchange rate to domestic price index and 
allowing the government to sell and buy foreign exchange to maintain this 
price ratio. However the Chinese government has switched to a managed 
floating exchange rate regime since July 2005 and let the exchange rate of 
Renminbi appreciate 17.4% gradually over the last four years. Therefore it is 
preferable not to fix the real exchange rate in the model. 
The model adopts a small open economy assumption, which suggests that 
changes of export and import volumes in each sector in counterfactual 
simulations are not large enough to affect the export and import prices in 
international markets. The quantity of exports and imports change 
endogenously, but the current account balance is set to be fixed. 
6 As discussed in Chapter 3, the purpose of the numeraire is to nonnalise all other nominal 
variables and make simulation results comparable. Theoretically we can choose any nominal 
variable as the numeraire. which does not affect the quantities in the simulation results at all. 
Choosing the exchange rate as the numeraire does not imply a fixed exchange rate regime. 
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5.4. EXTENSION 1: FDI PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS 
5.4.1. Productivity Decomposition 
The benchmark CGE model can be extended to endogenously incorporate 
fo ur possible productivity spillover channels, namely backward linkages, 
forward linkages, exporlS of FIEs, and horizontal effects (including 
demonstration, competition, and resource rea llocation). The spillover channel 
of labour turnover between FIEs and domestic enterpri ses is dropped in the 
model because such industry-level data are not available. 
Suppose VAi,l= TFPi/ K , ~ K K L ~ ~ ' ' , where K" , and L,,/ denote capital and labour 
respectively. As discussed in Section 5,3.1 , G(Ki./, Li./) takes obb-Douglas 
rather than CES functional forms here , which is consistent with the literature. 
Then TFP can be decomposed into: 
TFP = TFPindigenolls + TFPspillover (5 .5) 
where TFPindigenolls captures all indigenous factors that contribute the TF P 
of a firm (e.g. R&D, employee education level, employee training hours, and 
management skill s), while TFPspillover measures the FDI producti vity spillover 
effects. 
The TFP and spillover effects can be estimated in a 2-stage approach: 
TFPi,1 = exp(an+ r i,,) = al + p xSPL +G'/ 
(5.6a) 
(5.6b) 
where the vector SPL collectively denotes three FDI pillover channel . It 
contains four variables: horizontal demonstration, HZDSi,I, backward linkages 
BLi./, forward linkages FLi,1> and export concentration of multinational 
enterpri ses EXCOi,l,. 
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HZDSu , is the share of FfEs in the gross output in sectorj at time t . BLit 
and FLu are horizontal demonstrations weighted by input-output cocffi ci nts. 
They are designed to capture local firm interactions with FIEs as purchasers 
and suppliers, respectively. The specifications of BL and FL follow the practi ce 
adopted in the literature (Javorcik, 2004; Kneller and PiSll, 2007' irma, Gorg 
and Pisu, 2008; Girma and Gong, 2008a). 
(5. 7a) 
(5. 7b) 
where t5iJ are input-output coefficients. They measure the percentage or 
output of industry i provided to industry./ in the total output of industry i : 61J 
=1". / 1" IJ I 
For example, assume the foreign presences at industry I, 2, 3 are 10%, 
20%, and 30%, respectively. Industry I provides its products to itse lf, indu try 
2 and 3 with proportion of 40%, 35% and 25%. Then coefficient of backward 
linkage is BL = 40% x I 0% + 20%x35% + 30%x25% = 0.185. 
The selection of the above two input-output linkage variable as a measure 
of FDI spillovers has three merits. Firstly, they have been widely applied in 
many country contexts (China, Lithuania and the UK) in the econometric 
studies in the literature mentioned above, to examine the correlation between 
the productivity of domestic enterprises and the FIEs in downstream and 
upstream sectors. Secondly as BL and FL are both weighted measures of HZDS 
across a large number of sectors, the independence of BL, FL and HZDS is 
always observed in the literature. Thirdly, in the subsequent CGE modelling, 
both BL and FL can be modelled as endogenous variables and whole values 
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can change endogenously in counterfactual simulations. This will be discussed 
in detail shortly. 
Finally, EXCOi is the ratio of the export of foreign-invested firm s sector i 
to the total export in sector i , which measures "export concentration" as 
another spillover channel. 
Equation (S.6a) and (S .6b) are estimated with an industry- level panel 
dataset. As discussed by Gorg and Strobl (200 I), panel data analyses are 
superior to cross-sectional studies in their capability of capturing time-invariant 
sector-specific factors which may impact on the relationship between foreign 
presence and the performance of domestic enterprises. Ignorance of such 
time-invariant factors usually leads to an overestimation of FDI productivity 
spillovers. 
There are three issues regarding the above econometric model that merit 
discussion. The first one is the measurement of the labour input. It would be 
ideal to measure L with employment weighted by schooling years. But 
unfortunately the data of schooling years by ownership- ector are not available. 
The second issue is whether or not to include industry dummies to control 
for potential fixed industry effects. If industry dummy variables are included, 
equation (S.6b) can be transformed into 
TFPi./ = exp(ao+ GU) = al + p xSPL + ai xDUMMY, +(u (5.6c) 
then the decomposition of TFP as specified by (5.5) and (5.6b) will not be 
confined to be uniform across all industries. In other words, the indigenous part 
of productivity could vary across industries (TFP/IIdigenOlls = a, + a, x DUMMY, 
(,), while the spillover part of productivity takes a uniform specification across 
industries (TFPspillover = p XSPL). Unfortunately thi option was not available 
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for two reasons. (a) As we will discuss shortly, while for OEs we have 31 
(industries) x 5 (years) = 155 observations, for Private enterpri cs wc only 
have 31 (industries) x 2(years) = 62 observations. The latter rules out including 
30 industry dummies. (b) While our spillover variables (HZDS, EX '0, BL and 
FL, collectively denoted by the vector SPL) for the CGE modeling can change 
endogenously in counterfactual simulations (to be di cussed shortly), wc 
cannot allow for endogenous changes in industry fixed effects. 
The third issue is whether or not to include year dummy variables to 
control for the effect of CGE benchmark year (2002). Again the limited data n 
Private enterprises (for two years only, 2005 and 2006) preclude this. 
Thus we can employ econometric regression to obtain the share of TI ' P 
caused by spillovers in total TFP. 
TFP,plllol'cr P x SPL 
- --'--- = - - = - - ~ - -
TFP,o/a' £x, + jJ x SPL 
(5.8) 
where jJ x SPL == p, BL" + P2 FL" + P3 HZDS, I + P4 EXCO, , . 
. . . . 
In the CGE modelling, the share of FIEs in sectoral output (HZDSi) and 
the share of FIEs in sectoral export (EXCO i ) will be both endogeno/ls!y 
determined in counterfactual experiments. Backward linkages (BL I ) and 
forward linkages (FLi) are also endogenously determined by equation (5 . 7a) 
and (5.7b), respectively. Therefore, the share of productivity spillovcr is also 
endogenous, as specified by equation (5 .8). Thus we can transform equation of 
value-added production into 
VA = 8 xTFP x K a• L al. 
' . / I ' . / '.1 ',I (5.9) 
where e = TF?, TFPO, denotes the benchmark TFP (a , + /J x SPL ) 
, TFPO , ' 
- 137 -
and TFP i denotes endogenous TFP value (a, + jJ x SPL) . In this way we can 
model the For productivity spi llovers endogenously. In the benchmark 
scenario , 8,= I, so that the above equation simpli fies to VA u = TFPu x K , ( ~ < < L : ~ ; ; . 
5.4.2. Econometric Estimations of Spillove.· P ~ l I ' a m c t c r s s
The CGE model is built on the Input-output Table of hina in 2002, so 
the FDI spillover parameters P have to be estimated for the years around 2002. 
Table 5.1: Available Data for Industry-level Panel Data Analys is 
Variables Symbols Source Years 
Va lue added VA CIESY 200 1-2003. 2005-2006 
Net fixed assets K CIESY 2001-2003. 2005-2006 
Total employment L CIES), 200 1-2003. 2005-2006 
Input-output coefficients fJ i . 1 I/O 2002 
Backward linkages 8L,.1 = ~ ) b b , . j , l l * HZDS ,,1) CIES),. I/O 2002 
Forward linkages FL i ., = ~ ~ b ' ' . / . , , * HZDS, J CIESY, I/O 2002 
, 
Horizontal demonstrations HZDS CIES )' 200 1-2003. 2005-2006 
Export concentration EXCO CIESY 200 1-2003 ,2005-2006 
Note: CIESY is the acronym of China Indus/rial Economy S/a/is/ical Y C/I'book 
(2001-2003 and 2005-2006); I/O denotes the input-output table of China in 2002. Value added 
VA and intemlediate input /vi will be deflated with an "ex-factory or who lesale price index". 
Net fixed assets K wil l be deflated with a " fixed asset investment price index". Both indexes 
are obtained from China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statisti cs of hina.2007) . 
The main data sources for estimation are China Industrial Economy 
Stat istical Yearbook (hereafter ClESy) and the li D Table , both relea ed by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (hereafter "NB "). The availabl 
ClESYs around the year of 2002 are for the years of 200 1-2003 and 2005-2006. 
BS releases I/O tables every five years and the latest one is for th year of 
2002. So the I/O table of 2002 only wi ll be employed to calculate all the 
input-output coefficients Oij., (thus I can be suppressed) for the yea rs of 
200 1-2003 and 2005-2006. 
The available data sources are summarised III Table 5. 1. Th re are 
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31 (industries)x5(years) = 155 observations (panel data) for estimation or 
SOEs. But the data for private enterprises are on ly avai lable in 2005 and 2006, 
so total observations for the private sectors are only 62 . 
Table 5.2: Estimation of Value Added 
Firm types constant K L Ohs. 112 
SOEs 0. 13 0.91 0.09 
155 0.<)<) (0.04)*** (0.02)** * (0.03)*** 
Private 1.0 I 0.39 0.70 
62 0.97 
(0.19)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)*** 
Note : (I ) EstllnatlOn of equation (5.6a). (2) Standard errors In parenthc e . *, "'''', """'" 
denote statistically sign ificant at 10%, 5%, and I % leve l, respectively. (3) " E: ' and 
"Private" denote state-owned enterprises and domestic private enterpri cs respect ive ly. 
Table 5.3: Estimation of Productivity Spillovcrs 
Firm types constant BL FL JlZDS D<CO Obs. NZ 
SOEs 0.9 1 0.40 0.29 0.33 0.04 
155 0.31 (0.05)*** (0.42) 
. 
(O.IS)* (0.17)* (0.07) 
Private 2.21 0.15 2.S8 2.88 -1. 74 
62 0.30 (0.32)*** (2.73) (0.97)*** (1.11)*** (0.47)*** 
Note: ( I ) Estimation of equation (S.6b). (2) Standard errors 111 parenthe c . *, """ , "'*'" 
denote stati sticall y significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (3) "SOE " and 
"Private" denote state-owned enterprises and domestic private enterpri ses respectively. (-I) 
imilar to the results in the literature, the correlation coefficients of Bt.. Ft. and " ZDS aI'\.! 
reasonably low (both below 0.3 0), so that their independence is justi fi ed . 
The TFP estimated (TFPi,l = exp(ao+ GU)) from equat ion (5.6a) are further 
regressed against spillover variables as specified by equation (5.6b). 
As shown by Table 5.3 , there is a significant relationship between the 
productivity of domestic enterprises and FDl presence. Both OLs and Pri vate 
domestic firms benefit from spillovers from foreign-invested firm in up tream 
and horizontal sectors, and the coefficients for private enterprises arc larger and 
more statistically significant. This difference could be caused by th relat ively 
weak absorptive capacity of SOEs that undertake les R&D acti vity and 
employee training, as suggested by Girma and Gong (2008a). Neither SOEs 
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nor Private enterprises benefit from the contacts with the FIEs in downstream 
sectors (coefficients for BL are not significant). The reason tor this could be 
that the potential benefit of backward linkages is counterbalanced by the 
increased competition among domestic enterprises in the upstream sectors 
triggered by the FIEs in the downstream sectors. 
Finally, it seems that the export of MNE aililiates has no ctTects on 
improving the productivity of SOEs. Private enterprises are even negatively 
affected by the MNE exports. The latter makes little sensc as an "cxport 
spillover" and may reflect industry characteristics - i.e. FIEs have a higher 
share of exports in industries where domestic firms have relatively lower TFP.7 
Because this effect can vary endogenously in our simulations, we retain it but 
note that it may not be picking up a spillover as such. 
Based on the above econometric estimation, we calculate that the average 
contribution of FDI productivity spillovers to the overall TFP (estimated from 
equation (5.6a)) of SOEs and private enterprises (calculated with equation (5.8») 
are 22% and 20%, respectively. The estimated significant and insigniticant. and 
positive and negative spillover coefficients (denoted by the vector IJ) will he 
carried forward into the CGE modelling as specitied by equation (5.8). 
5.5. EXTENSION 2: FDI SPILLOVERS UNDER 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
5.5.1. Incorporating Monopolistic Competition into the CGE Model 
The CGE model constructed in previous sections assumes that the Chinese 
7 It has been suggested that export-oriented FIEs may "cherry pick" the best skilled workers 
from domestic firms leading to lower productivity in the latter. (Gimla and Gong, 2008a). 
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economy is a perfectly competitive market. However perfect competition is 
only one among various possible market structures and it is important to furthl.!r 
examine the effects of FDI productivity spillovers in an alternative scenario i.e. 
"monopolistic competition" (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Monopolistic 
competition refers to a market structure where a relatively large group of firms 
produce different varieties of a particular product. The product of onc firm 
within the group is highly, but not perfectly. substitutable for the product of 
another firm. Therefore each firm has a limited monopoly power and faces a 
downward rather than horizontal demand curve. Entry barriers are low so that 
entry occurs in a monopolistically competitive group when a new firm 
introduces a new product. In the long run, every surviving firm makes zero 
protit due to the assumption of free entry and exit. 
The scenario of monopolistic competition has been applied widely in the 
analysis of trade liberalization (e.g. Blake. Rayner and Reed. 1999; Francois 
and Roland-Holst. 1997; Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr. 1994. 1995. 1997). 
Their analyses conclude that the benefits of trade liberalization under 
monopolistic competition include consumption of a greater product variety. 
lower product price and higher production efticiency due to increased 
competition. 
However. FDI productivity spillovers in this scenario have not yet been 
studied so far. This Section is aimed at filling this gap. The key to modelling 
monopolistic competition in the CGE model on FDI productivity spillovers is 
to find the mark up rate (to be defined by equation (5.11 ». 
For a firm with certain market power. its total revenue is TR = P(Q)'" Q. 
where price of product (P) is a function of total output (Q). 
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Marginal revenue (MR) is 
MR = aTR = p + ap 0 = P(I _ ~ ) )
aQ aQ- /£/ (5.10) 
where 1£1 denotes the price elasticity of demand (!... aQ]. Q ap 
I P-MC 
MR = MC ~ ~R = P == markup(%) (5. 11 ) 
As discussed, in the long run, every surviving firm makes zero profit due 
to the assumption of free entry and exit, so that TR=P xQ=T '. Therefore the 
markup rate is also equal to the proportion of fixed cost in total cost: 
F F' 
---=--=-
PxQ ~ ~
where rc, vc, and FC denote total co t, variable co t, and fix ed cost, 
respectively. 
This indicates that in a monopolistic competitive market, each firm has to 
collect a mark up to pay the fixed cost. This transformed zero profit condition, 
together with market clearance and income balance conditions, is an important 
property of a general equilibrium (see Section 3.1.3), and the markup rate is 
crucial to modelling monopolistic competition in a CGE model. 
In the FOf spillover model , the representative agent has a nested 
consumption structure, each of which can be represented by a ES function , as 
shown by equation (5.1) to (5.4). With \. Of productivity spillovers spec ifi ed by 
equation (5.5.2) and (5.6.\), we know that Yij.k, as ownership-type products is a 
function ofFOI productivity spillovers, i.e. 
NTFP Y (0 ), where 0 = 1. I .k . 
I ,j ,k I ,j.k I .j .k NTFPO 
I ,J .k 
Since such spillovers are assumed to take place between FIEs and 
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domestic firms , so that NTFP;.}.k = NTFPO" ,.k and 0 ,.}.k = I for k= I (r l Es). 
The assoc iated demand functions of E equation (5 .1 ), (5.2), (5 .3) and 
(SA) can be derived: 
Top leve l aggregation: A R, = ( ~ : : ; I ( ; ; J(TI X A 
f AU( I) 
2 1ld level aggregation: DI = ( P I III(I) J(Tl x A R 
1.1 P I 
f)J ( I .}) 
-rd I I . Y = ( P Il/( I • .I) ] (Tl x DI j eve aggregatIOn : 1. I .k P, 1. 1 
)' (I . I .k) 
Bottom level aggregation : Q, I k r = ( P Y( I .J.k) JtT
4 
X Y 
. . . P 1. I .k 
(I( I . I.k .Il 
(SAn) 
(5 .3a) 
(5.2a) 
(5. 1 a) 
Starting from the bottom level aggregation, we transform (5 .1 a) to be: 
All the three terms in brackets on the right hand side of equation (5. 1 b) are 
functions of Q'J.kJ So we can differentiate equation (5. 1 b) W.I: t. Q'J.kj following 
the product rule: 
ap . I PIP . ay . (}(I . I .k.l) = __ (j(I.I.k . f) + _ ( } ( ( . I . ~ . f ) ) 1.1) 
aQ,.,.k. f 0'4 Q, .,.k./ 0'4 Y, .,.k aQ, ., .k./ 
+ P(J( I., .k .f) ap" (I . .I .k) 
(5 .12) 
PY(I . , .k) aQ,.}.k,f 
Unitary "conj ectural variation" (Kamien and Schwartz, 1983) is as umed 
here, i.e. each firm assumes that an increase of one unit of its own product 
va lue will bring exactly the same increase of total value of the product 
aggregate of its group. In other words, no other firm changes its output: 
P" (I.i .k) x ,0.Y, . .f.k = PQ(I . .I .kJ) x ,0.Q,.} ,kJ so that 
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t d ~ . I . k k _ P{}( ,. I .k,f) 
i1Q. /, j ' PoY( ' k) ' ,) .' . ' .), 
(5. 13) 
a ~ ' ( " I , k ) )
The term 111 (5. 12) can thus be transformed with equation 
a Q" j ,k,f 
(5,13): 
a a ' ( " I , k ) ) _ 8 8 ' ( ( . " k ) ) 8r.. ,.k 
aQ, .}.k./ a J ~ . } , k k aQ, .} ,k.J 
_ 8 8 , ( " , , k ) ) P I( ' ,I ,k , /) 
a } ~ . j , k k py( ,.} ,k) (5 ,14) 
Substitute (5. 13) and (5, 14) back into (5 ,1 2), and mUltiply both sides of 
( ) . I Q,. } ,k.J 5,12 Wltl P ,wecanget: 
Q(, ./.k) 
____ 8PQ(,.} .k. n Q, .},k,f = __ 1_ + I PQ(,.J,k.fl Q, . I ,k./ 
cQ(,.},kJ) 8Q, ,}.k..l PQ(, .).k) 0"4 0"4 ~ ' ( / ' I , k ) ) 0 ,} ,k 
+ (PQ(,.},k.1l Q, .} ,k,f ) x (ap,,(,. /,k) Q, ,/ .k, / ) 
pY( ,, / ,k) f. , / ,k ay, , / ,k p,' (,. /,k) 
(5 ,15) 
I I I 
= -- + -rp' , I .k, / + rp, , / ,k, / x 
0"4 0"4 ,. , c"(, , / .k) 
where (Pij.kJ denotes the market share of the fth firm in the kth sector, 
From equation (5.15), we can find that the inverse of elasti city of dellland 
ofthefih finn 's products is a function of the inverse elasticity of demand of the 
kth sec tor, which can be derived following a similar procedure: 
1 I 
---=--+-r,/k + r,/. x--
c Y(i ,j,k) 0") 0"3 ' , ' ' , ' c D/(,,) 
I I I 
--= - -+- /3' ,1 +/3,,} x--
c D/(, ,}) 0"2 0"2 C 1111(,) 
I I I I 
--=--+-a, +a, x-
c AII(, ) 0", 0", CA U 
(5. 16) 
(5,17) 
(5. 18) 
where ai, jJij and Yij. k are market share parameters of ARi, DJ,j , and Y1J,k 
respectively: 
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AR, x PA//( ,) D J,.) x ~ ) I ( ( . i l l r _ Y, . I .k X J ~ ' { { . ) . k ) )
a, = AG P ; f3..) = AR P ".).* - D J P 
. x Ae; , x .4 //(,) '.) x I)I(' . /l 
As Yij,k is a function of the endogenous FDI producti vity spillover terms 
8 NTFP; .i,k . k I . If ' f " ' ,I .k = FPO ' Its mar et s 1are Yij.k IS a so a unction 0 " 1.I.k . 
NT' , . ./ .k 
For the aggregate product A ,assumc Pile;' A = £ , where £ denotes the 
E 
consumer's fi xed expenditure. Then AG = P . Thus wc can get the elasti city 
;lU 
of demand for this aggregate product: 
(5 .1 9) 
Substitute (5 .1 9) back to (5. 18), and then substitute (5. 18) to (5. 17) and so 
on until we get the final express ion of the firm level inverse elasti city of 
demand, which is also the firm-Ievelmarkup rate: 
mk,,),k , / (%) = £ I 
(}(' ,I .k . /l 
I (I I J (I I) --+ - -- +ffJ - - -
- ffJ, . ).k. / , ,/ .k. /Y, . /,k 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
+ . --- +a G -- 1 ( 1 I) (I ) fJ, . ./Y, .),kffJ"./ .k,/ 0', 0'2 , fJ' ,I Y, .).k P,,) ,k, / 0', 
(5 .20) 
In Section 5.6 which examines the FDI producti vity spillovers in a new 
market structure, i.e. monopolistic competition among firms with 
heterogeneous productivities (in short "fi rm heterogeneity") a firm 's market 
share ffJ, ,), k,f will be determined by it productivity within each group (Melitz, 
2003). We will then replace equation (5 .20) with alternati ve specifications to 
contain ri cher in fo rmation of the new scenario. 
But in the current "representati v producer" CGE model. only the 
- 1-15 -
ownership-level aggregate markup rate mallers. uppos each " wnershi p 
group" (indexed by k) is populated by NJ firms with identica l size although they 
produce di ffe rentiated products. Thus their market share (/J'J.kJ is simply equal 
to 1/ NI This size symmetry al 0 implies that the mark up rate of each gro llp i 
equal to that of its representati vejirm: 
I 
mk,.},k (%) = mk, . .I.k,f (%) = e 
(J( I ,) .k ,f) 
I I (I 1) y, J k (1 1) 
= (j 4 + Ni.).k./ (j J - ~ ~ + N I . ' , . ~ . r r (j 2 - ;;-
fJl.JY,.J.k ( 1 1) aJJ,.JYi.J.k (I I) + - -- + - -
N ,., .kJ (jl (j2 N,.,.kJ (jl 
(5 .20a) 
In equation (5 .20a), the market share parameters (a" /J,,/, ' ' I J . ~ ) ) me 
endogenously determined while the elas ticities of substitution (a,. i=/ , 2, 3, -I ) 
are exogenou Iy chosen. YiJ ,k is of parti cular importance as it is a functi on or 
the term 0 /.,.k and conveys information of r OI spillover. 
5.5.2. FOr Productivity Spillovcrs under Monopolistic Competition 
The impact of FOI producti vity pillovers in a scenario of monopolisti c 
competition can be illustrated by a vari ety-sca le diagram (ori ginally proposed 
by Francois and Roland-Holst (1997, pp. 349) in a trade model) for a certain 
domestic sector whose aggregate output is denoted by Y'J.k. As shown in r igure 
5.2, Nij.kj(variety, in short " N') and Qij.kj(sca le, in hort 'I Q") are the verti cal 
and horizontal ax is, respecti vely. A down-sloping curv AoAo depi cts the 
trade-off between va riety and scale due to the resource constraint fac ing the 
producers in this sector. AoAo can also be understood as a "variety- calc 
possibili ty fronti er" . 
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Figure 5.2: FDI Productivity Spillovers under Monopolistic Competition 
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Now consider a case wherein the production capac ity of this domestic 
sector expands from AoAo to A lA I due to FDI producti vity spillovers, which 
helps the domestic producers in thi s sec tor produce more effi ciently with the 
given resources. 
Suppose an initial production point is ['o(Q, N), then a producti on capac ity 
enlargement can result in two dimensions of expan ion. one along Q (scale) 
and the other along N (variety), as shown in r igure 5.2. 
This can be illustrated algebraica lly in a simple m del (Krugman, 1980) . 
Suppose the composite input for each firm is denoted by /, and tota l fac tor 
supply is L. All firms take the same input function /=1+\ Q. where I and v 
denote fi xed cost and variable cost measured in units of input, respecti ve ly. 
Then the profit of any firm is 7r = p(Q)Q - 'rv(1 + vQ) where p and \11 denotes 
prices of output and input, resp cti vely. 
At long-run equilibrium with entry and ex it, two conditions should be b th 
satisfi ed. The first one is profit maximisation i.e. MR=M , and the econd one 
is zero profits in long-run equilibrium, i.e. P==A . 
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With equation (5.10), MR=MC means 
P=AC leads to P = (f + vQ) x w = f x w + v x w 
Q Q 
Substituting for equilibrium product price P we get 
Substituting Q to /=f+vQ, we can get equilibrium input demand for any 
variety: 
Thus the number of varieties which can possibly produced given the 
limited total supply of factor L is determined by the full employment condition 
L=Nxl, which implies that: 
Given the equilibrium solution of scale and variety (Q, N) 
(/(1£1- 1) L) d .. ·11 v ' f x 1£1 ' we can now examine how FDI pro UCtIVlty Spl overs 
affect the parameter values off and v, which in turn affect the solutions of (Q. 
N). 
In this context, bothfand v are functions of FDI spillovers, i.e. /(8) and 
v(8). As FDI spillovers push both fixed cost and variable cost lower. i.e. 
of (e )j iJEl <0, and av( e )/ iJEl < 0, then the number of varieties (N = f ~ ~ lel) 
produced in the economy will increase. When variable cost decreases faster 
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than fixed cost does, i.e. lav(e )/801 > I ~ f ( e e)jael, then the production scale 
Q = f(I&I-l) will also increase with FDI spillovers. 
v 
The above two expansion possibilities (i.e. both Q and N increase with FDI 
productivity spillovers) jointly result in a new equilibrium point E,(Q', N') in 
Figure 5.2. An up-sloping curve connecting Eo and E, depicts the positive 
correlation between Nand Q, and can be understood as a "sectoral 
variety-scale expansion path". Therefore under the assumption of monopolistic 
competition, if domestic firms receive productivity spillovers from 
foreign-invested firms, the new equilibrium E,(N', Q ') will bring consumers 
welfare improvement thanks to more varieties and cheaper prices 
( p = v x w x I £ I I ~ ~ I ). However, only the price benefits may be available if goods 
are homogeneous and markets are perfectly competitive. 
5.6. EXTENSION 3: FDI SPILLOVERS UNDER FIRM 
HETEROGENEITY 
5.6.1. Firm Heterogeneity and CGE Modelling 
The CGE model under monopolistic competition assumes a representative 
firm of each type in each sector. However, this assumption is at odds with the 
reality. Recent empirical research has shown that firms differ a lot in 
productivity. For example, Girma et at (2005) find that a productivity hierarchy 
exists and determines the behaviour of British firms, i.e. only the most 
productive firms can engage in FDI, and less productive firms export, while the 
least productive firms can only serve the domestic market. 
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Moreover. such pervasive productivity heterogeneity leads to firm size 
difference within each sector, i.e. the productivity of a firm is positively related 
to the size of this firm, as shown by Melitz (2003). In his model explicitly 
considering the productivity heterogeneity among firms, Melitz theoretically 
analyses the impact of trade on intra-industry resource reallocations and 
aggregate industry productivity. The model shows that only the most 
productive firms can afford the sunk cost of exporting. Trade liberalization can 
induce these firms to produce more and engage in export. leading to stronger 
competition for a common pool of labour. This can push up labour cost and 
drive the least productive firms to exit. So firms with higher productivity 
survive the trade liberalisation and grow larger by absorbing the resources 
released by the exiting firms. Thus aggregate industry productivity increases 
due to the resource reallocation effect of trade under firm heterogeneity. These 
conclusions are supported by Feenstra and Kee (2008), who find that export 
variety of firms accounts for the time-series variation in productivity. In brieC 
firm heterogeneity is an important theoretical assumption for explaining 
productivity growth caused by the endogenous self-selection of exporters. 
In this research on FDI productivity spillovers, the assumption that firms 
have heterogeneous productivity is also important in accounting the effects of 
potential FDI spillovers i.e. productivity improvement effect and resource 
reallocation effect. This will be discussed in detail in Section 5.6.3. 
In each sector. firms are heterogeneous in that they produce differentiated 
goods and are different in productivity. Every firm incurs fixed cost and 
variable cost in production. 
An option for incorporating heterogeneous firms into a standard 
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"representative firm" CGE model is to decompose the whole CGE model into a 
partial equilibrium (PE) module and general equilibrium (GE) module 
(Balistreri , Hillberry and Rutherfo rd, 2007). This option has been adopted here. 
Firm behaviour is determined in the PE module, while the aggregate economy 
is calibrated in the GE module. Key variables are se lec ted to transmi t 
information recursive ly between PE and GE modules. PE and GE mod ules 
recursively recalibrate to the new information. Thi s sequential re-ca li bration 
(SR) process will continue until all vari ables common to the PE and GE are 
consistent, i.e. the discrepancy between the vari able va lues obtained fro m the 
(I-l)th and tth iterations is at a tri vial leve l. This SR has proven effecti ve in 
achieving model convergence (Rausch and Rutherfo rd , 2007; Rutherfo rd and 
Tarr, 2008). The decomposition is sketched in Figure 5.3 . 
Figure 5.3: A Decomposition of CGE Model under Firm Heterogeneity 
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1 
: variables Z 
2, 
22 
2/'1 
I 
• _. _. _. _. _. _.--1 
·_._.- . -.- . _.-._ . _.1 
5.6.2. Model Construction for Firm Heterogeneity (PE Module) 
The PE module is constructed to model the heterogeneity of fi rms in their 
productivity. Suppose there is a mass of M; heterogeneous fi rms in the ith 
sector. These M; fi rms produce highly, but not perfec tly, substitutable products 
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111 that sector and have limited monopoly power, so that they can set their 
prices higher than their marginal costs, charge markups to compensate fixed 
costs and earn possible profits. On entry each firm is assumed to take a free 
draw (i.e. no entry cost) of productivity £Pi from a Pareto distribution 
g( rpi ) = ~ ( ~ ~ a a, and sets a price Pif( £Pi)' produces output Qij( £Pi). The val ues 
rp, rp, 
of parameters a and b can be taken from the literature (Bernard et aI., 2003; 
Zhai, 2008). 
(1) Market structure 
Suppose every firm in the ith sector needs to pay the same fixed cost Pi, 
which is assumed not to change to any external shock, e.g. productivity 
spillovers. Suppose firms in the ith sector face a market with a Dixit-Sliglitz 
style of preference (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977): 
CJ' > I (5.21) 
where illi indexes a continuum of variety of goods produced by the mass of 
Mi firms . The values of CJ'should be greater than I so that (CJ'-I)/ CJ' is greater 
than zero. 
From the profit maximisation condition MR =MC, we know that each firm 
sets a price so that the markup rate equals the inverse of the absolute value of 
the elasticity of demand, i. e. 
k (0/ ) - I _ I m ,./ / 0 - ~ ~ a (5.11 a) 
From markup rule (5.11 a), one can derive the optimal pricing rule for a 
firm with productivity £Pi! 
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P; f -C, / f/J, f 1 
mk .(%)=' . =- so that 1./ p , 
f· (J I • . 
(J C 
P j.=----' 
I . 1 (J- f/J;./ 
(5.22) 
where C denotes the price of unit input cost in the ith sector, which is a 
weighted average of the intermediate input prices (P;J) and primary input prices 
C, = - - ~ ~ - - ~ ~ = = ~ ~ ~ - - - - - -
I/OD ,.: + VA , 
In the above equation fOD; .: denotes the zth intermediate input while VA, 
denotes the primary input composite used for the production in the ith sector. 
The denotations for the prices of the two types of inputs (PA;.: and PVA;) are 
identical to those in Table 5.3. The amount of these inputs also corresponds to 
the parameters 111 Table 5.3 , i.e. IOD, .: = IOD(i.z) and 
VA, = CPCi) + DPCi) + OP(i). 
The duality of CES preference (5.21) implies that the aggregate price is: 
I 
[ ]
I-a 
P, = f P, .f ({V, )I-a dcv, 
ru,e O 
_ I (J.C, _ I 
C l [+'" ]1-0' -- M ; I- a (J . I - a-I (J-I 
=--M/I-O' Jf/JI g(CfJ;)dCfJ; = I 
(J-l []-
a 7f/J10' - ' g(f/J/)df/J1 0' - 1 (5 .23) 
[ 
(J 'C, ]M-I P( _ _ I 
= · I -a = (fI ) ·M I -a 
«(J-l)<P, I 1 '1"1 I 
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(5.24) 
(Pi denotes a weighted average of the firms ' productivity levels <p. 
For the feasibility of computation, one needs information on the 
productivity distribution of corresponding sectors. In the literature, the Pare to 
distribution has been found "compelling" in approximating the real distribution 
of firm productivity (Helpman, 2006, pp. 597). For a Par'eto distribution with 
probability density function of g(CfJ,) = ~ ( ~ ~ { / / , the corresponding 
CfJi CfJ, 
cumulative distribution is: 
(5.25) 
Now we can have a definition of the "marginal firm". For any firm , the 
demand for its products from consumers is determined by the preference 
equation (5.21). Assuming the total expenditure of the products in the ith sector 
are Ei , then 
(5.26) 
The profit function of a firm can be derived from (5.26) and (5.23): 
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(5.27) 
As can be seen from (5.27), since 0'> 1, profit (7riJ) is a monotonicall y 
increasing function of productivity (cpiJ). Suppose there exists a productivity 
level cp: which satisfies ": (cp:) = 0 , i.e. "zero cutoff profit" . Then for a firm 
whose CP iJ > CP:, 7riJ >0 so that it can survive; while for other firm s whose qJ ,j' 
< CP: , 7riJ <0 so that they have to exit. A firm taking a productivity draw of CPi· 
can be called a "marginal firm". Therefore the probability of s u c c e s s f l l l l entry 
(those firms with productivity higher than the marginal one cp,'): 
1- G(rp:l = ( :,. J (5.28) 
F or the "marginal firm", its markup equals the fixed cost, i. e. 
• • 1 C, . F, = P,(rp, ). Q,(rp, ) .- (5 .29) 
(j' 
(2) Aggregate productivity 
The conditional distribution of g(CPi) on [qJ ;", +00) can be obtained with the 
information of the probability of successful entry (equation 5.40): 
{ 
g(cp,) 
p (cp,) = ~ ~ - G(rp:) if 
>' I fP,-Cp" 
otherwise. 
Suppose cp, (denoted by equation (5 .24» as the productivity of a firm 
pricing at ~ , , then weighted average of the firm productivity rp, can be 
, inflated" (with equation (5.28» conditional on the successful entry: 
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If o--a-l >O, q;, approaches to infinity. When o--a-l <O (consistent with the 
results of Bernard et al. (2003)), a solution can be obtained: 
1 
_ • ( a )0'-1. 
rpj (rp, ) = 1 ((J, 
a+ -0-
(5 .30) 
Thus the weighted aggregate productivity in sector i (rp,) is denoted as a 
function of the cutoff productivity «((J:). The purpose of this denotation is to 
facilitate the interaction of GE module and PE module in the CGE model. In 
the PE module, the values of cutoff productivity «((J:) are simulated, then the 
values of aggregate productivity (rp; ) can be obtained with equation (5.30), 
summarising the productivity distribution of the firms in sector i. A virtual 
"quasi-representative" firm with a productivity level of rp, can be assumed 
here to represent the whole mass of firms in that sector. Such a 
"quasi-representative" firm takes the place of the conventional "representative" 
firm in each sector in the GE module, enabling the CGE model to capture how 
firm behaviour (e.g. productivity spillovers) affects the macroeconomic 
performance. 
(3) Zero cutoff profit condition 
From the model of Melitz (2003 , pp. 1700), one knows that the ratio of any 
- 156 -
two firms' revenues depends on the ratio of their productivity levels, so that 
using equation (5.30): 
P P ( ~ ) Q ( q J ; ! ! =( qJ,,]U-1 =[( a ) U U I I U _ I I = a 
P, (rp, )Q, (rp, ) rp, a + 1 - CT a + 1 - CT 
, , -_-_ (a+ I- CT ) 
and P,(rp, )Q,(rp, ) = P' (rp,)Q,(rp,) a (5 .31) 
Substitute equation (5.31) into equation (5 .29), we can get a new condition 
dependent on the weighted average producti vity rp,: 
(5.32) 
(4) Firm-level demand 
The duality of CES preference also implies that the demand fo r the output 
of the "quasi-representati ve firm" is determined by: 
(5.33) 
where P, and E; are the composite output price and expenditure level fo r 
the corresponding ith sector. 
(5) Input partial equilibrium 
Finally, one more equation is needed to link the parti al equilibrium module 
to the general equilibrium module. This equation concerns the cost of total 
input for each sector: 
( Q(rp)) "'( - ) -M; ,C; ' F; + '_ ' = ~ ~ PA;,z x lOD;,: + P VA; x VA; rp; z (5.34) 
where, again, IOD;,: denotes the zth intermediate input while VA, 
denotes the primary input composite used fo r the production in the ith sector. 
With the information of key price variables from the GE module (output 
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price vector, P, and input price vector C), the above system of five shaded 
equations (5.22), (5.30), (5.32), (5.33), and (5.34) can be solved to obtain the 
values of five endogenous variables, (M,iJ ,p"iP"rp,'). Then the information of 
computed productivity level rp, is passed back to the GE module, and GE 
module will recalibrate to this new information. This sequential recalibration 
process will continue until the values of the above three key variable vee/ors 
(P, e, q5) obtained from the re-calibrations in PE and GE module are mutuall y 
consistent, i.e. the discrepancy between the variable values obtained from the 
(/-1)th and tth iterations is at a trivial level. With the P module constructed 
above, we can thus extend the CGE model from a representative-firm model to 
one capable of analysing firm-level changes caused by productivity shock 
5.6.3. FDI Productivity Spillovers under Firm Heterogeneity 
]f the FDI productivity spillovers occur, then two effects arise. The first 
one is productivity improvement el/ecl, i.e. SOEs and private domestic 
enterprises can improve their productivity accordingly. As shown in Figure 5.4, 
the probability density function g,(<p) of the productivity distribution will be 
shifted rightwards from g,(<p) to g2(<p). Another effect is resource reallocation 
effect. The domestic firms are now generally more productive than before, and 
the market becomes more competitive. As a higher productivity enables a firm 
to reduce its price and to sell more, this will increase the demand for limited 
resources and thus lift input costs. Those least productive enterprises can no 
longer afford the higher costs and will be forced to exit. Thus the cutoff 
productivity level <p* will be lifted from the original level r p ~ ~ (without 
spillove rs) to a new level rp; (with spillovers). With the above two effects 
combined, the productivity of existing firms improves as does the distribution 
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from which new entrants draw productivity. 
Figure 5.4: FDI Spillovers under Firm Heterogeneity 
g(rp 
. 
. 
, 0 
" 0' 
· .... 
o • 
· . 
· '. 
'. 
FDI productivity spillover 
effects include: 
g, ( r p ) ~ ~ g! (rp) ; rp; ({J2 
Therefore the cutoff productivity level (jJ' is a function of the variable 
measuring FDI productivity spillovers, i.e. (jJ *(8) (defined in Section 5.5.2). If 
we assume that the g(rp) will be shifted in the same magnitude as rp ' does, then 
a Pareto distribution fW1ction of domestic firms ' productivity can be 
transformed into: 
• ab Q abo 
g(rp - tJ.rp ) = (rp _ tJ.rp' (0» 0+ 1 = (rp - (q:>; (0) - rp; (0»)"+1 
In computer programmIng, we can calibrate the benchmark value of 
rp; (0) first. Then in counterfactual scenarios with FDJ productivity spillovers, 
new cutoff productivity value rp; (0) is endogenously determined . 
We will discuss the results obtained in computer simulations in the next 
Chapter. 
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5.7. CONCLUSIONS 
A benchmark CGE model for the Chinese economy has been presented in 
Section 5.2 and 5.3 with the original forms and "calibrated duality forms" of 
CES functions. The model contains blocks of value-added production. output 
production. CET transformation into export and domestic consumption. labour 
and capital disaggregation, Armington aggregation, export and import. 
representative domestic agent. representative agent for multinational 
enterprises. and government. Equations for equilibria of factor marks. 
Armington markets. aggregate export and import are also presented. 
This model is extended to incorporate FDI productivity spillovers under 
perfect competition in Section 5.4. Chinese industry-level data during 2001 and 
2006 are employed to estimate the coefficients of four spillover channels. 
Forward linkages and horizontal demonstration are found to be the most 
significant channels via which spillovers take place. 
Section 5.5 models the FDI productivity spillovers in an alternative market 
structure. namely monopolistic competition with homogeneous firms. In this 
scenario. the markup rate of a representative firm of each sector is derived, 
which is essential to extending a CGE model to incorporate monopolistic 
competition. A CGE model to study FDI spillovers under monopolistic 
competition can also reflect the changes of product varieties and quantities 
caused by the spillovers. 
Section 5.6 models the FDI productivity spillovers in another alternative 
market structure, i. e. monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. This 
market structure is a newly explored one in the literature, and is potentially 
important in explaining the productivity change of domestic firms. A CGE 
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model under firm heterogeneity is composed of a general equilibrium module 
and a partial equilibrium module. The former is a model with FDI spillovers 
under perfect competition. The latter deals with firm heterogeneity, assuming a 
virtual "quasi-representative" firm and "summarising" the distribution of firm 
productivity in each sector. The CGE model in this scenario can provide 
alternative perspective to the effects of spillovers by examining productivity 
improvement under FDI productivity spillovers in a more direct way. 
In the next Chapter, the effects of an FDI shock to the economy under 
three market structures (i.e. perfect competition assumption, monopolistic 
competition with homogeneous firms and heterogeneous firms) will be 
evaluated and compared. The effects of 2008 corporate income tax reform in 
the above three market structures will then be analysed and compared in 
Chapter 7. 
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APPENDIX: THE GAMS CODE AND MATHEMATICAL 
SPECIFICATION OF THE BENCHMARK CGE MODEL 
The following tables will present the b nchmark mode l In 
GAMS/MPSGE syntax block by block. In interpreting the benchmark GE 
model coded in GAMS/MPSGE syntax, the price ratio eq uation (3 .19a) and 
input demand ratio equations (3. 18a) and (3. 18b) di scussed in hapter need 
to be employed frequently. Equations are categori zed into four groups: 
/1] Original CES functions. 
[2] Ratio equations: prices. These equations are applica ti ons of (3. 19a) . 
The equation (3.1 9b) is also applied when the elas ti city of substitution 
(transformation) is equal to one which implies a Cobb- Douglas fo rm. 
/3] Ratio equations: input demand or output supply. These ratio 
equations are applications of (3. 18a) , or (3. 18b) if the production has a ET 
form . 
[4] Level equations. These equations define the level quantities that 
correspond to output and input demand in the corresponding sector. A It! ve l 
value is a ratio variable multiplied by the base quantity denoted with a ha,. (- ) 
over a vari able. The level variables for input demand and output supply will be 
used in the market clearing equations to be li sted in the end of the Appendix. 
Table AS.I: Sectors, Commodities and Reprcsenhltivc Agents 
$SECTORS : 
'I (A ) 
YN (A ) 
ox ( A ) 
VA (A) 
ARl ( Z ) 
AR ( Z ) 
X (A ) 
M (A ) 
MZ ( Z ) 
! SECTORAL PRODUCTION 
! SECTORAL PRODUCTION 
' CET TRA NSFORMATION FROM '1 (A ) 
! VALUE ADDED 
! ARMING TON SUPPLY AT OWNERSHIP LEVEL 
! ARMINGTON SUPPLY AT INDUSTRY LEVEL 
! EXPORT 
! IMPORT AT SECTOR LEVEL 
! IMPORT AT INDUSTRY LEVEL 
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CS 
G 
INV 
LZ ( Z ) 
LTOTAL 
KZ ( Z ) 
KTOTAL 
$COMMODITIES: 
PY(A) 
PYY (A) 
PA4 (Z) 
PA (Z ) 
PO (A) 
PM(Z) 
PMA (A) 
PX (A) 
PC 
PINV 
PFX 
PG 
PVA (A) 
WL ( A) 
TWL 
::WL (:C) 
RK (A ) 
TRK 
ZRK ( Z ) 
PF (A) 
$CONSUMER : 
RA 
, PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
! PUBLI CONSUMPTION 
! INVESTMENT 
! LABOUR SUPPLY AT INDUSTRY LEVEL 
! TOTAL LABOUR SUPPLY 
! CAPITAL SUPPLY AT INDUSTRY LEVEL 
, TOTAL CAPITAL SUPPLY 
! TOTAL OUTPUT 
! TOTAL OUTPUT 
! ARMINGTON PRICE FOR EACH OWNERSHIP 
! ARMINGTON PRICE FOR INDUSTRY 
! DOMESTIC MARKET PRICE 
! IMPORT PRICE AT INDUSTRY LEVEL 
, IMPORT PRICE AT SECTOR-LEVEL 
! EXPORT PRICE 
' CONSUMPTION PRICE 
! INVESTMENT PRICE 
! FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
! LUMP-SUM TAX REVENUE 
! PRICE OF AGGREGATE VALUE ADDED 
! WAGE RATE 
! NATIONAL-LEVEL WAGE 
! INDUSTRY-LEVEL WAGE 
! RETURN TO CAPITAL 
! NATIONAL AVERAGE RETURN TO CAPITAL 
! INDUSTRY AVERAGE RETURN TO SCALE 
! FIXED COST 
! REPRESENTAT IVE AGENT 
!MULTINATIONAL ( FOREIGN) FIRMS FDI 
ENTRE (A) 
GOV 
! AGENTS TO COLLECT MARKUPS AND PAY FIXED COST 
! GOVERNMENT 
Table A5.2: Production of Value-added Composites 
MPSGE Declaration 
SPROD : VA(FNN) 
0 : PVA(FNN) 
I : WL (FNN) 
I : RK (FNN) 
s : 1 
Q : (CP (FNN ) +DP(FNN) +OP(FNN)) 
Q : CP ( FNN) 
Q: (DP ( FNN) +OP(FNN)) 
s : 1 S PROD : VA (SNO) 
0 : PVA(SNO) Q: ((CP ( SNO ) +DP ( SNO) +OP(SNO)) / ( l+ NTFPO (SNO ) $NTFPFLA )) 
+ A : GOV N: NTFP (SNO)$NTFPFLAG M: ( -l ) $NTFPFLAG 
I : WL (SNO) Q: CP ( SNO) 
I : RK (SNO ) Q: (DP(SNO) +OP (S NO )) 
Equations 
II1 original CES functions 
DY VA(FNN ) 
= a
VY 
JNN x DY _ L(FNN)o"WN_W!(FNN) x DY _ K(FNN) o,'f,'N- '" (FNN) 
DY VA(SNO) 1+ NTFP(SNO) 
I +NTFPO(SNO) 
= a NY _ SNO x DY _ L(SNO) f)SNO _w,(SNO) x DY _ K(SNO/Js.vo_ ,*(SNO) 
121 ratio equations: prices 
pva(FNN) = wl(FNN)oFNN- ",(FNN) x rk(FNN/lFNN_,* (FNN) 
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(AS.2. 1) 
(AS.2 .2) 
(AS.2.J) 
pva(SNO) 1+ NTFP(SNO) = wl(SNO)o,WO _",CSNO ) x rk(SNO)O;.Vo _"(SNO) 
I + NTFPO(SNO) 
131 ratio equations: input demand 
d)i I(FNN) = d Va(FNN)(pVa(FNN») 
- - wl(FNN) 
d k(FNN) = d Va(FNN)(pVa(FNN») 
y - - rk(FNN) 
d I(SNO) = d va(SNO) 1+ NTFPO(SNO) 
[ 
pva(SNO) 1+ NTFP(SNO) 1 
Y - - w/(SNO) 
k SVO) = d v (SNO) 1+ NTFPO(SNO) 
[
pva(SNO) I+NTFP(SNO) 1 
dy _ ( 1 _ a rk(SNO) 
141 level equations 
DY _ VA(a) = dy _ va(a)(cP(a) + DP(a) +OP(a») 
DY _ L(a) = dy _ /(a)CP(a) 
DY K(a) = dy k(a)(DP(a) + OP(a») 
Variables 
pva(a) 
w/(a) 
rk(a) 
dy_va(a) 
dy_w/(a) 
dYJk(a) 
D Y_ VA (a) 
DY_L(a) 
DY K(a) 
NTFP (a) 
Parameters 
a UY JNN 
a NY _SNO 
e A VA (a) 
e ~ ~ "la) 
e A rla) 
NTFPO(a) 
CP(a) 
DP(a) + OP(a) 
MPSGE Declaration 
$PROD :Y(A) 
Ratio market price for aggregate va lue-added of sector a 
Ratio wage level of sector a 
Ratio returns to capital input of sector a 
Ratio output of aggregate value-added of sector a 
Ratio input demand for labour of sector Cl 
Ratio input demand for capital of sector a 
Output of aggregate value-added of sector a 
Input demand for labour of sector Cl 
Input demand for capital of sector a 
Endogenous total factor productivity sp illovers of sector Cl 
Shift parameter of production of value added (FNN sectors) 
Shift parameter of production of value added (SNO sectors) 
Share of aggregate value-added in the total input 0 f sector a 
Share of labour cost in aggregate value-added input of sector a 
Share of capital cost in aggregate value-added input of ector a 
Base total factor productivity spillovers minu I in sector Cl 
Labour input in sector a 
Capital input in sector a 
Table AS.3: Production 
0 : PY (A) Q : TOUTPUT (A ) A : GOV T : (NTPO (A ) +7'AXR£F (A )) 
+ P : (11 (l - NTPO (A ))) 
I : PA ( Z ) Q : IOD1 ( Z ,A) 
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(A5,2.4) 
(A5 ,2.5) 
(A5 .2,6) 
(A5 .2.7) 
(A5 .2.8) 
(AS.2.9) 
(AS.2.IO) 
(A5.2. 11) 
I : PVA(A) Q : (CP (A ) +DP (A ) +OP ( A )) 
* TH IS BLOCK IS FOR THE SCENARIO OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
S PROD : YN (A) 
0 : PYY (A) Q: (TOUTPUT ( A ) *PHI_R ( A )) 
1: PY (A ) Q : ( TOUTPUT (A ) * [11 ( 1 +MKO ( A ) $NMKFLAG) j) 
+ A : ENTRE (A ) $NMKFLAG N : NMK ( A ) $NMKFLAG 
Equations 
II1 original CES functions 
----
Yea) x 1- NTFPO(a) - TAXREF(a) 
l- NTFPO(a) 
= IDY _AR(z,a)+DY _VA(a) 
1+ NMK(a) 
YY(a) x PHI R(a) = Yea) x 
- I +MKO(a) 
121 ratio equations: prices 
() 1- NTFPO(a) - TAXREF(a) 
py a x J- NTFPO(a) 
= By _AR (a) x Ipa(z,a) +By -"A (a) x pva(a) 
l+NMK(a) 
pyy(a ) x PHI R(a) = py(a) x 
- l+MKO(a) 
131 ratio equations: input demand 
dy _ area) = yea) 
dy _ va(a) = yea) 
141 level equations 
----
Yea) = y(a)TOUTPUT(a) 
DY _A R(a) = dy _ ar(a)2)ODZ(z,a) 
Variables 
py(a) 
pyv(a) 
para) 
dy_ar(a) 
Y(a) 
Ratio market price for gross output of sector Cl 
Ratio transformed market price for gross output of ector (/ 
Ratio market price for Armington aggregate goods 01' sector (/ 
Ratio input demand for Armington aggregate goods or sector Cl 
Gross output of sector a 
Transformed output of sector a 
Demand for Armington aggregates 
(A5.3. I) 
(A5.3.2) 
(A5 .3.3) 
(A5.3.4) 
(A5.3.5) 
(1\5 .3.6) 
(A5.3.7) 
(A5.3.8) 
YY(a) 
DY_A R(a) 
NMK(a) 
PHI R(a) 
Endogenous markup rate (for monopol ist ic compct it ion sccnario) 
Productivity ratio (for firm heterogeneity sccnario) 
Parameters 
e)' All (a) 
e l' v,la) 
NTPfxa) 
TOUTP UT(a) 
IODZ(: .a) 
TAX REF(a) 
MKO(a) 
Share of export value in total output value of sector a 
Share of domestically used value in total output va lue 01' sector (/ 
Base value of gross output tax on the product ion of sector {/ 
Total output of sector a 
Intermediate inputs for sector Cl 
Tax differentials (for FDI tax reform simulations in Chapter 7) 
Initial markup rate (for monopol ist ic compet it ion scenario) 
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Table A5.4: CET Transformation of Production 
MPSGE Dcclanltion 
$PROD : DX(A) T : ESUBAR(A ," EAR " ) 
O : PX (A) Q : EX (A ) 
O : PD (A) Q : (TOUTPUT (A) - EX (A)) 
I : PYY (A) Q: TOUTPUT (A) 
Equations 
111 original CET function 
__ (Pr J (a) x DY _ X (a)"','SUIIAJI- I)lIiSUIJAII J IiSUIJA II /(F:SUIIIIII_I) 
Y(a)-a r _ _ __ _ 
+ (1- Pr _D (a)) x DY _ D(a)( h'SlI'JAII- I )' l.iSUIJAII 
121 ratio equations: prices 
(
BY J (a)px(a)l- fSUIJAR ]1/(1-1,8 /lA 11) 
pyy (a) = __ 
+ Bv _o(a)pd(a)l-eSUIJAR 
131 ratio equlltions: OlltPllt supply (not "input demand") 
dy _x(a) = yy(a)( py(a))ESlIIJA II 
px(a) 
dy d(a) = y(a)(py(a))HSUIIAII 
- pd(a) 
141 level equations 
-
DY _X(a) = dy _x(a)* EX(A) 
DY D(a)=dy d(a)*(rOUTPU7(A)-EX(A») 
Rat io market price of export of sector a 
Ratio market price of domestically used good of sector I 
(AS.4. I) 
(A5.4.2) 
(AS .4.3) 
(A5.4.4) 
(A5.4.5) 
(A5.4.6) 
Variables 
px(a) 
pd(a) 
dy_x(a) 
dy_dM 
DY_X(a) 
DY_D(a) 
Ratio export demand for Y (with ET specification) of ector a 
Ratio domestic demand for Y (wi th CET pecification) of sector a 
Export demand for Yof ector a 
Parameters 
Br .do) 
Bl' o(a) 
PI' _x (a) 
ESUBAR 
EX(a) 
-
TOUTPUT(a)-EX(a) 
M PSG E Dcclllrlltion 
Domestic demand for Y of sector a 
Share of Armington aggregate in the total input of sector Cl 
Share of aggregate va lue-added in the total input of ector a 
Shi ft parameter of CET tran formation fu nct ion 
CET function parameter 
Elastic ity of transformation in CET funct ion of sector a 
Export in sector a 
Output in sector a for domestic Llse 
Table AS.S: Lilbour Disilggregation 
$PROD :LTOTAL T:l 
O : Z WL ( Z ) Q : ( SUM (A$MAP ( Z , A ), CP ( A ))) 
I ; TWL Q ; ( SUM ( A , CP (A ))) 
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$PROD : LZ(Z) $ (S M(A$MAP(Z , A) , CP(A») T : TAU L 
O : WL (A ) $MAP ( Z , A ) : CP ( A ) 
I : ZWL ( Z ) Q : ( 5UM (A$MAP ( Z , A ) , CP (A ))) 
Equlltions 
I11 originlll CES functions 
LTOTAL = a WJ1:4L IT LZ(z)f:}:",,(:) 
LZ(z) ~ ~a LZ ( ~ p pL, (a)LS(a)"'" ~ ' . ~ I ) " ' ' ' ' ~ , . ) )
121 rlltio equlltions: prices 
lwl = TI zwl(z) IJ",,(:) 
,, - ( I 'I:4U I ) 
( )
1/( 1-'1:411 J ) 
zw/(z) = ~ ~ w w ( a ) w l ( a ) ) - - . 
131 ratio equations: labour supply 
/z(z) = IIOla/( Iwl )1 
zwl(z) 
Is(a) = IZ(Z)( ZWI(Z)) TAU _ I. 
w/(a) 
141 level equations 
TWL = lW! x I CP(a) 
(J 
ZWL(z) = zwl(z) x I CP(a) 
tllIlap(:.a) 
WL(a) = wl(a) x CP(a) 
LTOTAL = /Iolalx ICP(a) 
a 
LZ(z) = lz(z) x I CP(a) 
tllI/ap(:.a) 
LS(a) = ls(a) x CP(a) 
Variables 
Ratio total wage leve l 
TAlI _ L/C/',j 1} _ I. - I) 
/11'1 
~ " I ( : : } }
\II/(a} 
b(::} 
Itotal 
Ratio aggregate wage level for industry z 
Ratio wage level for sl/h- ind l/.\'IJy sector a 
Ratio aggregate labour supply to industry :: 
Is (a) 
LTOTA L 
LZ(::} 
LS(a) 
Pa ral11etcrs 
e ,,·l ::) 
e ",(a) 
a ' .TOTA I. 
a u 
TAU L 
Ratio total supply of labour input 
Ratio supply of labour for sector a 
Total supply of labour input 
Aggregate labour supply to induslry :: 
Supply of labour for sector Cl 
Share of labour cost in total labour cost of indu try:: 
Share of labour cost in total labour co t of Sl!ctor (/ 
Shi Ft parameter of CET function of tOlal labour 
Shift parameter of CET function or labour by industry 
Elasticity of labour transformati on between ownerships 
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(A5.5.1) 
(1\5.5.2) 
(A5.S.3) 
(AS.SA) 
(AS.5 .5) 
(A5.S.6) 
(A5.5.7) 
(A5.5. 8) 
(A5.5.9) 
(A5.5.10) 
(A5.S. II ) 
(AS.5. 12) 
Table A5.6: C a p i t ~ ' 1 1 Disaggregation 
MPSCE Declaration 
$PROD : KTOTAL T:l 
O: ZRK (Z ) Q: ( 5UM ( A$MAP ( Z , A) , (DP (A ) +OP (II)))) 
I : TRK : ( 5UM (A, DP (A)+OP (A))) 
$PROD : KZ(Z) $(SUM(A$MAP(Z , A) , (DP(A) OP( A»» T : TAU K 
'1 : RK(!·) $l'1AP ( ::: , .4 ) : (OP (A ) I OP(A ) ) 
I : ZRK (Z ) Q : ( SUM ( A$MAP ( Z , A) , (Of' (11) I OI' ( A )))) 
Equations 
II1 original CET functions 
- IT KZ( )0,,, (: ) KTOTAL = a K)(Jl'AL . z ' 
)iW KIP"" K - I) 
KZ(z) = (;}.:zs ( I (JKs (a)KS(a)(WI J-l)i'li lU JJ - -
'<;/mo,,(= .a ) 
121 ratio equations: prices 
Irk = Il zrk( z )e"k(:) 
1/( 1- '/11 (/ _ K) 
zrk(z ) = ( LBrk (a)rk(a)(1-7/IU _Kl ) 
'</ /II0p (:, 0) 
131 ratio equations: capital supply 
kz(z ) = klolal ( 
trk JI 
zrk(z ) 
ks(a) = kZ(Z)( Zrk(Z)J7/IU_ K 
rk(a) 
141 level eq ua tions 
TRK = Irk x L(DP(a)+OP(a») 
a 
ZRK(z) = zrk(z) X L (DP(a) + OP(a») 
'<//IIC/p(:,o) 
RK(a) = rk(a) X (DP(a) + OP(a») 
KTOTAL = klotal x L (DP(a) + OP(a») 
a 
KZ( z ) = kz( z) X L (DP(a) + OP(a» 
'I /IIap(: ,Cl) 
KS(a) = ks(a) X (DP(a) + OP(a» 
Variables 
Irk 
: rk(=) 
rk(a) 
b'(=) 
klDla! 
ks(a) 
KTOTA L 
KZ(=) 
KS(a) 
Parameters 
e rl z) 
Ratio total return to capital 
Ratio aggregate return to capital for industry = 
Ratio return to capital at ector a 
Ratio aggregate capilal uppl y 10 industry: 
Ratio total capital upply 
Ratio capital supply to for sector a 
Total capital supply 
Aggregate capital supply to industry: 
Capital supply 10 for sector a 
Share of capital cost in total labour cosl of industlY : 
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(A5 .6.1) 
(A5.6.2) 
(1\ 5.6.3) 
(1\5.6.4) 
(A5 .6.5) 
(A5.6.6) 
(A5 .6.7) 
(A5.6 .8) 
(A5.6 .9) 
(A5.6. IO) 
(A5.6. 11 ) 
(A5 .6.12) 
Share of capital cost in total labour cost of ector a 
a KmrAI. Shift parameter ofCET function orlDtal capital 
Shift parameter ofCET function of capital by indu try 
CET parameter 
TAU K Elasticity of capital transformation between owncrships 
Table A5.7: Armington Aggregate 
MPSGE Declaration 
$PROD :AR1(Z) S : 10 
0 : PAA ( Z) Q : (S UM (A$MAP ( Z , A ) , (ARAG (A) - IM (A)))) 
I:PD(A ) $MAP ( Z , A ) Q : (ARAG (A ) -IM (A)) $MAP ( Z , A ) 
$PROD :AR(Z) $ARAGZ(Z) S : ESUBAR(Z ," EAR " ) 
O : PA (Z ) Q : ARAGZ ( Z ) 
I : PAA ( Z) Q : (SUM (A$MAP ( Z , A) , (ARAG (A) -IM ( A)))) 
I : PM ( Z ) Q: (SUM (A$MAP ( Z , A ) , IM ( A))) 
Equations 
111 original CES functions 
- {" - R (10 1)110 )1 0 /(10-1) ARI(z) = a AIII\LfJAR_D(a)A _ D(a) -
[
- (I,SUI1AII-I)I ESUI1AII ] ESUBAII (1:'81)111111-1) 
- fJ All A (z)ARl (z) 
AR(z) = aA11 _ -_ __ 
+ fJ All_M (z) MZ(z/ ESI)BAIH)I ESUBAII 
121 ratio equations: prices 
(" (HO) )1 /(1-10) paa(z) = \LBAII_D (a)pd(a) 
[
B All _A (z) paa(z)I- £SUBAI? ]I /(I_£SUBAII) 
pa(z) = _ _ 
+ B AII _M (z)pm(z)'- £SUBAR 
131 ratio equations: input demand 
( 
aa(z)J ESUBAII 
ar d(a)=arl(z)x .=...P_,,--,-
- pd(a) 
( 
paa( z) JF:SUBAII 
mz(z) = ar(z) x 
pm(z) 
arl(a) = ar(z) x ( 
pa(z) JIO 
paa(z) 
141 level equations 
ARl(a) = arl(a) x ARAG(a) 
AR(z) = ar(z) x ARAG(z) 
---
AR _ D(a) = ar _ d(a) x (ARAG(a) - [M (a» 
MZ(z) = mz(z)x IM(z) 
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(AS.7. 1) 
(AS.7.2) 
(AS.?.3) 
(AS.?.4) 
(AS.?S) 
(AS.7 .6) 
(AS .?7) 
(AS.7.S) 
(AS.7 .9) 
(AS .?II) 
JAS.? ln 
ARl(z) = arl(z) x ARAG(z) 
Variables 
paa(a) 
pm (a) 
pa(z) 
ar_d(a) 
mz(a) 
ar_a(a) 
arl (a) 
ar(z) 
A R_ D(a) 
MZ(a) 
AR_A(a) 
A RI (z) 
AR(z) 
Ratio price level of Arm ington aggregate of sector Cl 
Ratio price level of imported good of ector a 
Ratio price level of Armington aggregate of industry = 
Ratio input demand for dome tically produced goods or sector Cl 
Ratio input demand for imported goods of ector Cl 
Ratio input demand for Armington aggregate of indu try : 
Rat io Arm ington output 0 f sector a 
Ratio Armington output of industry = 
Input demand for domestica ll y produced goods of sector Cl 
Input demand for imported goods of sector a 
Input demand for Armington aggregate of industry : 
Annington output of sector a 
Armington output of industry z 
(A5.7.13) 
Parameters 
e All d a) 
e MZ(a) 
Share of domestically produced products in Armington aggregate in sector I 
Share of imported products in Armington aggregate in ector Cl 
e All z(a) Share of the ath Armington goods in upper level Armington aggregate in 
industry z 
a All 
a A/11 
fJ All IJ(a) 
fJ A/I A/(a) 
f3 All A(a) 
ARAC(a) 
IM(a) 
Shift parameter of aggregation over owner hips 
Shift parameter of Armington aggregation 
CES parameter of domesti c products in Armington aggregati on 
CES parameter of import in Armington aggregat ion 
CES parameter in ownership aggregation 
Armington aggregate in sector Cl 
Import in sector a 
Table AS.S: Export ami Import 
MPSGE Declaration 
$PROD : X(A) $EX(A) 
O: PFX Q : EX (A) 
I : PX (A) Q : EX (A ) 
$PROD : M(A) $IM(A) 
0 : PMA (A) Q : IM (A ) 
I : PFX Q : IM (A ) 
$PROD : MZ(Z) $SUM(A$MAP(Z , A) , IM(A)) S : 2 
O: PM ( Z) : ( SUM ( A$MAP ( Z , A), IM (A))) 
I : PMA (A) $MAP (Z ,A) Q: I M (A ) $MAP ( Z , A) 
Equations 
111 original Leonticf functions 
FX = IeE'\'_A(a) X (a) 
a 
FX = Le/M J (z)MZ(z) 
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(A5.8.1) 
(A 5.8.2) 
MZ(z) = a MZ ( I!JMz(a)'U4(a)(2-1)/2) 2/(2-1) 
'V",op(Z.(I) 
121 ratio equations: prices 
pft = I0 /;,x _ A (a)px(a) 
a 
1I 
pm(z) ~ ~ ( ~ ~ / M M _Apma(at' rH) 
131 ratio equations: input demand 
exd(a) = x(a) 
fx = mea) 
ma(a) = mz(z) x ( pm(z) )2 
pma(a) 
141 level equations 
X(a) = x(a) x EX(a) 
MZ(a) = m(a)x IM(a) 
EXDCa) = exd(a) x EX(a) 
FX(a) = fx(a) x IM(a) 
M(a) = mea) x IM(a) 
Variables 
pfx 
px(a) 
pm(z) 
pma(a) 
exd(a) 
x(a) 
m (a) 
fx 
mz(z) 
Parameters 
e EX A(a) 
e IAI z(Z) 
£X(a) 
IM(a) 
M(z) 
Ratio foreign exchange rate 
Ratio price of exported goods in sector Cl 
Ratio price of imported goods in industry = 
Ratio price of imported good in ector a 
Ratio demand for export fi'o m ector a 
Ratio export activity in sector a 
Ratio import activi ty in sector a 
Rat io demand for foreign currency to impol1 
Ratio import activity in industry z 
Share of expOlt of sector a in the total export value 
Share of import of industry = in the tOlal imporl va lue 
Shift parameter ofCES fu nction (AS.S .3) 
Benchmark export va lue of sector a 
Benchmark import value of sector a 
Import activity in industry z 
Table A5.9:Public and P r i v ~ ' t e e Consumption I ) c m ~ , " d d
MPSGE Declaration 
$ PROD: G S : l 
O:PG Q : GO 
I : PA(Z ) Q : GC1( Z ) 
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(AS.S') 
(AS .8A) 
(AS .8.S) 
(AS .8.6) 
(AS .8.7) 
(AS.8.8) 
(AS .8.9) 
(AS.8. 10) 
(AS.8. 11 ) 
(A5.8 .12) 
(AS .8.13) 
(AS.8.14) 
$PROD : CS S : l 
0 : PC Q : TC 
I : PA (Z ) Q : CON ( Z) 
Equations 
111 original CD function s 
G = ~ G G IT G _A(z)BC(:) 
121 ratio equations: prices 
pg = I1pa(z)OC(:) 
: 
131 ratio equations: input demand 
g _ a ( z ) = g x ~ ~
pa(z) 
p a a z ) = c c x ~ ~
- pa(z) 
141 level equations 
G=gxGO 
CS =csxTC 
--
G _ A(z) = g _ a(z) x GCl(z) 
P _ A(z) = p _ a(z) x CON(z) 
Variables 
pg 
pa(z) 
pc 
g_a(z) 
p_a(z) 
g 
cs 
Parameters 
Ratio government expenditure price index 
Ratio price level for Armington aggregate of industry ;; 
Ratio private consumption price index 
Rat io government demand for the products from industry;; 
Rat io private demand for the product from indu try ;; 
Ratio government consumption 
Ratio private consumption 
(AS .9.1) 
(AS .9.2) 
(AS.9.3) 
(A5.9.4) 
(AS .9.S) 
(AS.9.6) 
(AS.9 .7) 
(AS.9 .8) 
(A5 .9.9) 
(AS.9. IO) 
adz) Share of the consllmption of goods from industry z in total government 
expenditure 
a I'(z) 
a i; 
a cs 
GO 
rc 
GC I(z) 
CON(z) 
Share of the consumption of goods from industry ;; in total pri va tI;: 
expenditure 
Shi ft parameter of government expenditure fu ncti on 
Shi ft parameter of private expenditure fu ncti on 
Benchmark total government consumption 
Benchmark total private consumption 
Government expend iture on industry z 
Private expenditure on industry z 
Table AS.IO: Investment Demand 
I MPSGE Declaration 
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$PROD : INV S : l 
0 : PINV Q : TT 
I : PA (Z ) Q : ID1(Z ) 
Equations 
III original CES functions 
INV = a/NV rI INV _A(z)ii,." ,(:) 
121 ratio equations: prices 
n ()(hNI'<-) pinv = pa z -
131 ratio equations: input demand 
pinv 
inv u(z) = inv x--
- pa(z ) 
141 level equations 
INV = inv x TI 
-
INV _A(z)= inv_a(z ) x lDl(z ) 
Variables 
pinv Ratio price index for in ve tment 
inv _a(=) 
inv 
Parameters 
f) 1.\1 ( :.) 
a/NV 
T1 
IDI(z) 
Ratio demand fo r the input frolll indu try = 
Ratio investment leve l 
Share of lhe in ve tm nl from industry = in totnl inve tm t! l1t 
Shi Ft parameter of investment demand fun ction 
Total investment va lue in benchmark economy 
Inve tment demand in industry z 
Table AS.ll: Representative Domestic Agent 
MPSGE Declaration 
$DEMAND : RA 
0 : PC Q: rc 
E:TWL Q: (S UM ( A , CP (A))) 
E : TRK Q: ( SUM (A , ((DP ( A) +OP (A)) , (l - FOREIGN (A))))) 
E : PFX Q:(TB ) 
E : PINV Q : ( - TT ) 
Equations 
III Agent's activity level 
ra = Iw l x L CP(a) + Irk x L(DP(a) + OP(a))(l - FOREIGN(a)) 
" 
(J 
+ pfx x TB + pinv x ( - T1) 
121 consumption illld w e l l ~ l r e e demand 
dIe = ral p e = TC 
dwelra = ra lTC 
Variables 
Representative agent ra 
dIe Demand for total consumpt ion 
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(AS . IO. I) 
(AS. IO .2) 
(AS . 10. ) 
(AS. IOA) 
( AS. IO.SL 
(AS. I!.I ) 
(AS. II .2) 
(AS. I \.3) 
dwelra 
pc 
Parameters 
TB 
FOREIGN(a) 
Demand for we lfare of representative agent 
Price index of final consumption 
Trade balance 
Foreign presence in sector a 
Table AS.12: Government 
MPSGE Declaration 
$DEMAND :GOV 
D : PG Q : GO 
E:PC Q : (SUM[ Z , (GCl (Z) - NT(Z )) J) 
* THIS LINE PROVIDES THE SOURCE OF FDI PRODUCTIVITY 
E : PVA ( SNO) $NTFPFLAG 
PILLOVERS 
+ Q: ( ( CP (SNO) +DP (SNO) f OP (SNO) ) / (1 +NTFPO (SNO) ) ) $NTFPFLAG 
+ R: QNTFP (SNO) $NTFPF'LAC 
Equations 
II1 Agent's activity level 
gov= pc x I(GCI(Z)-NT(Z)) 
z 
+ I py(a) x TOUTPUT(a) x NTFPO(a) 
a 
+ I pva(SNO) x [CP(SNO) + DP(SNO) + OP(SNO)] X QNT:P(SNO) 
SNO 1 + NTFPO(SNO) 
121 consumption/ demand 
Igo = gov / pg = GO 
Variables 
gov Government activity leve l 
Igo Level of government demand and redistribution 
Parameters 
No new ones 
Table A5.13: Representative Multinational Firm Agent 
MPSGE Declaration 
$DEMAND :FDI 
E : TRK 
E : RK (A ) 
E : PFX 
D : PFX 
D : PC 
Equations 
Q: (SUM (A , ((DP (A) +OP (A )) *FOREIGN 
Q: DELTAFDI (A) 
Q : 2E+5 
Q: 2 E+ 5 
Q: (SUM (A , (( DP (A) fOP (A)) *FOREIGN 
II1 Agent's activity level 
fdi = Irk x Il(DP(a) + OP(a))x FOREIGN(a)J 
a 
+ I ~ k k a ) ) X DEL TA FD/(a) ]+ pfx X 2 X 105 
" 
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( A ) ) ) ) 
(A ) ) ) ) 
(AS .12. 1) 
(A5. 12.2) 
(AS . 13. 1) 
121 eOnSUml)tion demand 
dfd; J = (PC x ~ ~ (DP(a) + Ope a»)x FOREIGN( a) ) Ifd; 
(A5.13 .2) 
Variables 
fdi Activity level of multinational finns 
dfdi c Demand level of multinational firm s 
Parameters 
DELTAFDJ(a) FDI increment in sector a, for subsequent introduction oran FDI shock 
Three groups of market equilibrium equations for factor, Armington 
goods and traded goods respectively are implicitly contained but "hidden" in 
the GAMS/MPSGE syntax. rn the following disclIssions, these eq uations arc 
listed with demands on the left hand sides and sllppl ies on the right hand sides. 
(1) Equilibrium of factor marl{ets 
The demands and supply of labour 1Il sector a are gIven by eq uation 
(AS.2 .! 0) and (AS.5.!3), respectively. 'I hus the eq uilibrium condition for the 
labour market is: 
DY _ L(a) = LS(a) 
The demands and supply of capital 111 sector a ar gIven by equation 
(AS.2.!!) and (AS.6.14), respectively. Thus the equilibrium condition for 
capital market is: 
DY _ K(a) = KS(a) 
(2) Equilibrium of Armington markets 
The demands for Armington aggregate goods originate from three blocks, 
namely production (Table AS.3), public and private consumption (Table AS.9), 
and investment demand (Table AS.IO). So the total demand for Armington 
aggregate goods is the sum of over these four demands which are represented 
by equation (AS.3 .9) , (AS .9.9), (AS .9.1 0), and (AS. I 0.4) respectively. 
DY _AR = LDY _A R(a)+ LC _ ACz)+ LP _ A(z)+ L1NV _ A(z) 
a : : 
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The total supply of Armington aggregate goods can be obtained by 
summing equation (AS. 7.9) over z: 
TS _ AR = I AR(Z) 
Therefore the demand-supply equilibrium eq uation is: 
I DY _ AR(a)+ I G _ A(z )+ Ip _ A(z ) + IIN V _ A( z ) = I /IR (.: ) 
- -
- -
a 
(3) Equilibrium of aggregate export und import 
The demand and supply of aggregate export are represented by equati on 
(AS.8.7) and (AS.4 .S) , respectively. Therefore the equilibrium conditi on is: 
D Y _ X(a) = X(a) 
The demand and supply of aggregate import are repre ented by equati n 
(AS.7.12) and (AS.8.8), respecti ve ly. Therefore the equilibrium condition is: 
AR _ M(a) = M(a) 
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CHAPTER 6: FDI PRODUCTIV1TY SPILLOVERS 
UNDER THREE MARKET STRUCTURES 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Thi s Chapter presents the main research finding or computer simulati on. 
based on the theoretical models constructed in hupter 5. ection 6.2 discusses 
the effects of an FDI shock without producti vity pillover to the economy 
under perfec t competition assumption. ection 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 examine the 
effects of an FDI shock with producti vi ty spillovers unde r three marke t 
structures respective ly, i.e. perfect competition, mon poli stic competition and 
firm heterogeneity. The net FDI spillover effec ts will be ca lculated by 
deducting the effects of the FOr shock without pillovers from the effects of the 
FOr shock with spillovers under three market structures, respec ti ve ly. The net 
FOI spillover effects will also be compared acros th ree market structures. 
Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2. AN FDI SHOCK TO THE BENCHMARK ECONOMY 
(WITHOUT SPILLOVERS) 
An FOI shock without spillovers is introduced into the economy by 
increas ing the capital stock in each fo reign-invested sector. The investment 
data ac tually take the amount of FDl inflows in 2003, the year subseq uent to 
the benchmark year 2002. As shown in Table 6. 1, rDI into the manufacturing 
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secto rs account for a lmost 70% of tota l FOt. Among ma nufacturing sectors. the 
top fi ve sectors in a ttracting FDI are e lectroni ca l products ( 11 .9%10 1' tota l FDI ), 
textile (5.1 % of tota l FDI), raw che mica l materi a ls and chemica l products 
(4 .9% of tota l FDl), garments and othe r tibre product (4.4% of tota l FDI), and 
transport equipment (4.4% of tota l FOJ). 
When the above FDI shock is introduced into the E mode l by c hanging 
the values of DELTAFDl(A) in equation (AS .1 3 .1 ), the c hanges in secto rs of 
di ffe rent ownerships are different, as shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.1: FDI to China by Sectors in 2003 ($ milliun) 
Groups Sectors FDI '% 
Millillg Coal, petroleum and gas 2.779 0.6 
Ferrous metals mining and dress ing 0 0.0 
Nonferrous metals mining and dress ing 0 0.0 
Mining of non-metal, other mineral , and other ores 0 0.0 
Ma"'ifact'lrillg Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing 11 .206 2.5 
Textile industry 22.59 1 5.1 
Garments and other fibre products 19,653 4.4 
Leather, furs, down and related products 14.344 3.2 
Timber process ing. bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc. 3.252 0.7 
Furniture manufacturing 4.438 1.0 
Papermaking and paper products 9.807 2.2 
Printing and record medium reproducti on 4.268 1.0 
Cultural, educational and sports goods 7,083 1.6 
Petroleum process ing and coking 2.354 0.5 
Raw chemical materials and chemical product 2 1,5 18 4.9 
Medica l and pharmaceutical products 7.864 1. 8 
Chemica l fibre 3.595 0.8 
Rubber products 5.966 1.3 
Plastic products 16.20 1 3.7 
Non-metal mineral products 13.6 15 3. 1 
Smelting and pres ing of ferrous metals 10.809 2.4 
Smelting and press ing of non fe rrous metal 5.836 1.3 
Metal products 16,635 3.8 
O r d i i a r ~ ~ m a a h i i e r ~ ~ 12.906 2.9 
Special purpose equipment 10, 128 2.3 
Transport equipment 19,622 4 .... 
Electronic and electric products 52.490 11.9 
Instruments, meters, cultural and offi ce machinery 13,67 1 3.1 
Utilities Production of electric power, steam and hot water 4.549 1.0 
Production of gas 3,9 19 0.9 
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Agriculture 
Construction 
Banking and 
Insurance 
Real Estate 
Otlter services 
Subtotal 
Tolal 
Production of tap water 
Farming, fore try, animal husbandry & fi hing 
Construct ion 
Banking and insurance 
Real e tate 
Geological perambulation & water con ervancy; 
transport, storage, post & telecommunication erv ice ; 
wholesale & retail trade & catering; socia l ervice; 
healthcare, sports & social welfare; education, cu ltu re, 
radio, fi lms & televi ion ; cientific and techni ca l 
services 
Public administration & other erv ices 
All manufacturing 
All sectors 
2,244 0.5 
l:! ,278 1.9 
5,061 1.1 
1.91 9 0.4 
4 J 02 9.8 
60,578 I .7 
o 0.0 
309,8 52 69.9 
442,48 1 100 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of China; China Indllslria//:..conomy SIC//is/ic 11 l'e Irhonk 
200-1 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2004). ompi lation by the author. 
Table 6.2: Effects of ~ ' " " FDI Shocl< to the Benchmarl< Economy 
(without Spillovers) 
Variables 
Na tional output 
GDP 
Output of foreign-invested enterprise in MMU 
Output of domestic enterprises (SOEs + private) in MMU 
-- SOEs 
-- private enterprises 
Output of non-MMU sectors (both foreign and domestic) 
Welfare (equivalent variation) 
Change ('Vu) 
5.9 
5.7 
20.l:! 
- 1.9 
-0.6 
-2.3 
6.3 
2.5 
Note: (a) MMU is composed of mining, manufacturing, and utilitie . (b) Welfare bel (or 
equiva lent variation) denotes the sca le of total consumption by the rcpre entativc con umer. (c) 
Elasticity of transformation of capita l and labour (TK' T,.) = (2.0, 0.5) 
Table 6.2 shows that an FOr shock to the benchmark economy can help the 
output of foreign-invested enterprises in the MMU sectors (i. c. manufacturing, 
mining and utilities) surge by 20.8%, while the domestic enterpri cs (both 
SOEs and private) are negatively affected . This negative impact is caused by 
the expansion of foreign-invested firms which attract labour away from the 
domestic enterprises in the same industries. Nonetheles , the overa ll impact of 
FDI to total output, GDP and welfare is positive. 
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Table 6.3 shows how FD[ affects the performance of enterpri ses or 
di ffe rent ownership in the top five FDI rec ipient indu tries. The changing 
patterns of output, value added, and export are consistent with those ex hibikd 
by Table 6.2, i.e. the outputs of foreign-inve ted enterpri ses incrca e 
dramatica ll y, while the outputs of domestic enterprises contrac t. 
Table 6.3: Impacts of FDI on Enterprises with Different Ownershills in the 
top 5 Recipient Sectors in Manufacturing (%» (without Spil1overs) 
Export Output PI. P,; 
FIEs 46.1 39.9 7.7 -39.3 
Textile SOEs -7.9 -4 .0 -4 .6 - I. 
Private -8 .8 -4 .7 -5.4 -2 .4 
FIEs 43.4 3 1.9 5.2 -34.4 
Garments SOEs -5 .9 -9. 1 -9 .0 -4.6 
Private -5.9 -9. 1 -9.0 -4 .6 
FIEs 41.6 32.7 6.5 -29 .2 
Chemicals SOEs -5.5 -3 .2 -2 .6 -0.5 
Private -6 .0 -3.6 -3 .0 -1.2 
FIEs 31.0 16. 1 -2.2 -24.6 
Transport SOEs 0.5 -4 .6 -7.5 -2 .3 
Private -0 .9 -5.5 -8.5 -3.7 
FIEs 15.7 12.0 4.7 - 12.5 
Eieclronicais SOEs -5 .2 -4.6 -0.8 0.0 
Pri vate -5 .3 -4 .7 -0 .9 -0. 1 
Source: Same as Table 6.2 . 
Prices of capital are generall y pull ed down by the influx of fo reign capital. 
Due to the imperfect transformability (with a benchmark elasti city of' 2) of' 
capital between foreign-invested and domestic enterpri ses prices of capital in 
domestic sectors do not decrease with a magnitude as large as those in 
fore ign-invested sectors. 
Prices of labour in foreign-invested sec tors are genera lly higher as more 
fo reign capital is pursuing the limited amount of labour. Due to the ve ry low 
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transformability (with an benchmark elast icity of 0.5) of labour between 
foreign-invested and domestic enterpri ses, a contraction of domestic sec tors 
wi ll lead to less demand for labour and pulls down the price of labour. 
The elasticity of transformation of labour between owncrships is lower 
than that of capital because inter-ownership labour mobility is still very low in 
China. According to a recent firm-l evel survey conducted by the Asia Market 
[ntelligence (see Table 6.4), in the I ,500 firms surveyed only about 0.21X, of' 
the employees had wo rk experience in fore ign-inve ted enterpri cs in 2000. 
The labour mobility in the other direction, i.e. from domestic firm s to 
foreign-invested firms should be higher given the higher sa lary (2 hao, 2002) 
and more vibrant work environment in the latter. In brief, the labour mobility 
between ownerships is a rather unidirectiona l one, if any. Knight and Yueh 
(2004) also argue that the inter-firm labour mobility in urban areas in hina is 
still very low in 1999. Therefore it is reasonable to set a relati ve ly low 
benchmark parameter va lue for the elasticity of transformation of' labour. 
Table 6.4: Employees with Employment History in Foreign Firms, 2000 
Number of 
Industries 
surveyedl1nlls 
Pel'ccntllge 
Accounting and re lated services 104 0.5% 
Advertising and marketing 89 0.4% 
Apparel and leather goods 222 0. 1% 
Business logistics services 11 0 0.0% 
Communicati on services 7 1 0.0% 
Consumer products 165 0.1% 
Electronic components 203 0.2% 
Electronic equipment 192 0.6% 
Information technology services [28 0.6% 
Vehicles and vehicle pal1s 2 16 0.1% 
Total 1,500 O.2'YO, 
Source: Asia Market Intelligence. 
However, as a robustness check, we can also try di fferent parameter va lues 
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for the elasticities of capital (T;.:) and labour (rL) transformation and see how the 
results will change accordingly. In the ex perim nts, rK takes 10 nlternnti vl.: 
va lues ( TK =0.1 , 0.4, 0.7, .. . , 2.8) con ecuti ve ly, and r/. als takes these 10 
values consecutively as well. While some studi take 3 or 4 as the elasticity of 
capital transformation in the literature (e.g. Lejour, Rojns- Romagosa ancl 
Verweij, 2008; Springer, 1998), 3 is taken here as the upper limit given the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of foreign capital, state capi tal and private cap ital 
in the Chinese economy in transition . 3 is al t as the upper limit for the 
elasticity of labour transformability due to the reasons di scussed earlier. 
Therefore there are in total I Ox 10= 100 sets of combinations of (rK, riJ . The 
CG E model is run for each of these 100 sets of parameters and thus can 
generate 100 simulation results, as hown in the 3-dimen Ion diagrams in 
Figure 6.1. The X and Y axes are parameter valu , whil the ve rti ca l ax is 
represents the values in regard . A "va lue net" has 100 "knot " with each of 
them corresponding to a combination of (rK, rd. 
Figure 6.1: Impact ofFDI Shock on Output under Perfect Competition 
(without Spillovcrs) 
(a) Total output chan ge 
Change (%) r 
6.1 
5.8 
5.5 
Elasl ;c ;ly 0/lraI1510/'1I101;on 
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(b) Change of domestic OEs' output 
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From panel (a), one can see that total output alway Increases. The 
magnitude of changes gradually increases as the combination of (rK, rd moves 
from one corner (2 .8, 0.1) towards the other (0.1 , 2.8). Thi s implies that a 
higher degree of labour mobility will be b nefici al to the economy. The 
changes of GDP and national welfare are all positive and their patterns (not 
reported here) are very similar to that of national total output sh wn in Panel 
(a). 
I n panel (b) and panel (c), it is evident that the changes of' 0 Es and 
Private enterprises ' total output are ambiguous. For example in panel (b), the 
output change gradually turns positive a the combination of (rK. Tt) moves 
from one corner (0.1, 2.8) towards the other (2.8, 0.1). ne can also find from 
panel (d) that when (rK, TL) = (0.1 , 2.8), i.e. when the for ign enterpri ses can 
attract away labour from their domestic rivals mo t easily yet without losi ng 
much capital , the change of foreign enterpri se ' output reaches the hi ghest 
level. 
6.3. FDI SPILLOVERS UNDER PERFECT COMPETITION 
This Section examll1es the effects of FDl spillover ' under p e r ~ ~ ct 
competition. The same FDl shock is introduced into the economy as in the 
previous Section. The only difference is that thi For shock is accompanied 
with endogenous productivity spillovers. The purpose of illustrating the effects 
of an FDT shock with spillovers as well as without spillovers is to facilitate the 
comparison between three two scenarios. 
Figure 6.2 summarises the percentage changes of total output of the whole 
economy (panel (a)), SOEs only (panel (b)), Private enterprises only (pan I (c)). 
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and FIEs only (panel (d)). A compari son of the corresponding panels of ri gure 
6.1 and 6.2 exhibits highly similar effects of FDI hock with or without FD I 
producti vity spillovers. When (rK, rd moves fro m the corner or (I ow. hi gh) to 
the corner of (high, low), SOEs and Pri vate enterpri ses benefit more i'ro m the 
FDI shock. However the FI Es will lose more a (rK' r/.) moves t wa rds the 
(high, low) corner, because capital is more eas il y attrac ted away to S Es and 
Private enterpri ses, while labour is more difficult to be attrac ted by the rI Es. 
Collecti ve ly, national total output benefits more as (rK, rd is mov ing from the 
corner of (high, low) to the corner of (Iow, high). 
The changes of GDP and national welfare are all pos iti ve and their 
patterns are very similar to that of total output shown in panel (a) of' Figure 6.2. 
So their diagrams are skipped here. 
Figure 6.2: Impact of FDI Shoci{ on Output under Perfect om petition 
(with Spillovcrs) 
(a) Total output change 
Challge (%) 
9.0 r 
B.O r 
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Although Figure 6.1 and 6.2 look very similar, there ex ist differences 
between them. For example, the Increase rates of national total output are 
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higher than those in the scenario without FOI productivity pillovers. That is to 
say, the "value net" in panel (a) of Figure 6.2 is at a position hi gher than that in 
panel (a) of Figure 6. I. The magnitude of thi promotion (or th t: gap betwt:t:n 
panel (a) of Figure 6. 1 and panel (a) of Figure 6.2) i depicted by panel (a) of' 
Figure 6.3. Such a difference caused by I' 01 productivity spillovers is referred 
to as "spillover premium" throughout this hapter. 
Nonetheless, the increase rate of FIEs' output is lower than that in the 
scenario without FDI productivity spillovers given the same combinati n of' (r;.;, 
rd, i.e. negative spillover premium occurs (see pan I (d) in figure 6.3). This 
contrast has important implications, i.e. FDl productivity sp illovers arc 
benefic ial to promoting host country's total output, OP. and national welfare , 
although total output of foreign-invested sector will incrt!ase at a smaller 
magnitude. In other words, the lower increase rate of rI h is outweighed by 
even better performance of domestic enterpri se thank to the I· 01 productivi ty 
spillovers. 
Figure 6.3: Impact of FDI Shock on Output under Perfect Competition: 
Spillover Premium 
(a) Positive spiIIover premium of tota l output 
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Table 6.5: Changes (%) of SOEs with an FDI Shock under Perfect Competition 
FDI* BL FL HZDS EXCO NTFP TFP Export Import Output P 
Coal, petroleum and gas 0.6 7.8 7.6 6.8 9.6 6.7 0.8 -4.5 8.8 1.3 2.0 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing 0.0 7.2 18.0 -2.6 N .A. 11.2 1.2 -3.9 9. 1 1.8 1.9 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing 0.0 8.8 19.7 -2.0 -2.9 12.3 1.3 -6.4 15 .4 3.5 3.4 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores 0.0 9.6 13 .9 -1.9 -2.5 9.6 0.8 -4.2 7.7 0.6 1.6 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing 2.5 4.7 3.0 0.8 1.4 1.4 0.2 -1 6.2 22 .2 0.0 6.1 
Textile industry 5.1 14.0 12.6 16.6 21.0 11.8 2.6 0.6 7.8 2.0 0.4 
Garmellts ami other fibre products 4.4 14.8 9.6 9.9 9.2 8.7 2.4 6.6 -7.5 0.3 -1.6 
Leather. furs, down and related products 3.2 9.5 10.4 10.2 10.5 7. 1 2.8 5.7 4.0 4.2 -0.4 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc. 0.7 13 .3 13 .9 17.4 23 .6 13 .3 1.6 -1.6 3.1 -0.6 0.3 
Furniture manufacturing 1.0 13.5 8.9 17.4 17.3 13.6 2.3 6.4 -7.6 -0.3 -1.7 
Papermaking and paper products 2.2 12.4 9.3 13 .8 9.2 9.4 2.4 5.0 -3.0 -1.6 -2.2 
Printing and record medium reproduction 1.0 12.9 7.6 11.9 9.3 10.0 1.7 5.7 -8.3 -3 .6 -3.1 
Cultw-al, educational and sports goods 1.6 10.5 8.7 9.8 8.5 7.6 2.3 4.3 -5 . 1 0.7 -0.9 
Petroleum processing and coking 0.5 7.2 11.0 6.6 8.6 7.2 0.7 -1.9 6.9 1.8 1.8 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 4.9 10.7 10.9 13.3 16.5 9.4 2.2 2.6 3.5 1.7 -0.3 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 1.8 9.8 9.9 10.2 14.3 8.4 1.6 -1.6 -3.6 -5.2 -1.1 
Chemical fibre 0.8 11.0 11.8 10.1 12.8 8. 1 2.5 9.4 -1.1 2.5 -2.0 
Rubber products 1.3 12.2 7.8 12.4 14.3 8.7 2.3 1.5 0.3 -0.8 -0.7 
PlasTic products 3.7 12.7 7.0 14.1 12.3 8.5 2.5 7.7 -1.6 1.5 -1.8 
Non-metal mineral producTs 3. 1 10.9 6.8 14.7 14.2 10.2 1.7 8.0 -10.7 -3 .9 -3 .9 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 2.4 14.7 11.9 31.0 46.0 15.0 1.7 1.1 3.3 1.0 0.0 
Smelting and pressing ofnonferrous metals 1.3 16.1 6.8 24.4 38.3 10.4 2. 1 0.4 7.5 2.8 0.6 
Metal producrs 3.8 15.8 7.8 13 .7 15.4 10.2 2.2 9.2 -5.2 1.5 -1.9 
Ordinary machinel}' 2.9 9.9 8.2 12.9 13.6 8.7 1.7 3.9 -0.7 0.8 -0.7 
Special purpose equipment 2.3 10.7 12.9 19.7 14.8 13 .0 1.8 7.9 -6.1 -0.3 -1.9 
Transport equipment 4.4 7.9 6.1 5.6 5.7 4.9 1.5 9.7 -7. 1 004 -2.0 
Electronic and electric products 11.9 3.7 2.5 1.5 1.2 1.5 0.8 2.9 2.4 1.5 -0.3 
Instruments, meters, cullllral and office machinery 3.1 5.6 7.9 11.4 8.4 6.2 2.7 1.4 3. 1 0.8 -0.2 
Production of eleCTric power; steam and lIor warer 1.0 6.2 11.4 1.4 0. 1 4.5 0.8 -3.7 12.5 ·u 2.8 
Production of gas 0.9 9.3 10.2 20.8 51.1 14.2 J ' _ .-' 7.7 -8.5 - 1.6 -3.2 
Production of taJ] water 0. 5 9.0 10.9 160.2 N.A. 26.3 2.9 -u -8.") -1 3.0 -3.3 
Note: (J) FDI: percentage of tota l FDI in corresponding sectors; (2) BL: backward linkages; FL: forward linkages; HZDS: horizontal demonstration; EXCO: export 
concentration of FIEs; NTFP: share of TFP spillovers in total TFP, measured by equation (5.8); TFP: industry-level productivity, measured by the denominator of fraction 
(5. 8) ; upon: export of SOEs; Oulpllf: total output of SOEs; PL: average wage level of SOEs: PK: average wage level of SOEs: larie f)': number of firms; Scale: production 
scale of each variety. (3) (Tk', TL) = (2.0, 0.5); (4) Data not available are marked ·'N.A.", as the initial values are zero and it is not possible to calculate the percentage changes. 
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Table 6.6: Changes (%,) of Private Enterprises with an FDI Shock under Perfect Competition 
FDI BL FL HZDS EXCO NTFP TFP Export Import OutPllt P Coal. pe/roleum and gas 0.6 7.8 7.6 6.8 9.6 6.0 1.5 -3 .5 8.8 2. 1 1.9 Ferrous me/a/s mining and dressing 0.0 7.2 IK .O -2 .6 N .!\. 13. 7 2.9 -1.9 9. 1 3.5 1.& Nonferrous me/a/s mining and dressing 0.0 8.& 19. 7 -2 .0 -2.9 14.1 3.2 -5.5 15.4 4.3 3.3 Mining o/non-mewl. o/her minerals. and o/her ores 0.0 9 .6 13 .9 -1.9 -2 .5 10.1 1.5 -2.9 7.7 1.6 1.5 Food. beverage. and /obacco manu/ac/uring 2.5 4.7 3.0 0.8 1.4 1.2 0.6 -14 .6 22.2 1.4 6.0 Textile industry 5.1 14.0 12.6 16.6 21.0 9.3 5.0 0.2 7.8 1.7 0.4 Garmellts and other fibre products 4.4 14.8 9.6 9.9 9.2 5.1 2.9 6.3 
-7.5 0.1 
-1.6 Leather, furs, down and rela/ed products 3.2 9.5 10.4 10.2 10.5 5.6 4.9 
-6. 1 4.0 
-5 .5 0 .2 Timber processing. bamboo, cane, palm fibre e/c. 0.7 13 .3 13 .9 17.4 23 .6 11.7 3.6 -0. 1 3.1 0.6 0 .2 Furni/ure manufac/uring 1.0 13 .5 8.9 17.4 17.3 10.9 3.9 6.1 
-7.6 -0.6 
-1.7 Papermaking and paper produc/s 2.2 12.4 9.3 13.& 9.2 6.6 4.9 6.8 -3 .0 
-0.3 
-2 .3 Prin/ing and record medium reproduction 1.0 12.9 7.6 11.9 9.3 7.8 2.7 11.6 -& .3 0.5 
-3.5 Cultural. educational and sports goods 1.6 10.5 8.7 9.8 8.5 5.6 2.9 5.3 -5.1 1.5 
-1.0 Pe/ro/eull1 processing and coking 0.5 7.2 11.0 6.6 8.6 6.5 1.8 -2 .2 6.9 1.6 1.8 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 4.9 10.7 10.9 13.3 16.5 7. 1 4.5 2.3 3.5 1.5 
-0.2 Medical and pharmaceutical products 1.8 9.8 9.9 10.2 14.3 6.6 3.0 5.7 
-3 .6 0.2 
-1.6 Chemical fibre 0.8 11.0 11.8 10. 1 12.8 5.5 5.0 5.1 
-1.1 -0.6 
-1.7 Rubber products 1.3 12.2 7.8 12.4 14.3 5.9 4.2 0.4 0.3 -1.7 
-0.6 Plastic products 3.7 12.7 7.0 14.1 12.3 5.7 4.5 6.9 -1.6 0.9 -1.7 Non-metal mineral products 3.1 10.9 6.8 14.7 14.2 7.9 3.5 13.2 
-1 0.7 
-0.2 
-4 .3 Smelting and pressing of ferrous meta/s 2.4 14.7 11.9 31.0 46.0 12.9 4.0 2.6 3.3 2.1 
-0. 1 Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 1.3 16. 1 6.8 24.4 38.3 7.0 4.3 
-1.5 7.5 1.4 0.7 Meta/ products 3.8 15.8 7.8 13 .7 15.4 6.6 4.0 7.2 -5.2 0.0 
-1.8 Ordinary machinery 2.9 9.9 8.2 12.9 13.6 7. 1 3.2 5.0 
-0.7 1.6 
-0.8 Special purpose equipment 2.3 10.7 12.9 19.7 14.8 13.4 3.9 9.5 
-6.1 0.8 
-2.0 Trallsport equipment 4.4 7.9 6.1 5.6 5.7 3.1 2.3 7.5 
-7.1 
-1.0 
-1.9 Electronic and electric products 11.9 3.7 2.5 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.0 2.2 2.4 1.0 
-0.3 Instruments. meters. cultural and office machinery 3. 1 5.6 7.9 11.4 8A 7.2 5.0 3.3 3.1 2.5 
-0.2 Production of electric pOll'el; steam and hot water 1.0 6.2 11.4 1.4 0. 1 3.4 1.5 
-5 .0 12.5 3.0 2.9 Production of gas 0.9 9.3 10.2 20.8 51.1 12.0 5.8 0.9 
-8.5 
-6.8 
-2.8 Production oftaD water 0.5 9.0 10.9 160.2 N .A . .to.7 8.1 ')1.3 
-8.2 4.8 -0) 1 
Note: same as Table 6.5 
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Table 6.5 and 6.6 provide detailed illustrations of how the 1-' 01 shock has 
affected the performance of SOEs and private firms. The co lumn of " FDI " 
measures the percentage of FOI of each sector in total I-DI. The columns of ilL , 
FL , HZDS, and EXCO show the percentage change of the fOllr spillovcr 
variables, namely backward linkages, forward linkages, hori zontal 
demonstrations, and export concentration of foreign-invested enterpri ses, 
respectively. As shown in Table 6.5 and 6.6, almost all four pillover va ri ab les 
have increased due to the FOI shock. 
As introduced in Section 5.4, the changes of the va lues of the above 
spillover variables will affect the productivity spilt over fi'om foreign '-inns to 
domestic firms. The contribution of FOT productivity sp ill overs to the total 
productivity measured by equation (5.8) in Chapter 5 will al 0 change 
endogenously. This change is shown in the column "NTFP". for both Es 
and private firms in almost all industries, the contribution of FO I sp illovers to 
their productivity has increased. For SOEs, the "production of tap water" ga ins 
the most from the FDI spillovers. This is probably because the FOI volume in 
this industry was relatively low. For the private enterpri es, the indu try 
"instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery" benefit mo t for a similar 
reason. 
While the column "NTFP" measures the contribution rate of FOI 
spillovers to total productivity, " TFP" simply measures the total productivity as 
measured by £XI + jJ x SPL in equation (5.8) . The FO I productivity spillove rs 
also make the total TFP of each industry improve. Almost all Es and private 
enterprises in all industries have a positive TFP change with the FO I shock . 
However, the top five FOI recipient industries are not necessari Iy among the 
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top recipient industries of such FDI spillovers. The reason for this 
"inconsistency" is that FDI shock affects the productivity of domestic 
enterprises via four spillover channels, and the importance of these channels 
varies, as shown in Table 5.3 in Chapter 5. 
Regarding the total output in the "output" column and product price in the 
"price" column, the results are mixed. The reasons are twofold. On the one 
hand, the FDI shock can generally improve the productivity of domestic 
enterprises (SOEs and private firms), which can potentially raise their total 
output. On the other hand, the FDI shock can attract away resources from 
domestic firms and pose threat to the latter. The above two forces make the 
collective results ambiguous. 
6.4. FDI SPILLOVERS UNDER MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION 
6.4.1. Impact of Spillovers on Output 
Similar to the scenario of perfect competition, the FDI productivity 
spillovers in the scenario of monopolistic competition can also exert positive 
impacts on national total output, GDP, welfare, and total output of domestic 
enterprises. Total products of foreign invested enterprises will increase at a 
lower rate due to the fact that limited resources are attracted by domestic 
enterprises which become more productive with FDI productivity spillovers. 
The initial number of firms, and also the number of varieties, is set to be 8 
in each ownership type in each industry in the benchmark economy. Figure 6.3 
provides a summary of the findings. Panel (a) shows that the national total 
output with spillover increases, with a highest increase rate at (rA', rd == (0.1, 
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top recipient industries of such For spillovers. The reason for Ihis 
"inconsistency" is that FOI shock affects the productivity or dome ti c 
enterprises via four spillover channels, and the importance of these channels 
varies, as shown in Table 5.3 in Chapter 5. 
Regarding the total output in the "output" column and product price in the 
"price" column, the results are mixed. The rea ons are twoCo ld . Il the olle 
hand, the FOr shock can generally improve the productivity or domcsti c 
enterpri ses (SOEs and private firms) , which can potentially rai se their Iota I 
output. On the other hand, the FOr shock can attract away resources from 
domestic firms and pose threat 10 the latter. The above two Corces make Ihe 
collective results ambiguous. 
6.4. FDI SPILLOVERS UNDER MONOPOLISTIC 
COMPETITION 
6.4.1. Impact of Spillovers on Output 
Similar to the scenario of perfect co mpetition, the rO I productivity 
sp ill overs in the scenario of monopoli sti c compet ition can als excrt positive 
impacts on national total output, GDP, we lfar , and total output or domestic 
enterprises. Total products of foreign inve ted enterpri ses wi ll increase at a 
lower rate due to the fact that limited resources are attracted by domes ti c 
enterpri ses which become more productive with FOr productivity spillovers. 
The initial number of firms, and also the number oC varieti es. i set to be 8 
in each ownership type in each industry in the benchmark economy. I· igure 6.3 
provides a summary of the findings . Panel (a) shows that the national tota l 
output with sp illover increases, with a hi ghest increase rate at (r/\, rd = (0.1, 
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2.8). The changes of GDP and national we lfa re (not shown in diagrams) also 
show the similar pattern of positive changes, i.e. when (T}.: T/J approaches (0 .1 , 
2. 8), the increase rates of GDP and welfa re are the hi ghest. 
Both SOEs (see panel (b)) and Private enterpri ses ( ee panel (c)) benefit 
the most from FDI spillovers if labour can not eas ily be attracted away by 
foreign enterpri ses and they can easily absorb capital fro m the latter, i. e. when 
(TK, TL) approaches (2 .8, 0.1). In contrast, the tota l output of l"IEs (sec panel (cl)) 
increases by the least when (TK, T/J = (2.8, 0.1). However, panel (a) show that 
the national total output increases most when (TK, T/) = (0.1, 2.8) because the 
increase in the foreign enterpri ses outweighs the loss inculTed in the domesti c 
enterpri ses. 
Panel Ce), Cf), Cg) and (h) depict the producti vity "spillover premium ' 
under monopolistic competition that exists between the effec ts of FD I shock 
with and without spillovers. Domestic enterpri ses get a positi ve premium while 
foreign enterpri ses' premium is negati ve . But the overall premium is 
co llecti vely positive, i.e. a conclusion similar to Section 6.3. 
Figure 6.4: FDI Spillover Effects under Monopolistic Competition 
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(b) Output change of SOEs with sp illovers 
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(e) Positive "spillover premium" of total output 
Sp illover 
premium (%) 
2.5 
2.0 ' 
1.5 " 
1.0 : : . . . . , ~ , , ••••••• ~ . j ~ · · •• · . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ I ~ ! · i i ~ ~5 :'"";, ; I)' ~ r r
" 
0.5 
Elasticity ojtransjormation 
(K) 
t ra mjo r/llll t ion 
(L) 
(t) Positive "spillover premium" of SOb enterpri ses 
Spillover 
premium (%) 
I -
Elasticity o/transjormation 
(K) 
(g) Positi ve "spillover premium" of Private enterprises 
Spillover 
premium (%) 
2.5 -
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 ' 
:: ' l ~ A j ~ ~ ~ i i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i . ~ ~ j ~ ~ ; 3 3::','ki,yar 
. ',., 0.1 transjormation 
Elasticity o o t t a l l s j O , , ~ a l l o , " " (L) 
(K) 
- 195 -
(h) Negative "spillover premium" ofjoreign enterpri ses 
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6.4.2. Impact of Spillovers on Product Varieties and Scale 
Another important impact of FDI productivity spi llovers under 
monopolisti c competition is refl ected by the changes of varieti es and scale of 
domestic enterprises. From panel (b) and (c) of Figure 6.5 one can lind that, 
with FDI productivity spillovers under monopolistic competition. the number 
of varieti es produced by domestic enterprises generally decrea cs. But the 
number of total vari eties in each sector increases (see panel (a)) thanks to more 
varieti es created by foreign-invested sectors. 
Panel (e), (t) and (g) of Figure 6.5 indicate that there also ex ists pos iti ve 
"spillover premium" effects of FDI spillovers on the changes of variety, i.e. 
f..NINo (w ith spillovers) -f..N'IN'o(withollt spillovers) > O. 
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Figure 6.5: Variety Changes with FDI Productivity pillovers under 
Monopolistic Competition 
(a) Positive impact of an FDI shock to the variety of all enterprises 
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(d) Pos itive impact of an FDI shock to the variety of./oreign enterprises 
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(g) Positive "spillover premium" of production variety of private enlerpri cs 
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Panel (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Figure 6.6 show how the FDI shock increases 
the production scale per variety of all enterprises, SOEs, private and foreign 
enterprises respectively. Panel (e), Cf), (g) and Ch) indicate that the POl 
productivity spillovers lead to positive "spillover premium" in the changes or 
production scale, although sllch premium effects are very marginal. 'imilar to 
the results of Figure 6.4 and 6.5, when (rK, r/J approaches (2.8, 0.1), the 
production scale of the domestic enterprises benefit most, as they can attrac t 
the most capital from foreign enterprises while almost keeping their labour 
input unchanged. 
- 199-
Figure 6.6: Scale per Variety Changes with FDl Productivity Spillovcrs 
under Monopolistic Competition 
(a) Positive impact of an FDI hock to the sca le of all enterprise 
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(d) Positive impact of an FDI shock to the cale of Foreign enterpri e 
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(g) Positive "spillover premium" of production scale ofprivGle ent erprises 
Spillover 
premium (%) 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
(h) Positive "spillover premium" of prod ucti 011 sca le offoreign cntl:!rprise 
Spillover 
premium (%) 
(J./ () -
0.08 
0.06 I 
0.04 I 
0.02 
0.00 
El asticity o/tJ'Gnsjorll1l1i on 
(K) 
Elasticily 0/ 
//'{/1/4'1"II/lIt iu l/ 
(L) 
Thus a conclusion can be drawn from Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 that FOl 
spillovers can result in more product varieti es produced by domestic 
enterprises, and can also help domestic enterprises increa e their production 
scale for each product, although the net result of the FOl shock will be reduced 
domestic varieties when the values of (rK, rd move towards (low. high). This 
conclusion justifies the theoretical proposition derived in ection 5.S of 
Chapter 5. 
The "spillover premium" effects on variety and scale are briefl y illustrated 
in Figure 5.2 in Chapter S. Figure 6.7 is drawn here to compare how an FOI 
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shock with and without productivity spillovers affects the domestic sectors. 
Panel (a) shows that an FDI shock without spillovers may lead to fewer 
varieties and a larger scale for each variety in every domestic sector. 
Collectively, benchmark equilibrium Eo will be shifted to either E, or I ~ · : . . Pand 
(b) (same as Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5 in nature) depicts how spillovers can affect 
these changes. The "spillover premiums" on both varieties and scale .. ire 
positive, pushing A,A, and A2A2 upwards, resulting in a new equilibrium at I ~ " , ,
or E'2. 
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Figure 6.7: Variety and Scale of Domestic Enterprises with an FDI Shock 
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Table 6.7: Changes (Ufo) of SOEs with an FDI Shock under Monopolistic Competition 
FDI* BL FL HZDS EXCO N TFP TFP Export Import Output P VRT SCL 
Coal. petroleum and gas 0.6 7.9 7.6 6.8 9.6 6.7 0.8 -5. 1 9.3 1.1 2.1 0.7 0.4 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing 0.0 7.2 18.0 -3 . 1 N.A. 11.2 1.2 -4 .5 8.8 1.2 1.9 1.0 0. 2 
Nonferrous metals mining and dress ing 0.0 8.8 19 .6 -2.5 -3.5 12.3 1.3 -6.7 15.2 3.1 3.4 2.5 0.6 
Mining of non-metal. other minerals. and other ores 0 .0 9.7 14.0 -2 .1 -2.8 9.6 0.8 -4.7 7.8 0.3 1.7 0.2 0. 1 
Food. beverage. and tobacco manufacturing 2.5 4.6 2.9 0.6 1.4 1.3 0.2 -1 8.2 26.0 0.2 7.1 -0. 1 0.2 
Textile industry 5.1 14.0 12.7 16.4 20.9 11.7 2.6 -0.2 7.8 1.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Garments and other fibre products 4.4 14.7 9.7 10.0 9.3 8.7 2.4 5.2 -7.1 -0.7 -1.5 -0.9 0.2 
Leather. furs. down and related products 3.2 9.7 10.7 10.6 10.8 7.2 2.9 4 .1 4.3 3.0 -0.3 2.7 0.3 
Timber processing. bamboo. cane. palm fibre elC. 0.7 13.3 13.9 17.3 23 .5 13.2 1.6 -2.8 3.4 -1.3 0.5 - 1.3 0.0 
Furniture manufacturing 1.0 13.6 9.0 17.3 17. 1 13.5 2.3 5. 1 -7.4 - 1.3 -1.7 - 1.3 0.0 
Papermaking and paper products 2.2 12.5 9.4 13.9 9.3 9.4 2.4 4.3 -3.3 -2.4 -2.2 -2.7 0.3 
Printing and record medium reproduction 1.0 13.0 7.7 11.9 9.3 10.0 1.7 5.3 -8 .3 -4.0 -3.1 -4.0 0. 1 
Cultural. educational and sports goods 1.6 10.6 8.9 10. 1 8.7 7.7 2.4 3.2 -4.9 -0.3 -0.9 -0.5 0.2 
Petroleum processing and coking 0.5 7.2 11.0 6.5 8.5 7.2 0.7 -2.4 7.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 0.5 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 4.9 10.7 11.0 13.3 16.5 9.4 2.2 2.2 3.3 1.2 -0.2 0.4 0.8 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 1.8 9.9 10.0 10.3 14.4 8.4 1.6 -3.1 -2.3 -5.5 -0.7 -5.7 0.2 
Chemical fibre 0.8 11.1 11.8 10.3 13. 1 8.2 2.6 9.4 -1.9 1.8 -2.1 0.9 0.8 
Rubber products 1.3 12.3 7.9 12.6 14.5 8.8 2.3 0.6 0.5 - 1.4 -0.5 -2.1 0.7 
Plastic products 3.7 12.7 7.1 14.0 12.2 8.6 2.5 7. 2 -2.5 0.4 -2.0 0.2 0.2 
Non-metal mineral products 3.1 10.9 7.0 14.7 14.2 10.2 1.7 7.5 -1 0.7 -4.3 -3.9 -4.5 0.2 
Smelting and pressing offerrous metals 2.4 14.8 12.0 31.1 46.2 15.1 1.7 1. 1 2.9 0.6 0.0 -0. 2 0.8 
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 1.3 16.0 7.0 24.3 38. 1 10.4 2. 1 0.4 7.0 2.3 0.6 1.5 0.8 
Metal products 3.8 15 .8 7.9 13.7 15.3 10.2 2.3 8.7 -5.7 0.7 -2.0 0.4 0.3 
Ordinary machinel), 2.9 10.0 8.3 12.8 13.4 8.8 1.7 3.7 -1.1 0.4 -0.7 -0.1 0.5 
Special purpose equipment 1.3 10.8 13.0 19.7 1-t.8 13.0 1.9 7.7 -6.3 -0.7 - 1.9 - 1.3 0.6 
Trallsport equipmellf 4.4 8.0 6.3 5.8 5.9 5.0 1.5 9.6 -7.1 0.2 -2.0 -0.6 0.9 
Electrmtic a"d electric products 11.9 3.9 2.8 1.8 l A 1.6 0.9 1.9 2.3 0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.5 
Instruments, meters. cllllUral and office machinery 3. 1 5.8 8.0 11.8 8.7 6.:1 1.8 0.5 3.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.5 
Produclion of elec/ric pOIl'el; sleam and hot water 1.0 6. -t 11.4 1.3 0. 1 -t .5 0.8 -4.0 13 .3 -t .-t 3.2 ' , 1.0 .1 . .1 
Production of gas 0.9 9.5 lOA 21.6 53 .3 1-t.7 2.4 7.2 -8. 1 -1.9 -3.0 -2.5 0.6 
Production o(tap lIIaler 0.5 9.0 11.0 160.7 N.A . 16.:1 2.9 --t .9 -7.8 - 13.2 -3. 1 - 13 .8 0.6 
Note: VRT: number of firms in 1he sec tor: SCL: production scale of each variety. Other variables are the same as those in Table 6.5 . Benchmark number of firm s 
(under monopolistic competition) in each sector is set to be 8. The values of elasticity of transfomlation ( rK· rr.) = (2.0. 0.5). 
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Table 6.8: Changes (%) of Private Enterprises with an FDI Shock under Monopolistic Competition 
FDI* BL FL HZDS EXCO N TFP TFP Export Import Output P VRT SCL 
Coal. petroleum and gas 0.6 7.9 7.6 6.8 9.6 5.9 1. 5 -4 .1 9.3 1.9 2. 1 1.3 0.6 
Ferrous metals mining and dress ing 0.0 7.2 18.0 -3. 1 N.A. 13.7 2.9 -1.8 8.8 3.3 1.9 2.3 0.9 
Nonferrous metals mining and dress ing 0.0 8.8 19.6 -2.5 -3.5 14.1 3. 1 -5.2 15.2 4.2 3.4 2.9 1.2 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores 0.0 9 .7 14.0 -2. 1 -2.8 10.1 1.5 -3. 1 7.8 1. 5 1.6 1.1 0.4 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing 2.5 4 .6 2.9 0.6 1.4 1.1 0.6 -1 6.7 26.0 1.6 7.0 1.3 0.4 
Textile industry 5. 1 14.0 12.7 16.4 20.9 9.2 5.0 0.6 7.8 1.7 0.6 -0.4 2. 1 
Garmellts and other fibre products 4.4 14.7 9.7 10.0 9.3 5.1 2.9 6.9 -7.1 0.3 -1.3 -2.7 3.1 
Leather. furs, down and related products 3.2 9.7 10.7 10.6 10.8 5.8 5.1 -6.5 4.3 -6.0 0.5 -8.2 2.4 
Timber processing. bamboo. cane. palm fibre etc. 0.7 13.3 13.9 17.3 23 .5 11.6 3.6 -0.5 3.4 0.4 0.5 -0.6 0.9 
Furniture manufacturing 1.0 13.6 9.0 17.3 17. 1 10.8 3.8 6.5 -7.4 -0.5 -1 .4 -2.6 2. 1 
Papermaking and paper products 2.2 12.5 9.4 13.9 9.3 6.7 4.9 7.4 -3.3 -0.4 -2.2 -2. 1 1.7 
Printing and record medium reproduction 1.0 13.0 7.7 11.9 9.3 7.8 2.7 11.7 -8 .3 0.4 -3.4 -0.5 1.0 
Cultural, educational and sports goods 1.6 10.6 8.9 10.1 8.7 5.8 2.9 5.9 -4 .9 1.5 -0.6 -2.0 3.6 
Petroleum processing and coking 0.5 7.2 11.0 6.5 8.5 6.5 1. 8 -2.3 7.0 1.6 2.0 0.8 0.7 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 4.9 10.7 11.0 13.3 16.5 7.2 4.5 2.7 3.3 1.5 -0.1 -0.2 1.6 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 1.8 9.9 10.0 10.3 14.4 6.7 3.0 4.7 -2.3 0.2 -1. 2 -0.8 1.0 
Chemical fib re 0.8 11.1 11.8 10.3 13. 1 5.6 5.0 5.7 - 1.9 -0.9 - 1.7 -2.5 1.7 
Rubber producls 1.3 12.3 7.9 12.6 14.5 6.0 4.3 0.3 0.5 - 1.9 -0.4 -3.6 1.8 
PlasTic products 3.7 12.7 7. 1 14.0 12.2 5.7 4.5 8.3 -2.5 0.9 - 1.7 -1.3 2.2 
Non-mewl mineral prodllCIS 3. 1 10.9 7.0 14.7 14.2 7.9 3.5 13.5 - 10.7 -0.2 -4 . 1 - 1.4 1.2 
Smelting and pressing offerrous metals 2.4 14.8 12.0 31.1 46.2 12.9 4.0 3. 1 2.9 2. 1 -0. 1 0.8 1.2 
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 1.3 16.0 7.0 24 .3 38. 1 7.0 4.4 -0.6 7.0 1.5 0.8 -0. 1 1.6 
Metal products 3.8 15.8 7.9 13 .7 15.3 6.6 4.0 8.3 -5.7 0. 1 - 1.7 - 1.9 2.0 
Ordinary machinery 2.9 10.0 8.3 12.8 13.4 7. 1 3.2 5.7 - 1.1 1.6 -0.7 0.2 1.5 
Special purpose equipmenl 2.3 10.8 13.0 19.7 14.8 13.4 3.9 10.1 -6.3 0.8 -1.9 -0.7 1.5 
Transport equipmellt 4.4 8.0 6.3 5.8 5.9 3.2 2A 7.6 -7. 1 - 1.1 - 1.8 - 1.9 0.9 
Electronic and electric products 11.9 3.9 2.8 1.8 lA 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.8 
fl1Slrumen/s, melers. cultural and office machinery 3.1 5.8 8.0 11.8 8.7 7.5 5.1 3. 1 3.2 2.2 0.0 -0.4 2.6 
Production of electric powel; steam and hot water 1.0 6.4 11.4 1.3 0. 1 3.4 1.5 -5.7 13.3 2.9 3.3 1.8 1.0 
Production of gas 0.9 9.5 10.4 21.6 53 .3 12A 6.0 0.6 -8. 1 -6.9 -2 .6 -7.6 0.7 
Produclion of tap wafer 0.5 9.0 11.0 160.7 N.A. .to.8 8. 1 21A -7.8 U -u 2.6 2.2 
Note : same as Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the changes of key variables at industry-level. 
Similar to Table 6.S and 6.6, the contribution rate of productivity spillovers to 
total spillovers of domestic enterprises (NTFP) increases, resulting in 11100h:rute 
productivity (TFP) improvement. Table 6.7 and 6.8 also report the changes of 
varieties and scale of production in each industry. The results are consistent 
with those shown in Figure 6.5 and 6.6, i.e. varieties of both SOEs and PriVtlte 
enterprises decrease while scale per variety increase. 
6.4.3. A Comparison of an FDI Shock under Perfect and Monopolistic 
Competitions 
The impacts of FDI productivity spillovers on macroeconomic variables 
with different initial degrees of monopolistic power are also shown in Table 6.9. 
Two alternative values of the initial number of firms (N), and also the number 
of varieties, are chosen in each ownership type in each industry in the 
benchmark economy. N is an endogenous variable, the value of which may 
change in the counterfactual simulations. For example, when N= I 0, thl! 
percentage change of total output under an FOI shock without spillovcrs is 
6.0%, while this figure under the same FDI shock with spillover turns out to be 
7.2%, suggesting a net 1.2% FOI productivity spillover premium. 
We also include the outcomes for perfect competition for comparison. As 
we can see, the reduction in the number of competitors increases the impact of 
an FDI shock, with or without FDI spillovers. For example. the increase rate of 
GDP under perfect competition with spillovers is 7.1 %, but this figure becomes 
7.8% and 8.3% when N=10 and N=5, respectively. Moreover. the FDl spillover 
premia are higher when the benchmark number of firms (varieties) is smaller. 
For example, the spillover premia of total output increase rate are 1.1 %, 1.2% 
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and 1.3%, when the economy is competitive, N= I 0 and N=5, respec ti ve ly. To 
conclude, the lower the degree of competition in the benchmark , the hi gher 
returns to the FDI shock from competition. 
The only exception is the total output of SOEs, whose spillover premiulll 
exhibits a relatively stable pattern, refl ecting the balance of the bene fit · from 
the FOI shock (productivity spillove rs and cheaper capital), and the nega ti ve 
impact of increased competition from fo reign firms . 
Table 6.9: An FDI Shock under Perfect & Monopolistic Competitions 
Perfect 
% change of competition N= /f) N=5 
With spillovers Towl output 6.8 7.2 7.5 
CD? 7.1 7.8 tU 
Total output ofSOEs 1.9 1.8 I .H 
Total output of private el1lerprises 1.2 I . 1.4 
Tota! output of Ft Es 14.9 15. 15.6 
National welJEre 3.6 4.'-1 5.0 
Without spillovers Total output 5.6 6.0 6.2 
CD? 5.6 6.2 6.6 
Total outpul ofSOEs 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Total output of private enterprises 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Toto! output of FlEs 15.5 15.9 16.3 
National welfare 2.5 ]. 1 3.6 
Spillover premium Towloutput 1.1 1.2 1.3 
CD? 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Total output ofSOEs 0.5 0.5 0.5 
To/al output of private enterprises 1.2 1.2 1.3 
Total output of F/ Es -0.6 -0.6 
-0.6 
National welfare 1.2 1.3 1.4 
. . Note: ElastiCity of transformatIOn of capital and labour (rK, rtJ - (2.0, 0.5) . 
6.5. FDI SPILLOVERS UNDER FIRM 
HETEROGENEITY 
6.5.1. Impact of Spillovers on Output 
In the scenario of firm heterogeneity, firms are different 111 their 
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productivities so that the least productive enterprises will be driven out of the 
market when input prices are higher. Similar to the scenarios of perfect 
competition and monopolistic competition, the 1· 01 productivity spi ll ovcrs in 
the scenario of heterogeneous competition can also exert positive impacts on 
national total output, GO?, welfare, and total output of dome ti c enterpri ses. 
Total products of foreign invested enterpri ses will increase at a lower rate due 
to the fact that resources are attracted by domestic enterpri se ' wh ich become 
more productive with FDI productivity spillovers. 
Table 6.10 shows how FOI shock affects the national total output with and 
without productivity spillovers. As we can see, the ex i -tcncc or FDI 
productivity spillovers helps the total output increase with a greater magnitude. 
This difference is refl ected in the bottom panel titled with "spil/over premium". 
Figure 6.8 presents the findings in diagrams. Panel (a) shows that total 
output of all industries with spillovers increases, with Cl hi ghe t increase rate at 
(rK, rd = (0.4, 2.8), where only labour i relatively mobile. Es (see panel (b)) 
benefit the most from the FOI shock with sp illovers when (r/\, rd = (2.8, 2.8). 
However Private domestic enterprises (see panel (c)) benefit the most from 
FDI spillovers if labour can not eas ily be attracted away by foreign enterpri ses 
while they can easily absorb capital from the latter, i.e. (r", rL) = (2.8, 0.4). In 
contrast, the total output of FIEs increases by the least at (r/\, rd = (2.8, 0.4) . 
Similar to the conclusions drawn under perfect competition and 
monopolistic competition, domestic enterpri ses get positive productivity 
"spillover premium" (see panel (f) and (g)) while foreign enterpri ses ' premium 
is negative (see panel (h)). But the overall pr mium is co llec ti vely positive (sec 
panel (e)). 
- 209 -
T ~ l b l e e 6.10: Total Output C h ~ 1 n g e s s ('%) with and withuut Spillovc ."s under 
Firm Heterogeneity 
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Figure 6.8: FDI Spillover Effects under Firm Heterogeneity 
(a) TOlal output change with spillovers 
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6.5.2. Impact of Spillovers on Product Varieties, Scale and 
Productivity 
Another important impact of FDI productivity pillover under firm 
heterogeneity is reflected by the changes of varieties and sca le. From panel (b) 
and (c) of Figure 6.9 one can find that, with FDI productivity spillovers under 
tirm heterogeneity, the number of varieties produced by domestic enterprises 
may increase or decrease, subject to the values of elasticitics of capital and 
labour transformation. The total varieties in the whole country may also 
increase and decrease (see panel (a)). The impact on the variety of 
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fo rc! ign-inves ted enterpri ses IS negative . The " spillover premium" effect of 
FDI spillovers on the changes of variety for a ll types of enterpri ses are nega ti ve 
(see panel (f), (g) and (h)), i.e. I1NINn (with sp illove rs) - I1N'IN'o (without 
spillovers) < O. 
Figure 6.9: Variety Changes with FOr Productivity Spillovers under Firm 
Heterogeneity 
(a) Mixed impact of an FDI shock to the va ri ety of all enterpri ses 
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Cc) Mixed impact of an FDl shock to the va riety of Pril'ate enterpri es 
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Figure 6.10: Scale per Variety Changes with FOt Productivi ty Sllillovers 
under Firm Heterogeneity 
(a) Positive impact of an FDI shock to the scale of all enterprises 
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(g) Pos iti ve "spillover premi um" of an FDI shock to the sca le of Privule enterpri ses 
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The changes of production scale of both SOEs and Pri vate enterpri ses 
with the FDI shock under firm heterogeneity are mixed (see panel (b) and (c)), 
but the scale of foreign enterprises increases significantly (see panel (d)), 
leading to positive increase of the production scale at the national leve l (see 
panel (a)) . The net spillover effect on foreign enterprises is negati ve (see panel 
(h)), but the spillover premia of both SOEs and Private enterpri ses are pos iti ve 
(see panel (t) and (g)), leading to a positi ve spillover premium at the national 
level (see panel (e)) . 
The changes of variety and scale of domestic enterprises under firm 
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heterogeneity are similar with those under monopolistic compt:tition in that the 
variety and the scale change in the opposite directions in most of the occasions. 
The detail for this can be found by comparing the results by industry shown in 
the VRT and SCL columns in Table 6.7 and 6.10. 6.8 and 6.11. respectively. 
This similarity reflects the binding efTect of the variety-scale tradcotT. 
There exists an interesting contrast in foreign-invested t:nterprises under 
monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity. In the market structure of 
monopolistic competition, an FDI shock with or without spiJlovers can help 
create more varieties produced by foreign-invested sectors; however in the 
scenario of firm heterogeneity. an FDI shock decreases the variety produced by 
foreign-invested sectors in equilibrium. This contrast can be explained by the 
different assumptions of these two scenarios. The former scenario assumes a 
representative tirm, i.e. all firms of any ownership type are identical: however. 
in the latter one, firms are distinct in terms of their productivity. An FDI shock 
may cause higher prices of labour and intermediate products available for 
foreign enterprises. In the monopolistic competition scenario. foreign 
enterprises "collectively" expand their production presence (in both variety and 
scale) with a significant increase in capital supply. regardless of the higher 
input costs. Under firm heterogeneity, higher input costs cause the least 
productive foreign firms to exit and reduce the number of varieties produced 
(i.e. the number of firms), but boost the production scale of surving foreign 
firms.s 
8 In this model FDI is treated as follow-up investment to the existing foreign-invested 
enterprises. However. if FDI is treated as greenfield investment which involves starting up new 
ventures. then the simulation result of "variety" might be ditl"erent. 
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Table 6.11: Changes ('Yc,) of SOEs under Firm Heterogeneity 
FDT* BL FL HZDS EXCO NTFP TFP Export Import Output P VRT SCL 
Coal, petroleum and gas 0.6 7.1 7.8 6.2 12.3 6.3 0.8 -31.0 36.8 -0 .1 5.3 5.3 -5.2 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing 0.0 6.6 16.0 -7.3 N.A. 10.0 1.0 -1 5.9 9.9 -4.0 1.9 1.9 -5 .7 
Nonferrous merals rnining and dressing 0.0 8.6 19.7 -11.8 -15 .9 11.9 1.3 12.7 -29.2 -17.4 -4.3 -4 .3 -13 .7 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores 0.0 10.2 13 .2 -2 .9 .., .., 9.5 0.8 -7.4 9.0 0.2 1.1 1.1 -0 .9 -.} . .} 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing 2.5 7.3 5.6 4.9 0.8 4.8 0.9 42 .0 -30 .1 -5 .8 -5.8 -5 .8 0.1 
Textile ilUlustry 5.1 14.6 13.2 16.7 20.8 12.2 2.7 19.2 5.4 11.8 -0.8 -0.8 12.7 
Garmellts alld otlter fibre products 4.4 14.9 9.4 11.3 8.0 10.2 2.8 46.7 -32.4 12.5 -3.2 -3.2 16.1 
Leather, furs, down and related products 3.2 7.6 7.4 6.4 5.2 5.2 2.1 38.0 -6.4 19.3 -1.6 -1.6 21.3 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, pahnjibre etc. 0.7 13 .9 14.3 19 .5 24.2 14.5 1.8 40.4 -24.3 0.5 -4.2 -4.2 4.9 
Furniture manufacturing 1.0 13.3 8.8 18.5 14.4 14.8 2.5 40.8 -28 .9 5.9 -3 .3 -3.3 9.6 
Papermaking and paper products 2.2 9.8 7.7 9.1 7.8 6.8 1.7 -47.4 61.1 -2.8 9.3 9.3 -11.1 
Printing and record medium reproduction 1.0 10.3 7.6 7.8 5.6 7.5 1.2 1.5 -16 .2 -14.9 -2.5 -2.5 -1 2.6 
Cultural, educational and sports goods 1.6 10.4 8.8 10.0 7.1 8.1 2.5 28.3 -21.1 11.9 -1.6 -1.6 13 .7 
Petroleum processing and coking 0.5 6.8 10.7 7.6 10.6 7.4 0.7 -29.9 40.7 5.6 8.2 8.2 -2.4 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 4.9 11.7 12.3 14.4 17.5 10.5 2.4 22.7 -5.1 6.2 -1.9 -1.9 8.2 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 1.8 11.1 12.2 12.4 15.4 11.1 2.1 150.4 -61.8 -6.4 -12.2 -12 .2 6.6 
Chemical fibre 0.8 12.8 12.9 13 .2 15 .6 9.9 3.1 485 .2 -70.7 16.9 -1 9.1 -19 .1 44.5 
Rubber products 1.3 12.2 7.4 12.2 12.3 9.0 2.4 35.3 -21.3 5.5 -3.3 -3.3 9.1 
Plastic products 3.7 15.3 8.2 20.4 10.7 11.7 3.5 122.1 -46.4 5.3 -9.4 -9.4 16.2 
Non-metal mineral products 3.1 9.8 6.2 12.1 12.5 8.7 1.5 -2 .5 -4.1 -6.6 -0.7 -0.7 -6.0 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 2.4 13 .7 10.1 29.6 45.3 13.6 1.5 -73 .9 189.0 3.3 22.0 22 .0 -1 5.3 
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 1.3 15.9 6.2 24 .8 40.1 9.9 2.0 -59.1 129.3 9.5 11.0 11.0 -1.4 
Metal products 3.8 14.1 6.6 9.5 15.3 7.3 1.6 -41 .9 73 .0 4.4 7.1 7.1 -2.5 
Ordinary machinef)' 2.9 9.0 7.2 9.3 14. 1 6.9 1.4 -29.4 25 .2 -5.8 ., ? .}.- 3.2 -8 .8 
Special purpose equipment 2.3 9.4 11.8 16.2 16.3 10.9 1.5 -26.4 17.9 -5 .7 2.7 2.7 -8 .2 
Trallsport equipmellt 4.4 7.9 6.5 6.2 6.6 5.2 1.5 7.2 -4.2 0.9 -0.6 -0.6 1.6 
Electronic alld electric products 11.9 3.6 2.2 1.3 0.9 lA 0.8 17.5 -OA 9.0 -0.8 -0.8 9.9 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinery 3.1 5.2 7.1 9.0 5.9 5.3 ? ., _ . ..> 20.5 1.6 15.5 -0.6 -0.6 16.2 
Production of elecrric powel: steam and hot water 1.0 5.5 11.1 1.9 0.2 4.4 0.8 -12 .5 14 .9 -0.9 4.6 
Production of gas 0.9 6.5 7.3 3.2 8.3 3.9 0.6 17.8 -4 .9 9.9 -2 .5 
Production of/ap water 0.5 8.2 10.5 146 .0 NA 24.2 2.6 -3 .5 -1 7.9 -19 .8 -6.4 -30.9 -29 .6 
Note: parameters of Pareto distribution for domestic firms a=3.4 . b=0.2, 0=3.8 ; parameters of Pareto distribution for foreign-i nvested firm s a=3.4. b=0.3. 0=3.8. 
Elastic ity of transformation of capital and labour (r}.:. rd =(2.0. 0.5). 
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Table 6.12: C ha nges (Oft,) of Private Enterprises under Firm Heterogeneity 
FDI* BL FL HZDS EXCO N TFP TFP Export Import Output P VRT SCL 
Coal, petroleum and gas 0.6 7.1 7 .8 6.2 12.3 6.3 1.6 -27 .3 36.8 3 .7 5.1 5. 1 - 1.3 
Ferrous metals mining and dressing 0.0 6.6 16.0 -7.3 N.A. 12. 1 2.5 -8.7 9.9 1.9 1.5 1.5 0.4 
Nonferrous metals mining and dressing 0.0 8.6 19. 7 -1 1.8 -1 5.9 13 .5 3.0 34 .7 -29.2 -5.8 -4.9 -4.9 -0.9 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ores 0.0 10.2 13.2 -2.9 -3.3 9 .5 1.4 -5.5 9.0 1.8 1.0 1.0 0.7 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manufacturing 2.5 7.3 5.6 4.9 0.8 1.8 1.0 49.0 -30. 1 -2.3 -6.0 -6.0 3.9 
Textile industry 5. 1 14.6 13.2 16.7 20.8 8.5 4.6 22.6 5.4 14.3 -0.9 -0.9 15.3 
Garments and ollter fibre products 4.4 14.9 9.4 11.3 8.0 0.0 0.0 40.6 -32.4 8.6 -3.1 -3.1 12.0 
Leather,furs, down and related products 3.2 7.6 7.4 6.4 5.2 1.0 0.8 45.2 -6.4 24.4 - 1.7 -1.7 26.6 
Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palmjibre etc. 0.7 13.9 14.3 19.5 24 .2 11.0 3.4 42.3 -24.3 1.4 -4.3 -4.3 6.0 
Furniture manufacturing 1.0 13.3 8.8 18.5 14.4 6.5 2.2 36.9 -28.9 3.6 -3.3 -3.3 7.1 
Papermaking and paper products 2.2 9.8 7.7 9.1 7.8 5.2 3.8 -45.4 6 1.1 -0.1 9.2 9.2 -8.5 
Printing and record medium reproduction 1.0 10.3 7.6 7.8 5.6 5.2 1.8 25.2 - 16.2 -0.6 -3 .3 ... ... 2.8 - .) . .) 
Cultural, educational and sports goods 1.6 10.4 8.8 10.0 7.1 1.7 0.8 26.2 -21.1 10.3 - 1.6 -1.6 12.1 
Petroleum processing and coking 0.5 6.8 10.7 7.6 10.6 7.5 2.1 -29.8 40 .7 5.7 8.2 8.2 -2.3 
Raw chemical materials and chemical products 4.9 11.7 12.3 14.4 17.5 7.5 4.7 19.7 -5.1 4.2 - 1.8 -1.8 6.2 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 1.8 11.1 12.2 12.4 15.4 1.0 0 .5 173 .9 -61 .8 0.3 -12.4 -12.4 14.5 
Chemical jibre 0.8 12.8 12.9 13 .2 15.6 6.1 5.5 233.7 -70 .7 -22.1 -17.4 - 17.4 -5.6 
Rubber products 1.3 12.2 7.4 12 .2 12.3 3.6 2.6 31.7 -21.3 ... ... -3.2 -3.2 6.7 .) . .) 
Plastic products 3.7 15.3 8.2 20.4 10.7 5.2 4.1 110.1 -46.4 1.0 -9.2 -9.2 11.3 
Non-metal mineral products 3.1 9 .8 6 .2 12 .1 12.5 6.8 3.0 4.3 -4.1 - 1.7 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 
Smelting and pressing afferrous metals 2.4 13.7 10.1 29.6 45 .3 12.3 3.8 -74 .9 189.0 0.3 22.2 22 .2 - 17.9 
Smelting and pressing ofnonferrous metals 1.3 15.9 6.2 24. 8 40.1 7.6 4.7 -74.5 129.3 -20.6 12.9 12.9 -29.7 
Metal products 3.8 14.1 6.6 9.5 15.3 7.5 4 .6 -52.0 73.0 -8.9 7.8 7.8 - 15 .5 
Ordinary machinel)' 2.9 9.0 7.2 9.3 14.1 6.8 3.1 -29.1 25.2 -5 .6 3.2 3.2 -8.5 
Special purpose equipment 2.3 9.4 11.8 16.2 16.3 12.7 3.6 -28.0 17.9 -7.1 2.8 2.8 -9.6 
Transport equipment 4.4 7.9 6.5 6.2 6.6 3.5 2.6 -5.5 ... t2 -7A -0.2 -0.2 -7.2 
Electronic and electric products 11.9 3.6 2.2 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.4 11.8 -0.4 5. 1 -0.7 -0.7 5.8 
Instruments, meters, cultural and office machinel)' 3.1 5.2 7.1 9.0 5.9 4.5 3.0 23.4 1.6 18.0 -0.6 -0.6 18.8 
Production of elecrric powel; steam and hot water 1.0 5.5 11.1 1.9 0.2 3.5 1.6 -7.7 14.9 3.4 4. 1 
Production of gas 0.9 6.5 7.3 3.2 8.3 2.7 1.2 0.4 -4.9 -3.6 - 1.4 
Production of tap water 0.5 8.2 10.5 146.0 N.A . 37.6 7.4 42.6 - 17 .9 8.9 -9.2 -5.3 - 17.6 
Note : same as Table 6.11 . 
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Finally, the net productivity spillover effec ts on va ri ety and sca le are 
different in these two market structures. Under monopolisti c competition. the 
spillover premia of variety and scale are both po iti ve, which sup port s the 
theoretical hypothesis propo ed in ection 5.5.2 . However under firm 
heterogeneity, FDI spillovers will enhance the effi ciency o r dome ti c 
enterpri ses and inten ify the competition for limited resource , lead ing to even 
higher input costs and further decrease of vari ety produced by foreign-in vested 
enterpri ses. Therefore producti vity pillovers lead to hi gher input cost and 
force the least producti ve firms to exit a propo ed in ecti on 5.6 .". This 
causes negative spillover pren11lllTI on the vari ety and pos iti ve spill over 
premium on the production scale. 
Table 6.13 summarises the changes of va ri ety. scale. clItoff and average 
producti vity under firm heterogeneity. The pillover premia of cutoff and 
average productivity are positi ve for domesti c enterpri e which is c Il sistent 
with the hypothesis of productivity change proposed in ection 5.6 .3. 
Table 6.13: The Impact of an FDI Shock on Variety, Scale, Cutoff (qJ *) and 
Average ( qJ ) Productivity under Firm Heterogeneity 
Variety Scale lfJ w rp 
A F D A F D A F D A F D 
Without 
+/- - + +/- + /- + /- I- +/-
spillovers 
With 
+/- - +/- +/- /- +/-
spillovers 
Spillover 
- - - + - + + - + + - + premium 
. . 
" " 
, 
-Note. ( I) A refers to All enter pnse output ; "P' re fer to /'orelgll-lJ1 veslcd enterpl'l ·cs 
in manu facturing sectors only; " D" refers to Domestic- inve ted enterpri se (including E 
and private enterprises). (2) "+" and "-" denote po iti ve and negati ve change . (3) ollle re lilt S 
can be positive or negati ve, depending on the va lues of elasti citics of capit al and lab Ul' 
elasticities. 
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6.6. A COMPARISON ACROSS THE THREE MARKET 
STRUCTURES 
We have examined the FDl producti vity spillovcr effec ts in three different 
market structures, namely perfect competition, monopo li sti c competition. and 
firm heterogeneity. The spillover effec ts and spillover premia are compare I in 
Table 6.14. Panel (a) presents the numerica l results with the elas ticity or 
transformation of capital and labour (T/-;, Tt.) = (2 .0, 0.5). Panel (b) summari ses 
the results of sensiti vity tests against the changes of (rK. TtJ. The rnnge r r,.: (r/.) 
is 0.1, 0.4, .. . 2.8, the same range adopted in the sen iti vity experiments 
performed in previous Sections. The results show that the spillover effects and 
premia are similar across the three market structures: 
(a) Total output 
With FDI producti vity spillovers. domestic enterprises can acquire higher 
productivity and attract extra labour, capital and intermediate products from 
foreign-invested enterprises. 1 herefore total output of the latter will be 
negatively affec ted by FDI spillovers. However, the benefi t obtained by 
domestic enterprises outweighs the cost incurred by foreign firms, co llec ti ve ly 
resulting in a positive net spillover premium for the economy's total output. 
(b) Productivity level 
An FDI shock brings favourable changes to the endogenous spillover 
variables (not shown in Table 6.14, but shown in Table 6.5-6.8 , and Tablc 
6. 11-6.12), i.e. backward linkages forward linkages, export of foreign firms. 
and horizontal effects. These changes co llecti ve ly lead to a productivity 
improvement for domestic enterprises under all three market structures. 
(c) Importance of spillovcrs in TFP 
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For domestic enterprises, with an FDI shock, the amount of productivity 
"spilt over" from FDI changes endogenously and accounts for a larger portion 
in the total TFP under all three market structures. 
(d) Spillover effects across three market structures 
The three "spillover premium" columns in both panels illustrate the 
distinct net effects brought by the endogenous FDI productivity spillovers. The 
simulation results obtained from monopolistic competition scenario arc 
numerically comparable with those obtained from perfect competition scenario 
with all parameter values controlled, because the former scenario is simply all 
extreme example of the latter when the number of firms in a sector approaches 
infinity. As we have discussed on Table 6.9, the net spillover etlects under 
monopolistic competition is larger than that under perfect competition for 
domestic enterprises and for GDP, welfare and total output. 
However the net spillover effects obtained under firm heterogeneity are 
less comparable with those obtained under the other two alternative market 
structures, because the simulation results obtained under firm heterogeneity 
depend on the parameter values of the Pare to distribution of firm productivity 
taken from estimates for US firms (Bernard et aI., 2003). 
Panel (a) shows that the spillover premia of output, GDP and welfare given 
the Pareto parameters under firm heterogeneity are very close to those obtained 
under monopolistic competition. 
Panel (b) shows that the spillover premia exhibit a highly similar pattern 
across the three market structures, except for the variety changes. The reason 
for the exception is the different theoretical assumptions for monopolistic 
competition and firm heterogeneity, as explained in Section 6.5.2. 
- 225-
Table 6.14: The Effects of ~ m m FOr Shock (%, change) 
Ca) Elasticity a/transformation a/capital and labour (Tf;. I,) = (2.0. 0.5) 
Perfect competition Monopolistic competition Firm heterogeneity 
With Spillover With Spillover With Spillovt!r 
spillovers premium s ~ i l l o v e r s s premium spillovcrs premium 
Output All 6.8 1.1 7.2 1.2 6.6 1.0 
FlEs 14.9 -0.6 15.3 -0 .6 17.0 -0.8 
SOEs 1.9 0.5 1.8 0.5 4.2 O. -
Private \,2 1.2 1.3 \,2 2.8 1.1 
Variety All 2.4 0.3 -0.2 -0.3 
FIEs 13.3 -0 .7 -0.5 -0.2 
SOEs DJ 0.4 -0.2 -0. 
Private Not applicable -0 .2 1.3 -0 .1 -0.3 
Scale All 1.0 0.1 2.9 0.8 
FlEs 2.0 0.0 18 .4 -0.9 
SOEs 0.5 0.1 1.2 0.6 
Private 1.3 DJ 0.4 1.2 
Productivity SOEs \.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 5.3 5.3 
Privale 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 5.4 5.4 
Spillovers SOEs 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 10.3 10.3 
Private 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.4 8.3 8.3 
Welfare 3.6 1.2 4.4 I.J 4.0 1.0 
GDP 7.1 1.5 7.8 \.6 2.6 1.4 
Cb) Sensitivity lest oflhe e l a s l i c i ~ ~ aflransjormCltian a/capital and lahour 
Perfect competition Monopolistic competition Firm heterogeneity 
With Spillover With Spillover With Spi llover 
spillovers premium spillovers ..Qremillm ~ i l l o v e ~ ~ prem i Ulll 
011 tpll t All + + + + + 
FlEs + - + -
SOEs +/- + +/- + 
Private +/- + +/- + +/-
Variety All + +/-
FlEI + -
-
SOEs +/- + /-
Private Not applicable +/- + +/-
Scale All + + + 
FlEs + -
SOEs + + t-
Private + + +/-
Productivity SOEs + + + 
Private + + + + + 
Spilfovers SOEs + + + + 
Privale + + + + + 
We({are + + + + 
GDP + + + + + 
., . Note: (I) The range of (TK, TtJ IS 0.1, 0.4, . .. 2.8, the ame range adopted In the en Itl Vlt 
experiments performed in prev ious Sections. (2) "productivity" is denoted by equati oll (5 .6b); 
(3) "spillovers" measures how the importance of productivity spillover in domesti 
enterprises ' TFP changes, as denoted by equation (5 .8). (4) The initial number of firm in t:ach 
ownership-sector is set to be 10. 
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6.7. CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter discusses how an FOI shock to the benchmark economy 
together with productivity spillovers affects economic perf<Jrmance. 
Simulations are conducted under three different market structures. namely. 
perfect competition, monopolistic competition, and firm heterogeneity. 
Results show that (1) in terms of national aggregate indicators. an FDJ 
shock is beneficial to the economy, and FDI productivity spilloYl!l's are 
followed by positive spillover premiums under the three market structure 
assumptions; (2) for domestic enterprises (including SOEs and Private 
enterprises), FOI productivity spillovers promote their performance and always 
outweigh the negative impact of an FOI shock; (3) for foreign-invested 
enterprises, FDI productivity spillovers cause resources to be attracted away by 
their rivals that are more productive thanks to the FOr spillovers, thus making 
the increase in foreign-invested enterprises' total output lower than otherwise; 
This finding also applies to all the three market structures; (4) product variety 
and production scale per variety can both be improved by an FDI shock. and 
FOI productivity spillovers can exert positive "spillover premiums" under 
certain conditions; and (5) the experiments under the monopolistic competition 
assumption show that FDI productivity spillovers are more prominent in an 
industry with a lower initial degree of competition. 
The simulation results obtained under three market structures are generally 
consistent with the theoretical hypotheses derived in the previous Chapter. 
Under any market structure, productivity spillovers enable domestic enterprises 
to attract more labour, capital and intermediate products from foreign 
enterprises. In this way FDI generates positive spillover premia for domestic 
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enterprises and negative spillover premia for foreign enterprises. 
Under monopolistic competition, Section 5.5.2 derives a theoretical 
hypothesis that both variety and production scale of domestic enterprises can 
increase due to the possibly lower input costs brought by the FDl productivity 
spillovers. This hypothesis is justified by the simulation results presented III 
Figure 6.5. 
Under firm heterogeneity, Section 5.6.3 derives two theoretical hypotheses. 
namely productivity improvement efFect caused by the FDl spillovers from 
foreign to domestic enterprises, and resource real/oca/ion ett'ecl which transfers 
resources from the least productive firms (exiting the markd due to the 
increased competition) to the remaining firms. Both effects boost average 
productivity of the remaining firms. This proposition is also justified by the 
simulation results presented in Table 6.13 and 6.14. 
But there is one result seemingly counter to the theoretical hypotheses set 
out earlier in the thesis. Under firm heterogeneity, the spillover premium of 
domestic enterprises' ouput is not significantly larger than that obtained under 
the other two alternative market structures. However as the average 
productivity levels of both foreign and domestic enterprises can become higher 
with an FDI shock (as hypothesized in Section 5.6.3 and justified with the 
simulation results presented in the "with spillovers" row in Table 6.13). it was 
anticipated that the spillover premium in terms of the change of domestic 
enterprises' output would be much more significant. This may renect the 
parameters of the Pareto distribution of firm productivity, which were taken 
from values estimated for US rather than Chinese enterprises. as we discussed 
in Section 6.6. 
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In brief, the simulated effects of the FDI productivity spillovers obtained 
under the three market structures generally support the theoretical hypotheses 
derived earlier in the thesis. The trivial deviation between expected and actual 
results arises mainly due to the selection of parameter values and model design. 
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CHAPTER 7: 2008 CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
REFORM AND FDI PRODUCTIVITY S P I L L O V E I I S S
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the Chinese government abolished the preferential tux trea tmen t 
granted to foreign-invested enterpri ses almost three decades ago. Thi s haptcr 
di scusses the impact of the 2008 tax reform on the FO I producti vity spillover 
effects in China. Section 7.2 introduces the tax incenti ves used to attrac t ro l. 
Section 7.3 di scusses the cost and benefit of such a preferential rOI treatment. 
Section 7.4 simulates the economic effects 0 (' the 2008 corporate income tax 
harmoni sation. The responsiveness of FOI inflow to the tax ra te is taken from 
the literature. Section 7.5 concludes. 
7.2. CHINA'S FDI POLICIES 
China's FOI policies are mainly stated in two type of offic ial doc uments, 
namely the Guiding Directory on Induslries Open 10 Fore ign Dire '1 Invesllllel1l 
(hereafter FDI DireclOIY) and various laws and regulations (see Table 7.1), 
which were originally issued at the early tage of "Reform and pening-up" 
policy implementation, i.e. the late 1970 and early 1980s. Although the e 
offic ial documents have been amended various times in the past three decades. 
one of the priority targets has never been changed, i. e. FOl po lic i should 
provide fo reign fi rms with preferential incentive (Pra ad and Rajan, 2006) 
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aimed at swapping domestic market acces for advanced foreign technology 
and productivity (Long, 2005). 
Category 
Directory 
Laws 
Table 7.1: China's M ~ l i n n FD I Policies 
Name 
• Guiding Directory on 
In vestment 
• Corporate Income Ta.x L IHI 
• 
• 
• 
Law on Who lly Foreign-owned EJ7Ierpri.l'e.l' 
Law on Chinese- Foreigll Joint VPnlure.l· 
Law on hinese- Foreign ooper lIive EllIerpri.l· ' S 
Last updated 
2007 
200 1 
2000 
1988 
• Law on Prote tion of In vestlllent by olllpatriots 1994 
from Taiwan 
Regulations • Regulations jar Encourag ing 111 \1 '.I·tlll nt frO Ill 1990 
Overseas Chinese and 'olr/patriots frO Ill /Ion/!, KUllg 
and Macao 
• Regulations for Encouraging In\lestlllel1l ji'OlII 1988 
COl1lpatriotsfrom Taiwan 
7.2.1. FDI Directory 
The FD! DireclOlY li sts three categories of industries to which rOI arc 
"encouraged' , "restricted" and "prohihited', respecti ve ly. It has been amended 
five times since its first release in 1995. As shown in Table 7 .2, the prop rtion 
of "encouraged" industries gradually increa ed from 53.9% in 1995 (0 73.4% 
in 2007, whi le the proportion of " restrict d" industrie decrea d by half during 
that period . 
Table 7.2: Three Categories of Industries Listed in the F DI Directory 
Version 
Encouraged Restricted ProhilJited 
Number % Number % Number % 
1995 172 53.9 11 6 36.4 31 9.7 
1997 186 57. 1 11 2 34.4 28 8.6 
2002 262 71.0 7S 20.3 32 8.7 
2004 257 70.2 76 20.8 33 9.0 
2007 3S 1 73.4 87 18.2 40 8.4 
Source: Same as Figure 1.1. By author's compilation . 
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7.2.2. Laws and Regulations Related to Tax Incentives 
Various preferential treatments used to be granted to the t()reign invested 
enterprises (FIEs) 9 in manufacturing sectors and such treatments were 
enforced by laws and regulations. The most controversial treatment was the 
differential corporate income tax rates. According to the Income Tax Law.filr 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreixn Enterprises passed in 1991 
(abolished in 2008), foreign-invested firms should pay an income tax at thl: rate 
of 30%. However, any enterprise with foreign investment of a manufacturing 
nature scheduled to operate for a period of not shorter than 10 years shall. from 
the year in which it begins to make profits, be exempted of income tax in the 
first and second years and be qualified to claim a 50% reduction in the third to 
fifth years. That is to say, most FIEs only needed to pay income tax at an 
average rate of roughly 15% in the first seven years of operation. In contrast. 
the corporate income tax rate of domestic firms was as high as 33°;',. 
The dual differential corporate income tax system was aholished hy 
China's Parliament and the new tax rate for both domestic firms and FIb have 
been set to be 25% since January 2008. Nonetheless. FIEs established bd'ore 
16 March 2007 can still enjoy the tax exemption during a five-year interim 
period. i. e. from I January 2008 until 31 December 2012. 
Regardless of the above de facto dual tax system during the live-year 
interim period, both domestic enterprises and FIEs can also equally enjoy 
various nationwide tax incentives, such as: 
'i FIEs include all types of enterprises listed in Table 1.1, namely solely iorcign owned 
enterprises, joint ventures, and co-operative enterprises, and other types of foreign-invested 
enterprises. 
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(a) A reduced rate of20% may be applied to small or low-profit enterprises. 
The withholding tax lO rate is 10% on interest, royalties, capital gains and 
dividends; 
(b) Reduced tax rate of 15% to advanced technology enterprises; 
(c) Tax exemption or reduction for enterprises that engage in infrastructun: 
projects, agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy and water preservation, 
environmental protection business and transfer of qualified technology; 
(d) Reduced taxable income in proportion to the investment of venture 
capital; 
(e) Tax reduction for R&D expenses for developing new technology, new 
products and new processes. 
7.2.3. Objectives of China's FDI Policies 
(a) Export promotion 
Before China's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) 111 
200 I. export promotion and technology transfer were among the most 
important targets of China's FDI policies. 
In the late 1970s when China started transforming from almost an autarky 
economy into an export-oriented one, the foreign exchange reserves it held 
were as little as US$0.2 billion, which was a trivial figure compared to thl.! 
reserves it had by December 2008. US$1946.0 billion (State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange of China, http://www.saje.gov.cnl). In desperate need of 
foreign exchange reserves to fund the import of intermediate products and 
advanced technology, China adopted a series of mercantilist measures to 
10 Withholding tax is income tax withheld from employees' wages and paid directly to the 
government by the employer. 
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promote exports. The FDI policies regarding exports required that FIEs should 
keep a balance of exchange, or make sure the proportion of their domestically 
made products in the total number of products maintains at a reasonahle level, 
or a certain percentage of their products should be exported. Besides, any FIE 
with 70% of its total products exported was entitled to claim 50% cut in 
corporate income tax. However, since such requirements and incentives were 
inconsistent with the provisions of WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), they were abolished in 2001 as China became a 
WTO member state. 
The FDI policies were so effective in export promotion that the export 
propensity of FIEs and the contribution of FIEs to China's total exports have 
been astonishingly high. In 2004, the average ratio of export to total sales of 
FIEs was 46.1 % in manufacturing, while the average ratio of other types of 
enterprises was only 10.2% (National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2006a). In 
2007, the share of FIEs' export in China's total export hit a record high. 60%. 
which was much higher than 4% in the early 1980s (Ministry of Commerce of 
China). The strong export performance of FIEs set a good example for Chinese 
indigenous enterprises to enter the international market. 
(b) To transfer advanced technology 
China's laws on FIEs had specific technology requirements even atter the 
removal (in 2001) of the clauses inconsistent with China's WTO commitments. 
According to the latest Law on Chinese-ForeiKn .Joint J1entures. "the 
technology and equipment that serve as the investment of the foreign partner in 
a joint venture must be advanced technology and equipment that indeed suit 
China's needs." Both Law on Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises and Law on 
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Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Enterprises also state that the State encourages 
the establishment of wholly foreign-owned enterprises and production-based 
Chinese-foreign cooperative enterprises with advanced technology. 
7.3. COST AND BENEFIT OF PREFERENTIAL FDr 
TREATMENT 
As discussed, most FIEs only needed to pay corporate income tax at an 
average rate of as low as 15% in the first seven years of operation. I n contrast. 
the income tax rate (i.e. corporate income tax divided by total profit) of 
domestic firms is as high as 33%. Table 7.3 shows the actual corporate income 
tax rates for state-owned, private, and foreign-invested enterprises in 2004. The 
tax rates are calculated with the data from China Economic..' ('enslls SllIlis/iclI! 
Yearbook 2004, as the data of the benchmark year (i.e. 20(2) of this (,ClE 
model is not available. The average tax rates of SOEs and Private entcrpriscs 
were 19.5% and 19.3% respectively. However, FIEs only paid im:omc tax at 
10.4%, almost half of those of their domestic rivals. 
It is observed that there is much variation in these rates. Such variation is 
caused by various tax exemptions applicable to some enterprises as discussed 
in Section 7.2.2. Domestic enterprises in some industries collectively pay a tax 
at a rate higher than the upper limit 33%, which could be caused by accounting 
and measurement errors. 
The preferential tax treatment had potentially encouraged foreign capital to 
flow to China, especialJy at the beginning of the markctisation (1980s) when 
the Chinese market was relatively closed and unknown to the rest of the world. 
The foreign capital increased the foreign reserves of China and helped it to 
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import advanced equipment and technology. FDI also helped break the 
monopoly of SOEs and created a more eompetitiv markc t environmcnt. More 
importantly, preferential tax treatment had potenti all y prom ted the 
producti vity spillovers from foreign firm to domesti c firms via backward and 
forward input-output linkages, eros -ownership labour mob ility, th t.: ex p rt r 
fo reign firms, and hori zontal effec ts. 
Table 7.3: Corporate Incomc Tax Ilatc by Industt-y in 2 0 U ~ ~ ('Y.,) 
Sectors SO Es Privllte FI Es 
Coa l, petroleum and gas 12. 8 2 1.1 lA 
Ferrous metals mining and dress ing 19.6 27.2 15.5 
Nonferrous metals mining and dress ing 20.8 19.1 9.X 
Mining of non-metal, other minerals, and other ore 32.2 20.7 2 .7 
Food, beverage, and tobacco manu fac turing 30.3 14.9 14.5 
Textile industry n.3. 20.2 1_.7 
Garments and other fibre products 24. X 2 1.2 11.9 
Leather, furs, down and related product n.a. 14.7 13.3 
Timber process ing, bamboo, cane, palm fibre etc. 29 .6 15._ 14.3 
Furn iture manu facturing 10.0 17.3 X.7 
Papermaking and paper products 45 .4 20.6 I .2 
Printing and record medium reproduction 26.7 23 .X 1204 
Cul tural, educational and sports goods 47 .7 18.5 15.6 
Petroleum process ing and coking 24 . _0.3 1_.<1 
Raw chemi ca l materials and chemical products 2 1.3 17.5 10. 1 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 19.7 17.9 12.5 
Chemical fi bre 55 .7 18.6 I .8 
Rubber products 35.7 20.8 I .0 
Plastic products 24 .6 19.1 12.5 
Non-metal mineral products 29. 1 20.7 10.3 
Smelting and press ing of ferrous metals 24 .8 18.9 6.7 
Smelting and press ing of nonferrous metal 24 .2 19.3 10.9 
Metal products 28.2 _0.6 11. I 
Ordinary machinery 22 .7 20.6 12.1 
Special purpose equipment 29.2 2 1. 904 
Transport equipment 10.5 19.6 7.8 
Electronic and electric products 22 .6 19.6 10.3 
Instruments, meters, cultural and onice machinery 42.0 17.3 10.6 
Production of electric power, steam and hot water 2 1. 5 24.8 12.2 
Production of gas 45 .6 10.9 11 04 
Production of tap water n.a. 26._ 22 .1 
Avcnlgc 19.5 19.3 10.4 
Source: China Economic Cens Lls Statistical Yearbook 2004. Beij ing: China Stati tic Pres . 
2006. 
Note: "SOEs", " Pri vate", and "FI Es" denote the corporate income tax rate (=corporat ' 
in come tax/total profits) of state-owned enterprise, pri va te domesti c enterprise , and 
foreign-invested enterprises, resp,ecti ve ly. 
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However the benefits of such a preferential tax treatment seem to have 
dimini shed gradually due to the following two facts. First in rect:nt years 
China's forei gn reserves have been the hi ghest in the world , reducing the 
necessity of accumulating reserves by attracting rDI (espec iall y the 
export-oriented and labour-intensive foreign capital) simply with prcrercntial 
tax treatment. Second, in manufacturing sectors, monopoly power of the Es 
has already been greatly restricted, and a more competiti ve market 
environment has already been fostered with the emergence f' a vn ri ety of' 
ownerships. As shown in Table 7.4, by 2007 the " private en terp ri se ., and 
foreign-invested enterprises account for 9%, 23%, and 3 1 % of nati onal total 
output, respective ly. So the benefi t of the preferential tax treatment to the fI Es 
in breaking the monopoly of the SOEs is no longer so appea ling. 
Table 7.4: A Decomposition of National Total Output by Ownership, 2007 
Total outrlut Percentage 
_(RMB b'!l _(0;',) 
Total 40518 100'Yo, 
Domestic Enterprises 27755 69% 
-- SOEs 3639 9% 
-- Limited Liability Company 9034 2_% 
-- Stock Company 40 16 10% 
-- Private Enterprise.\· 9402 23% 
-- Others 1664 4% 
Foreigll-invested Enterprises 12763 31% 
-- Join! Venture 54 10 13% 
-- Solely Foreign Owned 6425 16% 
-- Others 928 2% 
Note : (a) Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008. Beijing: China Stati. ti ca l Pre s. 
2008; Cb) stat istics only covers the enterprises with annual sale ab ve RMI3 5 million in the 
MMU (mining, manufacturing, and utilities) sectors. 
At the same time problems related to uch preferential treatments also 
emerged so that the costs of the di ffere ntial tax ystem have increased in recent 
years. The most critical one is "round-tripping" FDI, i. e. fake FD I. " Round 
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tripping" FDI refers to cross-border investment motivated by the more 
favourable treatment of foreign as opposed to domestic capital. Domestic 
investors can transfer their capital out of, and then invest back into. the 
domestic market with a new label of "FDI". By 2003. about a quarter of FDI to 
China was round-tripping FDI (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2003, pp. 45). Those enterprises invested by round-tripping FDJ 
are not necessarily more productive than the firms registered as " d O I 1 1 ~ s l i c c
enterprises". However the former can enjoy a much lower corporate income tax 
rate (15%) for a maximum seven years. After this initial seven years, the 
investors could deliberately claim "bankruptcy" and re-register their fund as 
new "foreign-invested firms". By doing this, a domestic inwstor can 
circumvent the high corporate income tax forever. These tax evasion behaviour 
jeopardised the market environment and posed unfair competition against 
domestic enterprises. 
The second problem is related to the technology content und ( ) " i ~ i l 1 1 o(FDI. 
FDI from Hong Kong. Macau, and Taiwan tended to remain in labour-intensive. 
low-technology manufacturing sectors, e.g textiles. toys. and clothing. Some 
of those foreign-invested enterprises did not have any advantage in productivity, 
and the only advantage they held to beat domestic enterprises was the 
favourable corporate income tax rate. Empirical evidence suggests that once 
the presence of FDI in a certain sector exceeds a optimal point. 
foreign-invested enterprises may impose a negative impact on the performance 
of their domestic rivals (Buckley. Clegg and Wang. 2007). 
The third problem of the preferential taxes is linked to the survivul ( ~ ( (
domestic firms in services in China. The expansion of service sectors normally 
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accompanies the industrialisation process. The percentage of services III 
China's GDP has been growing from less than 25% in late 1970s to around 
40% in 2006. Also the employment in services accounted for 32% of total 
employment in China in 2006. These two figures in 2006 are still far hclow 
those in post-industrialisation economies, and indicate that the service sectors 
in the Chinese economy are far from well established. Facing the strong 
competition from mature foreign multinational firms in service industries e.g. 
banking, insurance, retail and wholesale, domestic enterprises do need u fair 
competitive environment where they can survive and sustain. A d i t l ~ r e n t i a l l
corporate income tax system will however threaten the development of 
domestic enterprises in service sectors. 
The fourth problem is the international competitiveness of Chinese 
domestic enterprises. The average corporate income tax rate is 28.6% among 
all the 159 countries (or regions) around the world which have adopted a 
corporate income tax system. The average rate is 26.7% among the I S 
countries (or regions) neighbouring China mainland (State Administration of 
Taxation of China, http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/. 27 March 2007.). A tax rate of 
33% on domestic enterprises undoubtedly reduced the international 
competitiveness of the domestic enterprises. 
The final possible problem is related to the .fisc,,1 revenue. Various 
empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corporate income 
tax and FDI inflows, i.e. with a lower corporate income tax rate on foreign 
firms, a country can generally attract more FDI (e.g. Grubert and Mutti, 1991: 
Hines and Rice, 1994; Cassou, 1997; Wei, 2000a, 2000b; Choi, 2003; Ang, 
2008). If FDI is very elastic to the preferential corporate income taxes, then a 
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lower tax rate could raise the fisca l revenue frol11 fo J' ign enterpri ses' taxes. 
However allured by the potential effecti venes' of var ious tax im;enti v(;s in 
attracting FDI, countries have "increas ingly" r lied on sllch p li cy instruments 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Deve lopment, 2000, pp. 3). 0 
compared with the corporate income tax rates (the de faC IO ones may be lower 
than the average 26.7% as discus ed) in surrounding regions, the lax ra te f 
15% in China might not appear so attrac ti ve. Moreover. if FOI is att racted to 
China more by the cheap labour and raw materi als and the market potential in 
China rather than the low tax ra te, then a low tax rat will ca use a Ilet loss or 
fisca l revenue. The tota l tax revenue, total corporate income taxes. and 
corporate income taxes paid by the fo reign enterpri ses In hina have grown 
very fast since early 1990s, as shown in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1: Growth Rates of Tax Revenue in C h i i ~ l , , 1995-2007 (cy;,) 
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I 
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Source: State Ad mini stration of Taxation of China (hIt )://\1' 1I' W. d u·ne/w\,. t:f!.1ill..!!.)' 
The average annual growth rates of total corporate income taxes and 
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corporate income taxes paid by FIEs are 22% and 34%, respectively, hoth 
higher than that of total tax revenue (19%). These ligun:s indicated that the 
foreign enterprises performed well in the Chinese mark!.!t, so a low corporat!.! 
income tax on FIEs might have incurred a loss of liscal revenue colkcted from 
foreign enterprises' income taxes. 
In brief, the recent Chinese macroeconomic situation indicated that the 
costs of the dual corporate income tax system may have come to !.!xceed the 
benefits in the recent years, and thus yielding an optimal time to harmonise thl.! 
tax rates. 
7.4. ASSESSMENT OF THE TAX HARMONISATION 
The experiments conducted in this Section are aimed at !.!valuating whether 
a removal of preferential corporate income tax treatment will hamper the FDI 
productivity spillovers. The simulations are situated under three ditlcrent 
market structure assumptions, namely perfect competition, monopolistic 
competition, and firm heterogeneity. 
The data of the corporate income taxes in 2002 are not available. but we 
can use alternative data to remedy this problem. According to China's input 
output table, the only tax data are titled "net taxes on production"II, and hased 
on the tax data and total output data, a gross tax rate can be calculated: 
gross tax rate, = net taxes on production, / total output, 
11 "Net Taxes on Production" refer to all taxes on production less all subsidies on production. 
They include various taxes, extra charges and fees levied on production, sales and business 
activities as well as on the use of factors, such as fixed assets. land and labour. In contrast to 
taxes on production, subsidies on production refer to the government transfer to the production 
units and are therefore regarded as negative taxes on production. 
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where i indexes the sectors in mining. manufacturing. and utilities. 
Then the data of corporate income taxes of foreign-invested enterprises. 
SOEs. and private enterprises in 2004 are collected from the China Economic 
Census Statistical Yearbook 2004, and are divided by total output to obtain the 
trans./iJrmed version of corporate income tax rate: 
income tax rate; = income taxes; / total output, 0.1 ) 
The 2008 tax reform harmonised corporate income tax rate for domestic 
enterprises (previously 33%) and foreign enterprises (up to 15°;(1) to 25(YlI. This 
reform formula can be modelled by deflating the corporate tax rate of domestic 
enterprises' output by 24.2% [(25%-33%)/33%= -24.2%], while augmenting 
the tax rate of foreign enterprises' output by 66.7% [(25%-15%)115 IYo=66. 7%1. 
It is necessary to endogenise the FDI flows by linking FDJ with such a tax 
reform 12. Here a parameter is taken from the paper of Wei (2000b) who 
estimates the responsiveness of FDI inflows to the statutory corporate income 
tax with a gravity FDI model. The details of the model are discussed in the 
Appendix to this Chapter. The responsiveness of FDI to tax can be specified as: 
8In(FDI) = t:.(FDI) = -0.032 
FDI x L\(tax) 8 (tax) 
(7.2) 
Wei's work covers bilateral FDI data from 14 source countries to 53 host 
economies (including China mainland), while other papers only examine the 
relationship between corporate income tax and FDJ flows of a single FDJ 
source country or recipient country (e.g. Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and 
Rice. 1994; Cassou, 1997; Ang, 2008). More importantly, this work is one of 
the very few papers which estimate the tax responsiveness for the FDI flow to 
I ~ ~ Such an endogeneity is similar to the practice adopted in a ('CiE Illodel (Gooroochurn and 
Milner, 2005), where tourist arrival is endogenously linked to the tax reform. 
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China. Another paper also by Wei (2000a) which covers 12 FDI source 
countries and 45 host countries, and a paper by Choi (2003) employing the 
same database of Wei (2000b), have both obtained highly close tax sensitivity 
values. Thus it is reasonable to employ the parameter (-0.032) in this model to 
capture the endogenous link between corporate income tax rate and FDI intlow 
amount in China. 
Four types of tax reforms are simulated. In the first scenario there are no 
FDI productivity spillovers, and only the corporate income tax rate for foreign 
firms increases by 40% (hereafter "single-sided re.liJrm without .\pil/o\'ers"). In 
the second scenario there are no FDI productivity spillovers. the corporate 
income tax rate for foreign firms increases by 40%. and the tax rate for 
domestic firms decreases by 24.2% (hereafter "integrated re.limn wit/Will 
. ~ p i l l o v e r s " ) . . In the third scenario there are FDI productivity spillovers. and 
only the corporate income tax rate for foreign firms increases by 40% 
(hereatter "single-sided reform with !)pillovers"). In the fourth scenario there 
are FDI productivity spillovers, the corporate income tax rate for fon:ign tirms 
increases by 40%, and the tax rate for domestic firms decreases by 24.2% 
(hereafter "integrated reform with !)pillovers"). The above tax rate changes wi 11 
be captured by changing the values of parameter TAXREF(a) in equation 
(AS.3.!). For example, this parameter value for the foreign enterprises in 
"electronic and electric products" sector can be obtained as: 
(a) calculate the income tax rate using equation (7.1). and we get 0.75%: 
(b) calculate the tax increment: 0.75%x40%=0.3%. 
All of the above reforms are accompanied with endogenolls FDI inflow 
reduction. From equation (7.2) we know that the percentage change of FDI 
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inflow follows: 
!!:.(FDI) = -0.032 x ~ ( t u x ) )
FDI 
(7.3) 
For example, in the "electronic and electric products" Sl.!ctor, FDI volumc 
will decrease by 0.032x[25 (%, new tax rate)-1O.3 (%. old tux rate)1 :cc 0.47 
(%). 
This reduces FDI inflow, and will result in a lower foreign prescm;c in 
terms of the proportion of output produced by foreign firms in the total output 
produced by all types of firms. This will make the channels (i.e. hackward and 
forward linkages, export of the foreign enterprises, and horizontal clTccts) of 
FDI productivity spillovers shrink. and reduce the mugnitude of FDJ 
productivity spillovers, as captured by equation (5.8). 
The domestic capital stock is assumed fixed in this static CGE model. As 
the output prices of products by foreign enterprises are higher aftcr the retlmn. 
the cost of intermediate products used by doml.!stic enterprises will also he 
higher. At the same time, facing higher corporate income taxes. the returns to 
capital and labour in foreign enterprises will be lower. This will consequently 
lead to a lower price of primary inputs of domestic enterprises due to the 
transformability between foreign and domestic capital. Therdl)re. the impact of 
single-sided reform on domestic enterprises will be jointly determined hy the 
above three possible effects, namely a smaller magnitude of FDI productivity 
spillovers, higher intermediate input costs. and lower primary input costs. But 
overall, single-sided reform will increase the uverage national tax rate level. 
and therefore reduce the welfare level. This model adopts a fiscal-neutral 
government closure rule (see Section 5.3.2), i.e. the fiscal deficit is financed hy 
borrowing a fixed amount of commodities from the households, and the 
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government spending is endogenously determined subject to the exogenous tax 
rate level (to be changed in counterfactual simulations in this Sl:ction). Thl.! 
government closure is so designed that the change of welfare. measun:d by the 
total amount of consumption goods and services available for the households 
and government, can be./ully attributed to the tax reform. 
An integrated tax reform not only raises the taxes of foreign enterprises but 
also reduces the taxes of domestic enterprises. This will complkate the net 
impact of the tax reform on the total output of domestic cntl;!rprises in that it 
can increase the returns to the capital and labour used by domestic enterprises. 
In terms of the FDI productivity spillovers. the impact of such a tax retorm still 
tends to be negative due to similar reasons. The sign of the national weltare 
change with an integrated tax reform can not easily be predicted. 
Fiscal revenue will also change accordingly. In the model. thl;! other tax 
rates. i.e. the average output overall tax rates. as denoted by NTP (a) in 
equation (AS.3.1). are assumed to be fixed. Due to the nonlinear relationship 
between tax rate and tax revenue suggested by the LatTer curve. the sign of tax 
revenue change can not be predicted ex ante either. and the diflcrent changing 
directions of tax rates over domestic (up) and foreign (down) enterprises also 
leave this as an empirical problem. 
Table 7.5 reports the numerical results from scenario (a) only. To make the 
results from four scenarios more easily comparable. Table 7.6 reports only the 
signs of the results out of four scenarios. 
Table 7.6 contains four panels. Panel (a) (b), (c). and (d) report the results 
from the scenarios of "single-sided re./iJrm wilholll spil!oV(!/'s", "integrated 
reform without spillovers", "single-sided re.fiJrm with .\pi!/overs". and 
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"integrated reform with spillovers", respectively. By compari ng the results In 
these four panels, we may have the following four main findings: 
(l) The difference between the scenarios with single-sided ami 
integrated reforms. The economy before the tax reform is already distorted 
with corporate taxes. Single-sided reform simply rai es the tax rale on fo reign 
enterpri ses, leaves the economy even more di storted , ancl reduces we lfare . 
However the integrated reform not onl y raise the tax rate n forei gn 
enterprises, but also lowers the tax rate on domesti c enterpri ses and improves 
national welfare. The production ca le of I:.s and Private enterpri ses an: 
negatively impacted in the single-sided reform , while pos itive ly alreeled in the 
integrated reforms. 
Table 7.5: Effects of Corporntc Income Tnx Reform: Scenario (a) 
(% changes, singIe-sided refo rm without ~ ~ l l o v e r s ) )
Perfect Mo"opolistic: Firm 
competitioll competitio" 11 eferol!e"eity 
0 11 tpll t All -0.17 -0 .18 -0.19 
FlEs -0.72 -0 .75 -0 .8 
SOEs 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Private 0.05 0.04 0.06 
Variety All -0.05 -0. 10 
FlEs Not applicahle -0.67 -0.40 SOEs 0.09 -0 .07 
Private 0.11 -0.05 
Scale All -0 .02 0.07 
FlEs Not appl icabl ' -0. 11 -0.4 SOEs -0.01 0.12 
Private -0 .03 0.15 
Productivity All 0.02 
FlEs Not applicable 0.0 1 SOEs 0.02 
Privale 0.02 
Spillovers SOEs Not applicable Privale 
Total tax revellue -0. 19 -0 .20 
-0 .2 1 
Corporate i"come tax revel/lie 11 .87 11 .86 11 .82 
Welfare 
-0.40 -0.42 -003 7 
GDP 
-0. 14 -0 .16 -0.14 
" 
. . 
" . Note : ( I) productI VIty I ll1du try- level productIVIty, measured by the denomlll<lt or of 
fraction (5 .8); (2) "spillovers" measures how the irnpol1ance or productivity ptll over ' in 
domestic enterpri ses ' TFP changes, as measured by eq uation (5 .8); ( ) Parameter or Paret 
distribution (domestic firm s) 0=3.4, b=0.2, a=3.8; parameters of Pareto distribution 
(foreign-invested firms) 0=3.4, b=OJ, a=3.8. Ela ticity of transformalion of capi tal ancl labour 
(rK' rd = (2 .0, 0.5). (4) "Not app licable" means that Ihe va lue of Ihe corre ponding variab le 
are not obtainable. 
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Table 7.6: Effects of Corporate Incom e Tax Rcf()rm (,X.) 
(a) single-sided reform _vithoUl spillo \ el's 
Perfect MOII(}polMic Firm 
competitioll competition IlI!terogelleit I' 
Output All -
- -
FlEs 
- - -
SOEs + 
Private + 
-+- I 
Va riety All - -
FIEI' Not applicable - -SOEs -
Private j ' 
-
SC{tie All 
-
j 
FlEs Not applicable - -SOEs 
-
j 
Private - + 
Pr(}ductivity All I 
FIEs Not applicable SOEs I 
Private j ~ ~
Spil/overs SOEs Not appli 'ohl > Private 
Total tax revenue - - -
Corporate illcome t(lX revellue I 
Welfare - - -
GDP - - -
(b) integrated reforlll without !Jpil/over,\' 
Perfect NI (JII ( 1)(1 lis tic Firm 
competition c()n1petitioll lH!terOj{ellei!J!. 
Output All - - j 
FIEs -
-
-
SOEs ~ ~
Private + + -
VlIrie(v All - + 
FlEs Not app/i obl > - -SOEs I-
Private + I 
Scale All -
FlEs Not appli 'abl - -SOEs j 
Private + 
_-I 
Productivity All + 
FlEs Not Ippli 'oh!e SOEs 
Private + 
Spil/over,'i SOEs Not opp/i 'uh!e Private 
Towl tax revellu e 
-
- -
Corporate ill come t(L,( revenue 
- - -
Welfare 
GDP 
-
-
-"'"-
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(e) single-sided reform with spillovers 
Perfect MOllopolistic Firm 
competitioll cOlIlJ!J!titioll IIetero}:elleity 
Du tpll t All - - -
FIEs - 0 0 
SOEs I· 
Private 0 
-
0 
Variety All 0 0 
FIEs Not app/icabl ' 0 0 SOEs t 0 
Private t- o 
Scale All - ., 
FlEs Not applicahl ' 0 0 SOEs 0 ,I 
Private 0 ., 
Productivity All Not Ipplicabl ' t FlEs I" 
SOEs 0 0 t 
Private 0 0 oj 
Spil/o vers SOEs . 0 0 
Private . 0 0 
Total /(Ix revenlle 0 0 0 
Corporate income tax reve//lI e I· 
Welfare 0 0 0 
GDP 0 0 0 
(d) integrated ref orm with spil/overs 
Perfect Mo//opolistic Fir", 
compelitio// competitio// heterogelleifr 
011 tpll t All 0 . t-
FIE.\" 0 0 0 
SOEs 
Private + + 0 
Variety All 0 
FlEs Not appli ahle 
0 0 
SOEs 
Private + 1 
Scale All 0 0 
FlEs Not appli 'able 
0 0 
SOEs + 
Private ~ ~ + 
Prodllctivi()1 All Not app/i 'abl ' 1-FlEs 
SOEs 0 0 
Private 0 0 + 
Spil/(}vers SOEs 0 0 0 
Private 0 0 0 
Total tax reve//lI e 0 0 0 
Corporate income tllX revel/Il l! 0 0 0 
Welfare + 
GDP 0 
- ~ ~
Note: same a Tab le 7,5. 
024 0 
(2) The difference between the scenarios with and without spillovers. 
The results are almost the same with or without spillovers. The only di tTerencc 
is the total output of Private enterprises in Panel (a) and (c). Thl!ir output is 
negatively affected in the scenario with spillovers while positively affhtcd in 
the scenario without spillovers. The reason for this seemingly countcrintuitivc 
result can be explained by the competition between the SOEs and Private 
enterprises. With a single-sided tax reform. the prices of intermediate inputs are 
higher while the prices of primary inputs become lower. When there arc no 
productivity spillovers, Private enterprises appear to benefit from such a reform. 
However, when there exist spillovers. SOEs benefit more from the spillovers 
than the Private enterprises do, so that SOEs attract resources from the Private 
enterprises, making the latter lose from the spillovers. 
(3) The comparison between the three alternative assumptions about 
industry structure. We need to keep in mind that any structure alone can not 
reflect the whole picture of an economy: some industries tend to be perfectly 
competitive as they produce highly homogeneous products, e.g "petroleum 
processing and coking", and "textile"; some industries are more monopolistic 
competitive as their products are idiosyncratic and the number of firms is 
relatively small, e.g. "transport equipment"; and finally some industries could 
be closer to the assumption of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous 
productivity, such as the "electronic and electric products" industry hosting a 
very high level of product variety and the largest number of firms in China. 
Therefore, the main purpose of spotting the difJerence between the above three 
alternative market structure assumptions is not to identify which assumption is 
"superior" to the others, but to get a sense of the range of possible outcomes. 
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The simulations in the scenario of perfect competition can provide results 
of output, productivity of domestic enterprises, spillovers, welfare, and GDP. 
Simulations in the scenario of monopolistic competition can provide further 
details of variety and production scale. Simulations in the scenario or firm 
heterogeneity can capture not only the above variables, but also the 
productivity changes of both domestic firms and foreign firms. 
The results of the productivity of domestic firms, output, productivity 
spillovers, welfare, and GDP are similar in the tirst two market structures. But 
the results under firm heterogeneity are different from those ohtained in the 
previous two market structures to some extent. For example, in pand (a) and 
(c), the variety of SOEs and Private enterprises are positiVely allccted under 
monopolistic competition while negatively affected under firm heterogeneity. 
Similar contrast applies to the changes of scale under monopolistic competition 
and firm heterogeneity. However, the above contrasts are consistent with those 
discussed in Section 6.4.2 and reflected in Table 6.14 in Chapter 6. 
Another difference between the scenario of firm heterogeneity and the 
other two alternative market structures is the change of productivity of 
domestic firms under the above three scenarios. The productivity change is 
positive under firm heterogeneity while negative under the other two scenarios. 
Such an "inconsistency" can be explained by the different specification of 
"productivity". Under perfect and monopolistic competition, productivity is 
denoted by a, + jJ x SPL in equation (5.8). so that the productivity of 
domestic firms is directly dependent on the presence of foreign firms. llowevcr 
under firm heterogeneity, productivity is an endogenous variable denoted by 
equation (5.30) in the partial equilibrium module. and it is only indirectly 
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linked with the foreign presence. In this sense, the "productivity" denoted by 
a, + p x SPL may not capture the actual information of domestic finns' 
productivity as fully as the "productivity" variable denoted by equation (5.30) 
under firm heterogeneity. 
A comparison of panel (b) and (d) shows diflcrences in total output and 
GDP. These two variables increase under firm heterogeneity whik they 
decrease under the other two alternative market structures. This is also because 
the assumption of firm heterogeneity makes the model capture the productivity 
changes in a different way. When there are no spillovers (scenario (b)). firm 
productivity is endogenously modelled under firm hcterogcneity and can aflect 
the output and GDP explicitly. while productivity takes the benchmark value of 
1 under perfect competition and monopolistic competition. When there are 
spillovers (scenario (d)), as discussed the productivity of domestic firms will 
decrease under perfect competition and monopolistic competition as it is 
directly affected by the weaker presence of foreign firms. But the productivity 
of all firms improves under firm heterogeneity. which is beneficial to total 
output and GDP. 
Finally, total government tax revenue unanimously decreases in the above 
four scenarios. Although the corporate income tax revenue decreases in 
integrated reforms, but it increases in single-sided reforms. That is to say, given 
the model assumptions, a lower corporate income tax rate over foreign firms 
indeed reduced the tax revenue collected from the foreign firms. 
(4) The relationship between corporate income tax reform and Fnl 
productivity spillovers, i. e. the soundness of the strategy "swapping market 
access for technology". As retlected by the "spillovers" rows in panel (c) and 
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(d), neither single-sided reform nor integrated rl!l'orm can increase the 
proportion of the productivity spilt over from foreign firms to domestic firms in 
total productivity of domestic enterprises, as denoted by equation (5.8). This is 
because that, with a higher corporate income tax rate, the output of foreign 
firms decreases, so that their input-output linkages with domestil: firms arc also 
weakened. That is to say, all of the four spillover channels (backward linkages. 
forward linkages, export of foreign firms, and horizontal efl'ccts) shrink. via 
which FDI productivity spillovers take place. The above result also implies that 
the original dual corporate income tax system was indeed good for the FDI 
productivity spillovers to occur in that it helped strengthen the foreign presenl:e. 
which is vital for FDI productivity spillovers. 
However the above conclusion derived from this slatic (,GF model might 
need to be modified if we situate this problem in a ( ~ v n { / m i c c perspective. First 
of all, with the integrated corporate income tax reform, the productivity of 
domestic firms is higher than before under firm heterogeneity in all of the four 
scenarios. This implies that the domestic firms have acquired better absorptive 
capacity to exploit the FDI productivity spillovers (Girma, 2005: Blake. Deng 
and Falvey, 2009). Secondly, in scenario (b) and (d), the average productivity 
of the foreign firms surviving the integrated tax reform is higher. This implies a 
greater likelihood of productivity spillovcrs. Therefore. taking into 
consideration the changing pattern of productivity under tirm heterogeneity, the 
tax reform will only temporarily lower the FDI productivity spillover effects. 
They can promote the speed and magnitude of spillovers later, i.e. a ".I-curve" 
effect of tax reform on productivity spillovers may exist. 
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7.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter simulates the impact of corporate income tax n:form in ~ 0 0 8 8
on the FDI productivity spillover effect in China. 
It introduces the major tax incentives to attract FDI in China. and discusses 
the cost and benefit of such preferential FDI treatment. The results or the tax 
reform simulations show that the original dual corporate income tax system 
was indeed good for the FDI productivity spillovers to occur in that it helped 
strengthen the foreign presence which is vital for FDI productivity spillovers. 
A higher corporate income tax levied on foreign-invested enterprises alone 
distorts the economy's structure and lowers total output. w e l l ~ l r e . . and GDP. 
However an integrated tax reform formula can do a better job by increasing the 
output level of domestic enterprises and by promoting national wellan:. Under 
firm heterogeneity, the spillover benefit of integrated reform is even mOl'e 
prominent, because the reform can raise the average productivity of all existing 
enterprises. and raises the possibility of productivity spillovers and the 
absorptive capacity of domestic enterprises. This is more bcnelicial to the 
productivity spillovers from foreign-invested firms to domestic enterprises. 
Neither single-sided reform nor integrated reform can increase the 
proportion of the productivity spilt over from foreign firms to domestic firms in 
total productivity of domestic enterprises. Taking into consideration the 
changing pattern of productivity under firm heterogeneity. the tax reform will 
only temporarily lower the FDI productivity spillover etli;:cts. however it may 
promote the speed and magnitude of spillovers later. 
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APPENDIX: AN FDI GRAVITY MODEL BY WE) (2000b) 
The Model 
Wei (2000b) performed an analysis over whether local corruption levels 
will affect FDI inflows with an FDI gravity model: 
log[ F DI(kJ') ]=L/u(i)D(i)+f5 ItaX(j )+f52corrupl ion(;)+ X(;')O Z(kJ)y e(kJ) 
where FD I(kJ) is the bilateral stock of FOr by source country k in host 
country j; DU) is a source-country dummy variable which takes the va lue of I 
if the source country is i , and 0 otherwise; /ax(;') is the corporate income tax 
rate in the jth host country; corruption(;') measures the corrupti on level in the 
jth host country; X(j) is a vector of other characteri sti cs of the jth host country 
e.g. GDP per capita, FOI incentives and restrictions, government de fi cit · Z(k,j) 
is a vector of characteri stics specific to the source country-host country pair, 
e.g. geographic distance, exchange rate volatili ty, lingui stic ti e; e(k,j) is an 
independently and identically di stributed error that follows a normal 
distribution; and u(i), f51, f52, () , and y are parameters to be estimated. 
Data Sources of Key Variables 
BILATERAL FDI FLOWS: OECD. International DireCI In veSlmenl Statistics 
Yearbook 1998. Average value over 1994-1 996. In millions of Doll ars, 
converted usmg yearly average exchange rates from annex IH of the 
publication. 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE: It takes the percentage value, rather than 
the proportional value. For example, if the tax ra te in country i is 28%, the 
corresponding vari able takes 28 rather than 0.28 in the econometric regress ion. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000). Doing Business and Investing Worldwide 
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(CD-ROM). New York. 
FDI INCENTIVES AND RESTRICTIONS: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000). 
Doing Business and Investing Worldwide (CD-ROM). Nt:w York. An "FDI 
incentive" index (dummy variable) is created to capture the following four 
disincentives specific to foreign firms: industry and geographic i n c ~ n t i v ~ s . . lax 
concessions, nontax concessions, export incentives. For example. China adopls 
three out of the above four incentives (with nontax concessions excluded). so 
the index takes the value of"3" for China. Similarly, an "FDI restriction" index 
(also dummy variable) is created to capture the following four disincentives 
specific to foreign firms: foreign exchange controls, exclusion from strategic 
sectors, exclusion from other sectors, and restrictions on ownership share. For 
example, China adopts all of the above four restrictions, so the index takes the 
value of "4" for China. 
DISTANCE: Great Circle distance, in kilometres, between economic centres 
(usually the capital cities) of country pairs. 
GCR CORRUPTION INDEX: Global Competitiveness Report J 997 (World 
Economic Forum and Harvard Institute for International Development. 1997). 
WDR CORRUPTION INDEX: World Bank, World Development Repor' 1997 
(World Bank, 1997) 
GDP PER CAPITA: World Bank SIMA/GDF and WDI central database. 
EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: International Monetary Fund. International 
Financial Statistics. 
Selected Estimation Results 
As shown in Table AI, there exists a negative corrdatiol1 between 
corporate income tax rate and FDI inflow in model (4-1) and (4-2). This 
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correlation is robust against addition of a China dummy variable (mode l (6-1 ) 
and (6-2» . In the CGE model, a ln(FDI ) = l!.(FDI ) = -0.032 is taken a 
a(tax) FDI x l!.( lax) 
a parameter of the responsiveness of FOr now to corporate income tax rate 
change. 
Table A 7.1: Selected Estimation Results 
Model (4-1) (4-2) (6-1) (6-2) 
Corporate income tax rate -0.028** -0.032** -0.035** -0.039** 
(0.0 11) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Corruption -0.337** -0.280** -0.39 1** -0.334** 
(0.068) (0.070) (0.071 ) (0.076) 
FDI incentives 0.410** 0.448 "'* 
(0.093) (0.059) 
FDI restrictions -0.337** -0 .3 16** 
(0.058) (0.059) 
Log CD? 0.864** 0.862** 0.9 11 ** 0.906** 
(0.049) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) 
Log CD? per capila -0.038 -0.019 -0.156* -0. 111 
(0.078) (0.085) (0.092) (0.097) 
Log dislance -0.577** -0.553** -0.585** -0 .563 ** 
(0 .062) (0.061 ) (0 .061 ) (0 .061 ) 
Linguistic lie 1.5 16** 1.437** 1.454** 1.394** 
(0.2 16) (0.2 10) (0.2 17) (0.2 11 ) 
China dummy -1.092* * -0.887* 
(0.442) (0.459) 
Adj. R- 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.73 
Obs. 658 628 658 628 
Note: (a) Dependent variable IS the logarithm of bilateral FDI va lue. (b) Standard errors in 
parentheses. ** denotes significance at 5% level, * denotes significance at 10% leve l. (c) The 
"corporate income tax rate" takes the percentage va lue. rather than the original va lue. For 
example, if the tax rate in country i is 28%, the corresponding variab le takes 28 rather than 
0.28 in the econometric regression. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
8.1. SUMMARY 
Research Questions 
One of the most important aspec ts of foreign direc t investment (F DI ) is 
that it embodies advanced technologies and business practices which can spill 
over to domestic firms via various channels, e.g. labour mobility, backward and 
fo rward linkages, export of multinational affi liates, and hori zontal effects. To 
pursue the benefit of FDI productivity spillovers, many deve loping countries 
adopt preferential FDI policies characterized by "swapping domesti c market 
access fo r advanced fo reign technology and producti vity". 
However it is debated in the literature on (a) how to quantitati ve ly measure 
FDI productivity spillovers as an economy-wide and cross-industry 
phenomenon rather than a region- and sector-specific one; and Cb) whether 
preferential FDJ policies can help productivity spillovers. This research, which 
is provoked by the above two intriguing questions, has mainly addre sed the 
fo llowing research questions: (a) how to quanti fy the FDI productivity 
spillovers in a CGE model; (b) how to model the spillovers under three 
alternati ve market structure assumptions, namely perfec t competition, 
monopolisti c competition with homogeneous firms and heterogeneous fi rms; 
and (c) how the 2008 corporate income tax reform has impacted the FDI 
producti vity spillover effects. 
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Model Construction 
The research combines computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling 
and econometric techniques to quantify FDI productivity spillovers. This 
research is conducted in the context of the Chinese economy, considering the 
fact that China has been the largest FDI host country among the developing 
economies for the past 15 years. 
A static lOl-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is 
constructed to measure the endogenous productivity spillovers of FDI in China. 
Spillover effects are analyzed under three different market structure 
assumptions, namely perfect competition, monopolistic competition, and 
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms. 
First, the input-output flows of state-owned, private and foreign-invested 
enterprises are disaggregated from the original input-output table for China 
which did not contain ownership information. In the benchmark model four 
FDI spillover channels (backward linkages, forward linkages, MNE exporting, 
and horizontal demonstration) are endogenously incorporated in a perfectly 
competitive economy. When the model is simulated to counterfactuals, the 
spillover variables will change endogenously, making productivity spil10vers 
change endogenously as well. Spillover parameters are estimated with Chinese 
industry-level panel data. Other parameters are taken from OTAP 6 database 
and the literature. 
Second, in the intermediate model, monopolistic competition is modelled 
to explore how market competition affects the effects of FDI productivity 
spillovers. 
Third, firm heterogeneity has also been incorporated into this model. 
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examining how competition and intra-industry resource reallocation triggered 
by multinational firms improve industry-level aggregate productivities. The 
importance of firm heterogeneity, as a newly explored market structure, in 
modelling trade and FDI has been widely acknowledged. 
Fourth, the CGE model is simulated in the above three market structure 
scenarios with an FDI shock, and the results are compared. 
Finally. experiments of FDI policy reform counterfactuals are also 
conducted. The experiments simulate a harmonisation of corporate income tax 
rates over domestic and foreign-invested enterprises. These counterfactuals are 
of great policy significance not only to China but also to other economies, as 
countries have "increasingly" relied on tax incentives to attract FDI. 
Methodologically, this research introduces three novelties. Firstly it is the 
first to endogenise the FDI spillovers by linking spillover effects to spillover 
channels. Secondly this research is the first to examine FDI spillovers under 
the market structures of monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity. 
Finally, this research has also assessed the impact of corporate income tax 
harmonisation on FDI productivity spillovers. 
Main Findings and Policy Implication 
The research results show that the presence of FDI productivity spillovers 
has generally improved productivity and led to "spillover premium" effects of 
the total output of domestic enterprises in China. Spillovers make foreign 
firms' total output decrease. But collectively, spillovers exert positive impact 
on national aggregate variables, i.e. GDP, total output. and welfare. 
The market structure assumptions of monopolistic competition and firm 
heterogeneity provide special insights (e.g. in terms of product variety and 
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scale) for this research which the assumption of perfect competition can not do. 
Furthermore, the assumption of firm heterogeneity can provide a more 
comprehensive measurement of productivity change than perfect and 
monopolistic competition assumptions do. 
A higher corporate income tax levied on foreign-invested enterprises alone 
distorts the economy structure and lowers total output, welfare, and GDP. 
However an integrated tax reform formula can do a better job by increasing the 
output level of domestic enterprises and by promoting national welfare. Under 
firm heterogeneity, the spillover benefit of integrated reform is even more 
prominent, because the reform can lift up the average productivity of all 
existing enterprises, and raises the possibility of productivity spillovers and the 
absorptive capacity of domestic enterprises. This is more beneticial to the 
productivity spillovers from foreign-invested firms to domestic enterprises. 
Neither single-sided reform nor integrated reform can increase the 
proportion of the productivity spilt over from foreign firms to domestic tirms in 
total productivity of domestic enterprises. Taking into consideration the 
changing pattern of productivity under firm heterogeneity, the tax reform will 
only temporarily lower the FDI productivity spillover effects, however it can 
promote the speed and magnitude of spillovers later. 
In Chapter 2, we have reviewed the literature and found few papers 
studying the effects of FDI productivity spillovers with CGE models. The 
findings in this research are generally in line with those found in the broad 
literature. For example, the net productivity spillover effects of FDI can 
promote GDP, national output and welfare, which is consistent with the 
findings of van Meijl and van Tongeren (1998) and Lejour, Rojas-Romagosa 
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and Verweij (2008). Another example is the tax reform experiments which 
imply that the "swapping market access for technology" policy was likely a 
success in China. This is also consistent with the stylised facts regarding this 
policy collected by Long (2005). However, as this research is methodologically 
novel and involves new research perspectives, many of its findings do not have 
their counterparts in the literature to compare with. 
8.2. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Dynamic modelling. This research is based on a static computable general 
equilibrium model. However the accumulation of foreign capital and its 
subsequent productivity spillovers is a dynamic process. Therefore it would be 
more appealing to study the FDI productivity spillovers and their economic 
growth etfects in a dynamic COE model. 
Social accounting matrix (SAM). The COE model constructed here is 
based on a transformed Chinese input-output table containing an intermediate 
input-output block, a value added block, and a final demand block, as shown 
by Table 3.4. As the primary concern of this research is on the supply side 
rather than the demand side of the economy, the input-output table was not 
extended to a SAM to contain further information on transactions between 
non-producer agents. But with a SAM the COE model could provide more 
detailed measurement of domestic consumption demand and investment 
demand, and thus making the simulation results more accurate. 
Firm-level data. This COE model mainly addresses the interaction 
between foreign enterprises and their domestic counterparts. More accurate 
spill over parameters (jJ in equation (5.6b» and Pareto distribution parameters 
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(a and b in equation (5.29)) can be estimated with firm-level data. More 
importantly, firm-level data can be used to implement more interesting 
micro-simulation experiments under the assumption of firm heterogeneity. 
Rutherford and Tarr (2008) have used data from 55,000 Russian households 
and incorporated them into a COE model. Their research shows the importance 
of incorporating the diversity of heterogeneous agents. 
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